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Abstract 
The centrality to philosophy of the relation between philosophers and artists is as old 
as philosophy itself. Regardless of whether one accepts Arthur C. Danto's claim that 
'philosophy down the ages has consisted in placing codicils to the platonic testament' , . 
it is difficult to ignore the challenge the ancient Greek thinker posed when he 
excluded artists from his Republic. My thesis takes up this challenge head-on, 
critically asking why a philosopher would take an artist seriously, why addressing 
artists is so essential to engaging with society and even the world. 
As it turns out, this question itself involves several queries. The first wants to 
understand what it means to take someone seriously at all, to understand that to take 
seriously is to run the risk of taking too seriously, and thereby to fall into ridicule. 
The second links these insights into seriousness' non-seriousness to the particular case 
of philosophers and artists. This is to recognize that for a philosopher the recourse to 
the artist is a claim about the seriousness, not just of the artist, but also of the world 
itself. It is the claim that our conception of the world is at stake, is serious. Thirdly, 
we must account for the model of art and artists in this conception, and grasp that the 
exemplarity of artists is simultaneously their counter-exemplarity. As such, the 
exemplarity of the artist is indeed his inappropriateness to the Republic, but also the 
basis for there being any Republic at all. 
In order to address these queries, the thesis focuses on three prototypical examples: 
Friedrich Nietzsche on Richard Wagner, Martin Heidegger on Friedrich Holderlin, 
and Theodor Adorno on Arnold Schonberg. In all three cases, the recourse to the 
artist is central to the philosopher's greater philosophical project, and for each, the 
artist stands as a potential model for our necessary engagement with the world. 
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Why would a philosopher take an artist seriously? 
Introduction 
In his essay 'The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art' , Arthur C. Danto grapples 
with the often contradictory and sometimes even conflictual relation between 
philosophy and art. Very much inspired by the thinking of Hegel on the end of art, he 
notes how often art falls short in its political aspirations, how little a work of art like 
Guernica is able to ward off the suffering it represents, to what extent works of art 
constitute 'a kind of cenotaph to house the fading memories' 1 of historical events. 
But as he himself subsequently questions, 'if the sole political role of poetry is this 
deflected, consolatory, ceremonial-not to say, reliquary-office, why is it so widely 
subscribed a political attitude that art is dangerous?' And he goes on: 
'The history of art is the history of the suppression of art, itself a kind of 
futility if that which one seeks to cast in chains has no effectiveness 
whatever, and one confers upon art the illusion of competence by treating 
as dangerous what would make nothing happen if it were allowed to be 
free. Where ... does the belief in the dangerousness of art come from? My 
own view ... is that it does not come from historical knowledge, but rather 
from a philosophical belief. .. the history of philosophy itself might almost 
be regarded as a massive collaborative effort to neutralize an activity'. 2 
One does not have to share in the conspiratorial attitude of this passage to see that 
Danto's question is well-placed. It is, indeed, a bit odd at times the lengths to which 
philosophy has gone to sideline art-one need only think of the much maligned artists 
of the Republic. However, perhaps we should be less concerned with saving art from 
philosophy, as seems to be Danto's project,3 than simply trying to understand why 
philosophy takes art so seriously in the first place. 
In this spirit, we can take a recent example, and look at what happens when a 
philosopher-and incidentally, a philosopher not generally known for his engagement 
1 Danto, Arthur C. 'The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art', p. 4. 
2 Ibid. 
3 As we will see in the first chapter, a separation of art and philosophy is also Alain Badiou' s 
aspiration. However, in his view a 'desuturing' of art and philosophy would first and foremost be of 
benefit to the latter. 
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with art-namely Donald Davidson, is challenged by an artist, namely Robert Morris, 
to take art seriously. The way in which Morris frames this challenge is to cite 
Davidson's philosophical writings in the context of a series of drawings made with 
the eyes closed entitled Blind Time Drawings. Why, we must ask, does Davidson not 
simply ignore the drawings, just shrug off their gesture as irrelevant to his 
philosophy? Why, in other words, does he overcome his misgivings and respond to 
the drawings in his essay 'The Third Man'? That he himself struggles with these 
questions seems evident from his initial query: 'What am I doing here?,4 
His answer, moreover, does nothing to dispel the ambiguity of his position. What he 
says is as follows: 'what is my work doing here? I hazard this answer: it expands the 
background against which we encounter Morris' "actions"'. 5 Such an answer just 
begs the question. It refuses to address the paradox of how philosophy can be both 
part of art-as an element of Morris ' drawings6-and the background against which 
we understand this art. Referring to the marks in the drawings, Davidson describes 
these 'actions' as illustrations of philosophical texts. But why are they illustrative of 
philosophical texts rather than the activity ofthe artist himself? Or if they are 
illustrative of both, what does it say about the relation between the philosophy and art 
involved? Davidson does not address these questions, because he never 
acknowledges the way in which his philosophical texts-including the very text he 
writes in response to the drawings-lose their independence, and become part of the 
art they are supposedly commenting upon. This happens moreover, because, in 
writing 'The Third Man', Davidson assumes that Morris takes his philosophy wholly 
seriously. He assumes that there is some meaning invested in the appearance of his 
philosophy in Blind Time Drawings. Just the same, it may indeed be that the artist's 
seriousness actually depends upon the philosopher's response, and that because 
Davidson ignores this irony, he himself paradoxically risks taking Morris too 
seriously. 
4 Davidson, Donald. 'The Third Man', p. 607. 
5 Ibid, p. 614. 
6 Davidson himself underscores the degree to which his words are part of the drawings, when he 
enumerates the 'four clearly distinguished elements' of these pictures, and names the 'fragments of a 
philosophical discussion of the general nature of action' as the fourth (p. 613). 
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Why this might be so is due to the paradox of taking seriously, which is the following: 
that we can never know why we take something seriously unless we are already 
taking it seriously, but because we are already taking it seriously, we cannot get the 
perspective needed in order to know why we took it seriously in the first place. In 
other words, we are blind in the moment we first take something seriously, and yet it 
is only this moment that can explain our engagement. This is what makes Davidson's 
dilemma so poignant: by his acknowledgement of the appearance of his texts in 
Morris' drawings, he is already engaged in art, already taking it seriously, before he 
even has a chance to pose the question Why. Such a temporal disjunction leaves the 
philosopher trying to justify afait accompli, and as such it is no wonder that he 
decides to make necessity of need and ignore the possibilities for self-parody lurking 
in the gestures of both himself and the artist. 
And yet, this ironic potential is necessary if philosophy is not going to degrade to the 
level of captions. If Davidson is indeed reasonable in hoping that the citations from 
his writings 'hint at [a] larger canvas' of 'communal assumptions and ideas' ,7 then he 
is also committed to philosophy's own implication in this 'larger canvas', its own 
submission to the demands of this greater community. Philosophy very often assumes 
an authoritarian position vis-a.-vis its objects, and yet for it to have any significance at 
all, it must share their fate. For this reason, Davidson will never be able to 
definitively decide to what extent Morris' blind drawings are serious, and to what 
extent they are tongue in cheek, and as such, he will remain in the risible position of 
never really knowing where he stands in relation to works he is already a part of As 
a philosopher, he must continue to ask why.he takes an artist seriously, even though, 
and of course also because, he will never have the comfort of a definitive response. 
Perhaps it is the open-ended nature of such a situation that has drawn so many 
philosophers and thinkers to the question of the relation between philosophy and art, 
or then again, perhaps it is something quite different-the chance to showcase one's 
own artistic talents, or even the opportunity to engage in a little irony and humour-
but whatever the individual motivations, the resulting literature is both substantial and 
strangely divided. The division follows precisely that which distinguishes the two 
7 Ibid, p. 615. 
Julie Kuhlken Page 8 
Why would a philosopher take an artist seriously? 
texts we have just outlined: whereas, Danto purports to deal with the relation between 
philosophy and art as a whole, Davidson offers a very particular example of a 
philosopher taking an artist seriously. Both of these approaches will be addressed in 
the dissertation. 
The first of these approaches focuses upon the degree to which art and philosophy are 
locked in an inextricable embrace. As such a view often points out, it is not simply 
the case that philosophy is indebted to art, it is also the case that art needs philosophy. 
Walter Biemel, for example, emphasizes this duality in his contribution to the 
literature: 
'By way of brief elucidation I should like to add some remarks concerning 
the significance of art for philosophy. The philosopher seeks to grasp the 
specific engagement of man which upholds his contact with the world. In 
taking note of art he is able to see how openness is experienced by the 
artist. In this way he can avoid the construction of an openness that is not 
there at all. On the other hand, philosophizing is important for art as well, 
since it must seek to make explicit the secret movement of artistic creation 
and in so doing decipher the hieroglyphics' .8 
As such, if we ask what constitutes the basis for the inseparability of art and 
philosophy, what we must answer is that together they detennine--or at least 
elucidate-'the specific engagement of man ... with the world'. But even if we are 
safe to say that art and philosophy are critical to man's place in the world, this still 
leaves us to wonder-and everyone must know where this is going-what man is and 
what constitutes a world. The latter in particular seems to elude Biemel. Whereas, 
man might be understood as regards his relation or belonging to the world, the world 
itself defies definition. As Biemel puts it, a philosopher 'wants to know what is 
involved in being human, what man's place is in the world, whatever "world" may 
mean,.9 
8 Biemel, Walter. 'On the Relation Between Art and Philosophy', p. 135. 
9 Ibid., p. 134. 
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Nevertheless, even if Biemel abdicates in the task of defining the world, his phrase 
does tells us something about it. Whatever the 'world' may mean, what it does mean 
is that meaning is essential to it. That is, in his approach and ones like it, the meaning 
of the world itself is at stake. Moreover, because such an assumption is so critical, we 
will give this world a name and call it a 'serious world'. The key aspect of this 
'serious world' is that it is believed, or at least hoped, that in questioning the ways of 
the world we will find answers. In other words, what a serious world assumes is that 
the world is susceptible to our questioning, that it is a riddle which one day the proper 
answer will make unfold just as does the world of Combray in the bottom of Proust's 
tea cup. But just as Proust's metaphor would indicate, such hope has bounds, and 
very serious ones at that. On the one hand, if a serious world is a world susceptible to 
our questioning, then to fully participate in it, we must question it. We cannot simply 
drift along thoughtlessly in its currents and still say that we are an active player in it. 
This exposes us to the demands of the necessity of questioning. However and on the 
other hand, these demands are both motivated and mitigated by a second determining 
aspect of a serious world: namely, the possibility of answering. That is, our 
submission to the necessity of questioning is predicated upon the hope that our 
questioning will indeed lead to ways of answering. 
We see this dual-action at work if we now tum back to the relation between 
philosophy and art. On the one side, a serious world can be dominated by the heady, 
hopeful motor of the possibility of answering. Such an aspirational world would 
require, just as Biemel does, that artists are in a unique position, that their experiences 
and activities are central to the meaning of all our lives. Artists would be the tragic 
heroes of such a serious world, their deeds faithfully recounted by philosophers 
attentive to the possibility of answering these deeds open up. On the other side, we 
have a serious world dominated by the relentless demands of the necessity of 
questioning, an ironic world in which philosophy and art echo each other much in the 
way Robert Morris' drawings assume Donald Davidson's response as much as they 
call for it. In such a world an artist is as blind as Morris is when he undertakes his 
Blind Time Drawing, but no more blind than the philosopher who rises to the 
challenge posed by them. 
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Moreover, we should recognise this pairing of tragic heroism with ironic questioning 
in the works of a number of philosophers, the most important of which are probably 
Soren Kierkegaard, Friedrich Nietzsche and Walter Benjamin. Kierkegaard is the 
author not only of Fear and Trembling, but also The Concept of Irony. Friedrich 
Nietzsche is not simply the thinker of the will to power~ he is also the author of The 
Gay Science. And Walter Benjamin's oeuvre is marked by his two lengthier historical 
investigations, The Origin of German TragiC Drama and Concept of Criticism in 
German Romanticism. In all three cases, an impulse toward the tragic heroic is pitted 
against an extreme awareness of the seriousness of irony. 10 For all three, if the world 
is truly at stake, if it really is a question of the seriousness of the world, both extremes 
are possible, both the darkest tragedy and the most ridiculous farce. 
We will start with the tragic heroic version, because it is perhaps easier to see how the 
world can be at stake in the case of tragedy. Walter Benjamin's understanding is a 
case in point 
'Tragic poetry is based on the idea of sacrifice. But in respect of its 
victim, the hero, the tragic sacrifice differs from any other kind, being at 
once a first and a final sacrifice. A final sacrifice in the sense of the 
atoning sacrifice to gods who are upholding an ancient right; a first 
sacrifice in the sense of the representative action, in which new aspects of 
the life of the nation become manifest. These are different from the old, 
fatal obligations in that they do not refer back to a command from above, 
but to the life of the hero himself~ and they destroy him because they do 
not measure up to the demands of the individual will, but benefit only the 
life of the, as yet unborn, national community. The tragic death has a dual 
significance: it invalidates the ancient rights of the Olympians, and it 
offers up the hero to the unknown god as the first fruits of a new harvest 
of humanity'. 11 
10 For the sake of brevity, we will focus in the introduction primarily on this split as it is developed in 
the work of Walter Benjamin. As for the other two, Friedrich Nietzsche's work will command much 
attention in the body of the thesis, and Seren Kierkegaard's work, though perhaps not given its full due, 
will be addressed in the accompanying argumentation. 
11 Benjamin, Walter. The Origin afGerman Tragic Drama, pp 106-7. 
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First off, this passage should allow us a better understanding of the tradition in which 
Walter Biemel is working when he makes his statements about the significance ofthe 
relation between philosophy and art. Philosophy refers to art, and in particular to 
tragic art, because art offers insight into man's tragic place in a serious world. Such 
references can be traced from Holderlin's meditations on Antigone, and Schlegel's 
analyses of Shakespeare, through Kierkegaard' s celebration of Mozart's Don 
Giovanni, Nietzsche's investigations into the birth of tragedy, and Freud's 
interpretation of the Oedipus myth, to Heidegger's lectures on Holderlin's hymns, 
Adorno's indefatigable defence of 'serious music', and Alain Badiou's musings upon 
an 'Age of Poets'. 
Secondly, in addition to identifying a tradition of philosophical writing on art, there is 
something else that this passage achieves: an understanding of the tragic hero. For if 
it is tragic art that is privileged in its conception of man's relation to the world, it is 
the tragic hero who occupies pride of place in such a vision. Moreover, when this 
understanding of the tragic hero combines with the Kantian notion of the genius-and 
its reworking by the German romantics--one arrives at the notion which will occupy 
our attention: namely, that of the tragic heroic artist. Possibly the most famous of 
tragic heroic artists is Richard Wagner as he is seen through Nietzsche's generous 
gaze in The Birth of Tragedy and 'Richard Wagner in Bayreuth'; however, as will be 
developed, Heidegger is equally prone to such idol ising in his treatment of Friedrich 
Holderlin, and Adorno in his advocacy of Arnold Schonberg. 
Luckily for the notion of a serious world, though, such idolising is only one half of the 
story. For as one can imagine, the notion of a tragic heroic artist, like any cult of the 
genius, is easily brought into question. Just the same, doesn't a tragic heroic world's 
susceptibility to critique play right into the notion of a serious world? Doesn't the 
latter's durability derive precisely from the fact that it is dual, and hinges upon a 
necessity of questioning just as much as upon a possibility of answering? As we said 
above, a serious world is as much a world of irony as it is a tragic heroic one. And 
what we shall see is that, if a tragic heroic artist represents one aspect of a serious 
world of philosophy and art, it is irony in the guise of a blind poet that affirms the 
other. In fact, the very same artists who ply the boards as tragic heroic artists can 
reveal themselves in other moments as masters of irony. 
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But what does it mean to be a blind poet? Or even more basically, what is irony-his 
tool of trade? This is not so easy to determine. If nothing else, because, as Paul de 
Man argues, irony is not a concept, and as such it is, 'uncannily difficult to give a 
definition of. And even though later on in this same essay De Man does offer a 
definition-'the permanent parabasis of the allegory of tropes '-he himself admits 
quite openly that we 'won't be much the wiser for it' .12 As such, it becomes quite 
common in writing on irony to focus much less upon what irony is than what irony 
does. Such a tendency may be driven by what Friedrich Schlegel identifies as the 
'irony of irony' , at work, for example, 'when one uses irony to speak of irony without 
realising that at that very moment one finds oneself in another, much more striking 
irony,.13 To avoid the 'irony of irony', then, many thinkers prefer to discuss irony in 
terms of its action, and in particular, its action in works of art. 
This is Walter Benjamin's approach. On the one hand, he describes a subjective form 
of irony, an 'irony in ... (such and such work of art)" which consists in an ironisation 
of the material of works of art. The spirit of such irony 'is that of the author who 
elevates himself above the materiality of the work by despising it' .14 However, this is 
only the negative version of irony. Because of the boundary defying nature of irony, 
it can bring into question the very works that are supposed to exhibit it. The positive 
version of irony, therefore and on the other hand, is an objective irony which acts on 
the form of the work of art: 
'Thus, the ironization of form ... assails the form without destroying 
it. .. This relation bears a striking affinity to criticism, which irrevocably 
and earnestly dissolves the form in order to transform the single work into 
the absolute work of art, to romanticize it'. 15 
It is this latter, totalising, conception of irony, which is at work in a serious world 
when we speak of the necessity of questioning. Such a tenaciousness in pursuit of the 
questioning of questioning, in uncovering the question marks behind the question 
12 De Man, Paul. 'The Concept of Irony', pp 164 and 179. 
13 Schlegel, Friedrich. 'On Incomprehensibility', p. 267. 
14 Benjamin, Walter. The Concept o/Criticism in German Romanticism, p. 162. 
IS Ibid, p. 163. 
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marks-what Kierkegaard dubs with the Hegelian term 'infinite absolute negativity' , 
by which it is 'not this or that phenomenon but the totality of existence, which [irony] 
considers sub specie ironiae,16-this is what the artist as blind poet undertakes. 
The reason it is an artist who undertakes this ironisation will be discussed at greater 
length in the dissertation itself, but for the moment we might mention that it is linked 
to artists' presumed privilege with regard to the aesthetic. And even if we are 
doubtful of anything that might be called 'aesthetic experience', we must admit that 
there is something in the aesthetic which presumes a momentary arrestation of our 
attention, an 'aesthetic moment' that gets us thinking and questioning, very much akin 
to that moment of engagement at the heart of taking seriously. It is the moment that 
no questioning and no answering can ever entirely account for, because it is the 
moment our questions always follow and our answers always chase; it is the blind 
spot of a serious world. 
And it is because of the opacity of the aesthetic, of its impenetrable 'that-ness', that 
many philosophers who interest themselves in art do not attempt to express their 
interest by way of general concepts, but rather by means of particular examples. It is 
with this in mind that we will now shift to the second of the two approaches to the 
relation between art and philosophy that we outlined at the outset, that typified by 
Davidson and Morris. Now Davidson would almost certainly protest that he is not 
taking either Morris or his works as examples, and in fact, he would have every 
reason to argue that philosophy ceases to be philosophy at the point it is no more than 
commentary upon empirical examples. Nevertheless, even if philosophy must avoid 
straightforward empiricism, it cannot entirely disentangle itself from the need for 
examples. 
This dilemma is typified by Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason. One of Kant's 
primary targets in this work is David Hume, who attempts to ground causality in 
empirical experience. According to the latter, our understanding of causality 'is 
not ... attained by reasonings a priori; but arises entirely from experience, when we 
16 Kierkegaard, S0ren. The Concept of Irony with Constant Reference to Socrates, p. 271. 
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find that any particular objects are constantly conjoined with each other'. 17 What 
Kant points out, however, is that even if 'appearances do provide us with cases from 
which we can obtain a rule whereby something usually happens, they can never 
provide us with a rule whereby the result is necessary '. 18 In other words, for causality 
to exist as a principle rather than as a simple guide or benchmark-and thus as 
universal and necessary rather than as potentially coincidental-it must be conceived 
a priori, and not on the basis of examples, according to Kant. 
That said however, the case of causality does not rule out the possibility that there 
might be situations in which it is precisely guides and benchmarks that are most 
needed. Moral actions, for instance would be impossible if they followed 
automatically from a priori principles. That is, what would be the meaning of saying 
someone did the right thing, if there was never the possibility that he could do the 
wrong thing? Because moral actions require freedom, they also require standards for 
its proper use. Such standards are, in Kant's terminology, 'archetypes', Urbilder; 
'originary images' that serve as ideals 'for the thoroughgoing determination of the 
cop[ies] [Nachbilder], as they appear in the empirical world. 19 Now Kant would say 
that these archetypes are not examples, and certainly they aren't in any conventional 
sense. As the preceding statement indicates, archetypes are not derived from 
empirical experience. They necessarily lack 'objective reality', and any attempt to 
'realize the ideal in an example' would subject the archetype to the suspicion that is 
'mere invention'. 20 But this begs the question of exemplarity: for if archetypes are 
neither examples drawn from empirical experience nor inventions held up as models, 
how are we ever to recognize them? Kant posits them as the 'indispensable standard 
of reason' ,21 and yet offers no explanation for how they ever acquire this role. He 
exhorts us not to simply dismiss them as 'chimera', and yet for all Kant says, we have 
to imagine that they pop into our heads fully formed in the way that only fairies and 
goblins do?2 
17 Hume, David. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, p. 30. 
18 Kant, Immanuel. Critique a/Pure Reason, p. 146. 
19 Ibid., p. 562. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Kant reinforces this notion of miraculous manifestation by contrasting the 'archetype' with the 
'monogram', saying that the latter amounts 'less to a detenninate image than to a design that hovers, as 
it were, at the mean of various experiences' (Ibid.). 
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Because of his silence on this point, it is worth momentarily considering the examples 
Kant himself cites. In Critique of Pure Reason, in the passage where he introduces 
the notion of archetypes, Kant offers as an example that of the 'wise person', who is 
said to derive from the Stoics. In Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, the 
notion of the archetype reappears in the figure of Christ23 as he is presented in the 
Bible. And perhaps most significantly, in Critique of Judgement, the notion of the 
archetype is used to present the figure of man as the ideal of beauty, in particular as he 
appears in the figure of the genius.24 Moreover, it is the notion of the genius that 
makes sense of archetypes. On the one hand, the genius shares with the other two the 
characteristic of being a product of a certain literature, of a certain philosophico-
historical vector that includes both the writings of Kant and the notions of the 
philosopher and artist as they appear in this investigation. As the products of a 
literature, archetypes are indeed neither to be found in empirical reality-our relation 
to Christ, for instance, his redemptive power, depends entirely upon the sacrifice that 
took him from this world, and thus only comes to light through the gospels written 
after his death-nor can be imputed to the intentional activity of an individual 
author--even as a prime contributor to the literature on genius, Kant does not invent 
the notion any more than he can pierce the veil that shrouds its origin. 25 At the same 
time and on the other hand, then, the products of this literature can only be considered 
archetypal to the extent that it is genius itself that produces them. According to 
Kant's logic, it is only genius that has the capacity for producing models that can 
23 Kant, Immanuel. Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. p. 80. It is worth reading this 
passage because it restates the problematic of the origin of ideals such as archetypes: 'Now it is our 
universal human duty to elevate ourselves to this ideal of moral perfection, i.e. to the prototype 
[UrbildJ of moral disposition in its entire purity, and for this the very idea, which is presented to us by 
reason for emulation, can give us force. But, precisely because we are not its authors, but the idea has 
rather established itself in the human being without our comprehending how human nature could have 
ever been receptive of it, it is better to say that that prototype has come down to us from heaven, that is 
has taken up humanity ... This union with us may therefore be regarded as a state of abasement of the 
Son of God'. 
24 Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Judgement, pp 69 and 72. The notion of the 'archetype of taste', or 
'ideal of beauty' is introduced on p. 69. Its relation to genius appears in a footnote on p. 72, where 
Kant rejects both regular features and exaggerated caricature as constitutive of the ideal of beauty, in 
favour of 'what is called genius, in which nature seems to depart from the ordinary relations of the 
mental powers on behalf of some special one'. 
25 On p. 151, Kant suggests that 'it is probable that the word "genius" is derived from genius, that 
peculiar guiding and guardian spirit given to a man at his birth, from whose suggestion these original 
ideas proceed'. 
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'serve as a standard or rule of judgment for others,;26 only genius-as it is found 
amongst the Stoics, as it appears in the Bible---can produce archetypes. 
What this self-referential aspect of archetypes does is to protect archetypes from the 
fate of simple examples. Whereas, simple examples can be 'neutralised' by being 
taken as examples; whereas as Derrida puts it, in philosophy 'to take something 
seriously, is to read the essence in the example',27 thereby dissolving singularity in 
conceptual thought; an archetype, by contrast, survives such treatment by having its 
singularity reside in its very exemplarity. It is an example that can never be entirely 
taken (as an example) and possessed by conceptual thought. Andrzej Warminski 
describes this excess when he says, '[a]n example can never represent or exemplify 
itself enough as example to recover its own excess, the excess of example "itself," for 
there will always be one more (or less) as yet unreflected and forever unreflectable 
and unmediatable example left over or missing'. 28 It is this' + Beispiel', 29 this excess 
of exemplarity, that Kant draws on in his notion of the archetype, with artistic genius 
as its paradigmatic instantiation. 
As such, when in his response to Hume, Kant attempts to eliminate exemplarity from 
philosophy, he does nothing other than to offer one more example of the strategy of 
'anti-mimesis', a strategy that Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe identifies in his essay 
'Typography' as typical of philosophy. Such a strategy strives to eliminate 
exemplarity through a pure speculativity.30 However, as Lacoue-Labarthe argues, this 
attempt at a displacement or de-installation of mimesis, and thus exemplarity, has the 
very opposite effect from that intended; rather than successfully eliminate 
exemplarity, anti-mimesis leads to its (re-)installation at the heart of philosophical 
discourse.31 This is what we observe in the case of Kant and his ultimate recourse to 
the notion of genius, and this is what we want to recover in considering the 
exemplarity of art and artists. 
26 Ibid 
27 Derrida, Jacques. 'La parole souffiee', p. 255. 
28 Andrzej Wanninski. 'Reading for example', p. 178. 
29 Ibid 
30 Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe. 'Typography', p. 127; 'Anti-mimesis is what will finally be revealed in 
the last, Hegelian dream of philosophy: absolute (in)sight, the subject theorizing its own conception 
and engendering itself in seeing itself do so-the speculative' . 
31 See for instance, p. 121. 
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Initially we will focus on the exemplarity of the artist, and the degree to which his 
activity can constitute a model for the activity of a philosopher himself. In such a 
situation, a philosopher explicitly rejects the anti-mimetic strategy undertaken by 
Kant and sees himself as the heir to a socio-historical project that he shares with 
artists. But as such a project would imply, its potency itself depends upon receptivity 
to works of art. As such, our next question must regard the exemplarity of works 
themselves-to ask to what degree these philosophers hope to create works of 
philosophy on the model of works of art. As we will discover, however, it is not at all 
the case that these philosophers want philosophy to be art. Quite the contrary, they 
want philosophy to have art's critical power without, for that token, having to be art. 
To the very extent that they see in works of art a response to modem ways ofliving-
a resistance to the predominance of instrumental reason, as Adorno might put it-they 
want to distance themselves from the apparent powerlessness of artists themselves, no 
matter how engaged. They do not want their critical interventions to appear as mere 
illusions as do works of art; they want to engage directly with the world itself. It is at 
this juncture that the initial exemplarity ofthe artist becomes a counter-exemplarity, 
an example of what not to do-and a re-engagement with anti-mimesis. 
Finally, we must acknowledge that in addition to these various relations of 
exemplarity between philosophers and artists, thinking and poetising, there is also the 
exemplarity of the pairings themselves of philosophers and artists-the paradigmatic 
aspect of Nietzsche on Wagner, Heidegger on Holderlin, and Adorno on Schonberg. 
Even though we cannot argue from the outset and on strictly philosophical grounds 
that these cases are indeed paradigmatic-for this would be for us to presume that we 
can see the limits of the literature of philosophy and close the door to future, 
potentially even more exemplary, cases-we can make our arguments on the hope-
and as the furtherance of the hope-that others will also see how these pairings place 
something at stake. Like Nietzsche, Heidegger and Adorno themselves, then, we are 
in the awkward position of taking seriously before we take seriously, of accepting the 
model and engaging ourselves without fully being able to account for the implications 
of that engagement. 
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chapter one 
In their own words 
In this first chapter we will consider those points at which Nietzsche, Heidegger and 
Adorno themselves take up the question as to why we take art and artists seriously. 
'Why do I take this seriously?' 
Sometimes we're sorry that we asked. 
This is because asking why we take something seriously is an admission of doubt, and 
possibly even the first groan of despair. Whereas references to seriousness usually 
add weight to our statements-'You should seriously consider this option', 'She was 
seriously hurt'-this time it betrays us, and just weighs on our minds. Saying things 
are serious should act as a bulwark against attacks on our perceptions and 
presuppositions, an assurance that what we believe is true and sacrosanct. However, 
in this case our own protector mocks us. This 'this', whatever 'this' is, could be a 
joke; that is what the question implies. 
Just the same, there is no reason to see this admission of doubt as a concession of 
defeat. Rather, this incipit parodia has all the hope of a new beginning. For as long 
as we are not willing to pose the question of taking seriously, we have little chance of 
clearing the moss from the edifice of 'serious' debate. In other words, if we do not 
question things' seriousness, 'serious' debate risks amounting to nothing more than 
the mindless reaffirmation of what we already held dear. As Kathleen Higgins 
concludes from her reading of Nietzsche, 'the more adept we become at inference-at 
remarking, "Consequently" ,-the more we ignore the extent to which our 
classification scheme is arbitrary'. 1 Not asking the question of taking seriously, then, 
is an acceptance of arbitrary classification schemes and received ideas about what is 
important and should not be contested; asking, at the very least, exposes these 
received ideas as what they are, received. 
1 Higgins, Kathleen Marie. Comic Relief Nietzsche's Gay Science, p. 56. 
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Nevertheless, we also have to ask ourselves what we expect to find through our 
probing. For one, we have to resist the false triumphalism of the overzealous 
iconoclast, who in his excitement is willing to topple large monuments in order to 
show what we already knew: namely, that they are made of quite common stuff. 
Even quiet resistance to received bastions of seriousness can easily degrade into 
mockery, including the mockery of he who mocks. Secondly, we have to engage this 
exposure to self-mockery head-on. The self-mockery arises because whatever we 
might find by asking why we take something seriously, what we are certain not to find 
is why. Asking the question why we take something seriously is first and foremost an 
engagement with that something as serious enough to warrant questioning. To ask 
why we take something seriously, then, is to question our own questioning of that 
something--as something serious-and there is nothing to inhibit us from pursuing 
this logic to its abyssal conclusions, infinitely questioning our questioning of our 
questioning of our questioning of that something. Our motivation for first asking is 
opaque to us, and this blindness makes us ridiculous. 
Just like physical blindness, this interrogative blindness invites creative strategies for 
overcoming it. One of these strategies is metaphor, and is the first we will examine, 
largely through the writings of Friedrich Nietzsche. Someone might argue that such a 
rhetorical figure is inappropriate to philosophical rigour, and yet interrogative 
blindness forces upon us those 'conjectures for which the language of science and 
traditional philosophy is totally unsuited' , and which Ernst Behler identifies in 
Nietzsche's writings as 'events which announce their arrival or which still throw a 
shadow, although they have passed ... thoughts which evaporate at the moment one 
articulates them'. '[T]hese phenomena can only be communicated in a language that 
suggests through images and attempts to persuade through its tone-the language of 
rhetoric,. 2 Faced, therefore, with the insurmountable task of explaining why one 
takes something seriously, a possible recourse is to claim rhetorically, and 
metaphorically, that this 'something' is like something else whose seriousness is not 
in doubt. 3 If for example, one was trying to defend the seriousness of art, it might be 
quite tempting to claim that art was serious because it was like war and rebellion. 
2 Behler, Ernst. 'Nietzsche's conception of irony', p. 30. 
3 One might protest at this point that the abyssal logic of questioning seriousness would eventually 
place even the most important 'something else' in doubt. As we will see, a possible response to this 
very real risk is to introduce an asymmetry or disjunction into the metaphorical relation. 
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Sounds ridiculous, and yet, we accept speaking of art in terms of revolutions, the 
avant garde and movements without even a hint of a smile. What is even more 
noteworthy about this acceptance is that it goes against a 'conventional wisdom' 
about art: that it is opposed to the warlike spirit. In his preface to The Birth of 
Tragedy, where he claims the importance of taking art seriously, Nietzsche refers to 
this 'conventional wisdom' and signals his intention to challenge it: 'But anyone who 
thought that this book reflected the contrast between patriotic excitement and 
aesthetic indulgence, between courageous seriousness and cheerful play, would be 
mistaken' .4 By turning a conventional opposition into a metaphorical association, 
Nietzsche asserts the seriousness of art in a serious world. 
A political manifesto 
A first response to this last statement might be to wonder why the seriousness of art is 
said to be 'in a serious world'. What is this serious world? And moreover, how does 
it relate to the Janus-faced nature of the question of taking seriously as we have 
introduced it? What we said in the introduction is that the phrase 'serious world' 
designates a questioning of the world which places the world itself at stake. What this 
means in the case of Nietzsche is that when he asserts the seriousness of art in a 
serious world, what he does is to make the very seriousness of the world hinge upon 
how seriously we take art. In Nietzsche's view, whether we take art seriously 
impinges directly upon how seriously we take the world, with the radical implication 
that if we ignore the former, we can expect nothing decisive to ever occur in the latter. 
It is this firm link between the fate of art and the world that we see if we now return to 
the preface to The Birth of Tragedy and again take up the passage just mentioned 
above: 
'But anyone who thought that this book reflected the contrast between 
patriotic excitement and aesthetic indulgence, between courageous 
seriousness and cheerful play, would be mistaken: were they to read this 
4 Nietzsche, F. The Birth a/Tragedy, p. 13. 
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essay, they would be astonished to discover the seriously German problem 
that we are dealing with, a vortex and turning point at the very centre of 
German hopes' .5 
What is at stake, then, in The Birth o/Tragedy is not, as we might have been led to 
expect by its title, the origins of an artistic form, but the very fate of the German 
people and their place in the world. Nevertheless-and this is what is philosophically 
interesting (or if you will, philosophically serious)-this fate can only be understood 
through art, that is, through the birth of tragedy. Moreover, the way in which 
Nietzsche binds the fate of the world to that of art is via a metaphor between art and 
war. As such, Nietzsche's reference to the conventional opposition between art and 
war is actually his way of assuring their inseparability. 
We find the arguments that underpin this inseparability most fully developed in an 
earlier version of the essay entitled' Socrates und die griechische Tragodie'. What 
we discover there is that the 'seriously German problem' has, at least for the young 
Nietzsche, a very real political solution: namely, the Kaiser's military, anti-liberal 
politics. By tying his hopes to the Kaiser's bandwagon, Nietzsche imagines that he 
can decisively take sides in a serious world, and see the opposition between art and 
war transposed into a unified and unifying figure of hope. 
* 
'And now my hopesl': This is the celebratory enthusiasm with which Nietzsche greets 
the then recent victory of Germany against France. According to Nietzsche, since the 
power which achieved this 'most colossal' of victories is the 'only productive 
political power in Germany' ,6 it can and should use its power to rid Germany of 
'liberalism', which Nietzsche hopes 'will bleed to death on this above mentioned, 
inflexible power'. 7 Such evisceration is called for, because liberalism-rather than 
war, as conventional wisdom would have it-is 'the real opponent of every deeper 
philosophy and artistic consideration'. It is 'a sickness, from which the German 
5 Ibid. 
6 Nietzsche, F. 'Socrates und die griechische Tragodie', p. 7 (Nietzsche's emphasis). 
7 Ibid. 
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essence has suffered above all since the French Revolution, and which also has 
afflicted the best of Gennan nature in ever-returning gouty convulsions,.8 The first 
hope, then, that Nietzsche is so colourfully expressing is that, with a common front of 
artistic and military might ranged against it, the obstacle of liberalism 'will be cleared 
out of the way of the genius,.9 As such, ifthere is any opposition to speak of with 
regard to art and war, it is liberalism's objection to them, and not their opposition to 
each other. They, by contrast, stand politically united with their sights on the genius 
and the future. 
By way ofa second hope Nietzsche tries to substantiate his first. For even if the first 
hope links art and war, it only really does so negatively-i.e. as united against 
liberalism-so what Nietzsche presents next is something that would give them 
common ground. What he offers is the (supposedly) German characteristic of bravery 
(Tapferkeit): 
, . -. who other than the German will be able to take on [the] tragic 
disposition, which I require, as preparation for the genius, as the new goal 
of cultivation for a noble, striving youth? Who other than the German 
youth will have the fearless gaze and heroic trait amidst the 
monstrousness ... ?' 10 
The notion of German bravery is supposed to make it plausible to assert past military 
victory as a guarantee for future cultural achievements, and to see in the German hero 
of the recent war, the shape of the German genius to come. Such a militarisation of 
art encourages us to think of it in the stark terms of war, such that our support for it is 
so constituted that co-existence with its enemies appears impossible. In this context, 
the question of whether we take art seriously takes on an urgency, which, when 
pursued to its fullest implications, becomes tantamount to a necessity. To the extent 
that we respond to this necessity we plunge with Nietzsche into a serious world, in 
which questioning art promises a response in the form of the genius. 
8 Ibid (my emphasis). 
9 Ibid 
10 Ibid, p. 8. 
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The 'aesthetic problem' 
What must be developed, then, is the notion that art is rent by an opposition as 
unsustainable as that in war. However, contrary to our expectations, Nietzsche does 
not argue for this by rooting out resistance to art, but rather by focusing on an 
'aesthetic problem'. 
That the opposition involved in this 'aesthetic problem' is so starkly serious is not 
immediately obvious from its terms. What are opposed are 'a true and a false concept 
of "Greek cheerfulness'" ,11 and what is at stake in this contest is that it is impossible 
'to arrive at an insight into the essence of Greek tragedy from [the] false concept of 
cheerfulness' . 12 But even though this description certainly tips our sympathies in 
favour of the 'true' concept, there is no reason to immediately conclude that the 
opposition necessitates decision. It seems quite reasonable that those holding a 'false 
concept of Greek cheerfulness' would be able to endure their ignorance as to the 
essence of Greek tragedy. Therefore, what Nietzsche also needs to do is to make this 
ignorance, and with it the 'false' position, untenable. 
The 'false' concept maintains that 'Greek cheerfulness' is a form of "'comfortable 
sensuality"', beautiful images representing deeper truth. For the 'false' concept the 
appeal of Greek art, its 'cheerfulness', is that it makes this depth comfortably and 
clearly accessible-Nietzsche refers to the metaphor of the sun's rays reflecting on 
the bottom of the sea such that one imagines oneself able to touch it with one's 
hand.13 The problem with this representational approach is that it cannot take into 
account the very distinction-between surface and depth-upon which it is based, and 
as such it constantly confuses the two, contributing to a muddying of the metaphorical 
waters, to a 'churning of the Greek depths'. 14 This confusion is particularly evident in 
the philological project to 're-erect the fallen statues of Greek antiquity lying sunken 
in the ground' ,15 because this project, rather than spawning a rebirth of Greek art, 
11 Ibid., p. 3. 
12 Ibid. It should be noted that Nietzsche presents this idea (flatteringly) as being something he 
learned from Wagner: ' ... von Ihnen weill ich gleichfalls, daB Sie es fur unmoglich halteD, von jenem 
falschen Heiterkeitsbegriffe aus zur Einsicht in das Wesen der Tragodie zu kommen'. 
13 Ibid., p. 4. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid., p. 5. 
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destroys it. This failing is important, because the desire for, and even necessity of, 
rebirth makes the 'false' concept untenable. To the extent that we are haunted by the 
'German problem', by Germany's inability to assert itself in the world, we strive for 
its rebirth, such as it is promised by the 'true concept of Greek cheerfulness', and 
blocked by the 'false'. 
Thus, in the light of the promise of renaissance, the 'true' concept of 'Greek 
cheerfulness' contests the representational nature of the 'false' concept. Since rebirth 
has to involve the simultaneous re-emergence of both idea and appearance (depth and 
surface), it cannot be achieved by focusing on the appearance of Greek art as separate 
from the idea it supposedly represents. The fust notion Nietzsche develops to this 
effect is that the appearance of Greek art does not resemble its essence, that its 
beautiful surface does not re-present beautiful depths. Quite the contrary, what Greek 
art has taught Nietzsche is 'that there is no beautiful surface without dreadful 
depths' .16 Nevertheless, this notion modifies the representational approach without 
entirely repudiating it-it still thinks in terms of surfaces and depths. The repudiation 
comes when 'Greek cheerfulness' itself arrives on the scene ... literally . What 
Nietzsche calls this immediate presentation of the concept is the 'future hero of the 
tragic disposition'. Now, it is a bit confusing that 'Greek cheerfulness' comes as a 
'hero of the tragic disposition'; however, this convergence of the beautiful and 
pleasant with the tragic and dreadful has already been established. The way Nietzsche 
deals with it here is to describe the 'future hero' as glowing with 'Greek 
cheerfulness'; it is his aura and transcendent presence: 'This future hero of the tragic 
disposition will be such that upon his brow lies the echo of this Greek cheerfulness, 
this halo, with which a still to come rebirth of antiquity will be inaugurated, the 
German rebirth ofthe Hellenic world'. 17 The aura allows us to identify the presence 
of 'Greek cheerfulness' in spite of the hero's dreadfulness, his 'angry sovereignty, 
proudest gaze, [and] most daring will' .18 It establishes the 'context of understanding 
in which great men (geniuses) do not appear as strangers' ,19 as Salim Kemal sees it as 
necessary to Nietzsche's thought. 
16 Ibid., p. 4 (my emphasis). 
17 Ibid., p. 5. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Kemal, Salim. 'Nietzsche's politics of aesthetic genius', pp 260-61. 
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It is necessary, moreover, because only if the 'true' concept of 'Greek cheerfulness' 
can overcome the deceptive distinction of surfaces and depths-that is, only if we are 
able to immediately recognise the future hero-only then is much at stake in 
Nietzsche's 'aesthetic problem', only then does the latter decisively mark the 
threshold to a new era. And even then, there remains a question mark as regards the 
possibility itself of the hero's arrival. Nietzsche's whole argument hinges upon our 
willingness to believe in this possibility, and yet his difficulty is that there is no 
assurance that the 'future hero' will indeed appear. 
A hopeful metaphor 
As such, then, Nietzsche is put in the position of having to argue, not in order to prove 
something, but in order to make us hope. To instil hope in us he first off solicits what 
he believes might be 'our' sentiments-'ourselves' thought of as his probable German 
readers in 1871-and then, on the basis of these hopeful sentiments, makes a bid for 
the potential universal import of particular experience. Nietzsche achieves the first 
half of this strategy by making an appeal to patriotism and the feelings likely to have 
been aroused by Germany's victory in the Franco-Prussian war. He says quite simply 
(addressing himselfto Wagner): 'Ah, my honourable friend, scarcely can I say in 
what way I tie my hopes for this rebirth [of the Hellenic spirit] with the current bloody 
glory of the German name' .20 The second half of the strategy is achieved when 
Nietzsche links his experience at the front with the idea of Greek tragedy: 
'These [hopes] made it possible, while the earth shook uninterruptedly 
under Ares' march, and myself in the middle of the war's next horrible 
effect, to be dutiful to the contemplation of my theme; yes I recall lying in 
the ambulance together with the wounded to whose care I was bound 
during the solitary night, with my thoughts on the three abysses of 
tragedy, whose names are "Madness, Will, Travail" [Wahn, Wille, 
Wehe]'.21 
20 Nietzsche, F. 'Socrates und die griechische Tragodie', p. 5. 
21 Ibid., pp 5-6. 
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This narration highlights hope's capacity to make our individual experiences seem to 
reverberate on a wider stage, and does so precisely by means of a metaphorical 
relation between art and war: because of his hopes Nietzsche binds his experiences at 
the front with the idea of Greek tragedy, and places in parallel his duty in the war and 
his dutifulness to his theme. In this way, the decisive seriousness of war is made to 
appear as analogous to that of art, just as his duty to the wounded was as great as his 
duty to the consideration of tragedy. 
However, the seriousness of war cannot be said to be reflected in the realm of art 
without exposing war's seriousness to some scrutiny. In other words, if Nietzsche 
indeed wants to imply that his theme and the wounded held an equal claim upon him, 
this just as readily reflects well on the seriousness of his theme as it reflects poorly 
upon how seriously he took his duties to the war. Therefore, in order to encourage us 
to read the metaphor between art and war in the sense that art is like war, but not the 
reverse, Nietzsche introduces a disjunction or asymmetry into their metaphorical 
connection. He does so temporally, by placing art's protagonist-who paradoxically 
is, just the same, a projection of the heroes of the recent war-beyond time: 'in the 
great "individual", in the saint and the artist, lies the goal [of mankind], thus neither in 
front of nor behind us, but outside of time'. 22 The effect of this temporal disjunction 
is to throw art into the forefront, shielding our attitude to war from critical 
questioning. Furthermore, as temporal, the disjunction presses us with the urgent 
need to decide, and more specifically, the need to decide in favour of art. In such a 
way, art is presented as our greatest, and most serious, hope. 
Furthermore, it is not just art as such, it is art as it is embodied in a particular figure 
that we are being asked to take so seriously. This is what distinguishes Nietzsche's 
thought on genius (here appearing as the 'future hero') from that of earlier 
philosophers, and in particular from that of Immanuel Kant. Whereas Kant attributes 
to the genius a decisive role in art and aesthetics, and does so in such a way as to 
make the latter central to any systematic thought about the world, Nietzsche goes even 
one step further and names the genius. In other words, it is not incidental that the 
prefaces to both 'Socrates und die griechische Tragodie' and The Birth of Tragedy are 
22 Ibid, p. 6. 
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addressed to Richard Wagner. For Nietzsche, the genius is not simply a necessary 
systematic possibility; for him, the genius must really and actually be able to exist; for 
otherwise, all thought of the rebirth and renewal of the world is empty speculation. 
As such, he does not simply ask us to take art seriously, he asks us to take the artist 
seriously-to see Wagner as undertaking 'the supreme task and the truly metaphysical 
activity in this life'. 23 
Two questions 
However, even if we accept the logic of this argument, the adoration of the early 
Nietzsche for Wagner--contrasting, as it does, so neatly with his later revulsion-
begs the question of 'why Wagner?' Why is it, in other words, that Wagner is said to 
be so perfectly suited to disjunctively mark what is serious? To some degree 
Nietzsche deals with this in 'Richard Wagner in Bayreuth', a text we will look at in 
greater detail in the following chapter; nevertheless, it seems reasonable that the 
question of who, in the sense of who we are to take seriously, is germane to the 
question itself 
How the question 'who' can come into play is evident in the case of Martin 
Heidegger's writings on Friedrich Holderlin. For instance, by emphasizing the 
particular biographical fact that Holderlin was a poet-as opposed to some other kind 
of artist-Heidegger gains the notion of poetising. And even if, as we will see, there 
are grounds for criticising this recourse to the biographical, the notion of poetising 
offers him an essential basis for the seriousness of art and the world. That is, it allows 
him to operate a reversal on Nietzsche's strategy: rather than try to argue that art is 
like something from the 'real' world, something such as war, Heidegger argues that 
the 'real' world is itself essentially an artistic construction, entirely dependent on 
language as it is employed by the poet. As Heidegger says, 'our existence is poetic in 
its very foundation'. 24 Because of the primacy of the poet's language, therefore, 
23 Nietzsche, F. The Bilth of Tragedy, p. 13. The full phrase is as follows: 'Let these serious people 
know that I am convinced that art is the supreme task and the truly metaphysical activity of this life in 
the sense of that man, my noble champion on that path, to whom I dedicate this book'. 
24 Heidegger, M. 'Holderlin and the Essence of Poetry' , p. 465. For those unfamiliar with 
Heidegger's writings on Holderlin-and it is unfortunate that not all exist in translation, in particular 
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taking a poet seriously can be the deepest acknowledgement of the seriousness of the 
world. 
Nevertheless, even with this substantial reversal upon Nietzsche's approach, we still 
find echoes of the latter's militarism. That is, if we look at Heidegger's early appeal 
to the seriousness of Holderlin and his poetry in the lectures on Germanien and Der 
Rhein, what we find is an account that very much replays the Hobbesian brutishness 
characteristic of the world of Nietzsche's artist-warrior: 
'One takes Holderlin "historically" [historisch] and misunderstands this 
unique essentiality, that his work, itself still outside space and time, has 
already overpowered [uberwunden] our historical fuss and founded the 
beginning of another history [Geschichte], of this history, which 
commences with struggle [Kampf] over the decision about the arrival or 
flight of the god'. 25 
And it is this echo of Nietzsche and his flag-waving rhetoric that complicates any 
reading of Heidegger on Holderlin, because as we will develop here and throughout 
the thesis, Heidegger does not pose just one question about the seriousness of poetry 
and the poet, he always poses both questions simultaneously. That is, when he asks 
how seriously we take poetry, he is also asking how seriously we take the poet, such 
that the seriousness of the one has implications for that of the other, but that we can 
never be sure of the seriousness of the one until we have committed ourselves to the 
other. In this way, Heidegger's arguments play directly upon the dual aspect of 
seriousness, its non-serious seriousness. 
In terms of this passage, it means that on the one hand, there is a moment in it in 
favour of taking Holderlin seriously which very much resembles the one we found in 
Nietzsche's early work: a decisive temporal disjunction marked by tragic struggle. 
On the other hand, there is a moment of indecision and self-doubt, which mocks our 
misunderstanding of the 'unique essentiality' of Holder lin's work, and ridicules our 
the 1934-35 lectures-Gary Aylesworth offers a summary ofHeidegger's basic themes in his essay 
'Heidegger and Holderlin' . 
25 Heidegger, M. Holderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und 'Der Rhein', p. 1. 
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uncertainty as to whether we, living as we are in our 'historical fuss', can belong to 
the new history founded by Holderlin. Heidegger's arguments about Holderlin 
succeed to the extent that they draw upon the tension between these two moments. 
* 
We re-encounter the double questioning of the poet and poetry in the essay 'Holderlin 
and the Essence of Poetry' , which appeared one year after the lectures on Germanien 
and Der Rhein. In it, Heidegger asks explicitly why we take poetry seriously: 
'And we are inquiring into the essential, into what forces us to decide 
whether we will henceforth take poetry seriously, whether we accept our 
being placed within the sphere where poetry can affect us'. 26 
But even before this, and as the very first sentence of the essay, he asks: 'Why is it 
that Holderlin has been chosen to explore the essence ofpoetry?,27 As such, the 
question 'Why Holderlin' is presented as an introduction to the question of taking 
poetry seriously, and the upshot of this is the following: whereas the argument for 
taking poetry seriously opens up a realm of indecision as to our belonging-
uncertainty as to whether we will indeed 'accept being placed within the sphere where 
poetry can affect us'-the already decided essentiality ofHolderlin-the question is 
'Why Holderlin', not 'Whether Holderlin', or even better, 'Who' -encloses the 
indecision within a horizon of tragic seriousness. To caricature, it is as if we were 
asked which poet's poetry we most identified with, and were told we could choose 
anyone as long as it was Holderlin. What constrains matters even further, however, is 
that we do not even have the option of not deciding. It is in this characteristic-in the 
necessity of deciding-that one perceives the serious world at the heart of 
Heidegger's writings on Holderlin: For him, one must decide about poetry, because 
otherwise one is doomed to a shallow existence blind to the seriousness of the world. 
In other words, one must decide, because one is fated to a serious world-to a world 
that necessitates questioning-and thus to even belong to one's own existence, one 
must question poetry. 
26 Ibid, p. 457. 
27 Heidegger, M. 'Holderlin and the Essence of Poetry' , p. 456. 
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Political persuasion 
As such, even ifit avoids the kind of militant determinism that haunts Nietzsche's 
early account of art' s seriousness, Heidegger's question of our acknowledgement and 
belonging to poetry is not entirely aloof from the appeal to political sentiments. Just 
as Nietzsche imagines that hopes from the Franco-Prussian war can carry over into 
art, Heidegger wants to persuade us that poetry offers a model for political consensus 
and power relations. However, as we will see, Heidegger also projects something 
even more radical than a political vision: he points to a world beyond the political. 
Robert Bernasconi notes this aspect ofHeidegger's thought, saying: 'To side with 
Holderlin is "politics" in the highest and most authentic sense, to the point that one no 
longer has any need to talk about the "political"'. 28 The crux of this dual vision is 
evident in the question of taking poetry seriously from 'Holderlin and the Essence of 
Poetry', particularly if we read it in the original German: 
'Doch eben dieses Wesentliche des Wesens suchen wir, jenes, was uns zur 
Entschiedung zwingt, ob und wie wir die Dichtung kunftig ernst nehmen, 
ob und wie wir die Voraussetzungen mitbringen, im Machtbereich der 
Dichtung zu stehen' .29 
It is the last phrases which allow us to trace the political aspect ofHeidegger's 
thought on Holderlin. Heidegger wonders in them 'whether and how we will 
henceforth take poetry seriously', and it is important to emphasize the word 'how'. It 
does not appear in Paul de Man's translation, and yet, the doubling ofthe question-
in terms of 'whether and how'-is critical. Like the question of 'Why Holderlin', the 
'whether' alludes to something already decided, something already fated to 
seriousness-if nothing else, in that we are bothering to read an essay on Holderlin 
and poetry, it is safe to suppose that we take poetry seriously to at least some degree. 
Just the same, we would not acknowledge the full seriousness of poetry if we were 
28 Bernasconi, Robert. 'The Greatness ofthe Work of Art', p. 107. 
29 Heidegger, M. 'Holderlin und das Wesen der Dichtung', p. 34. 
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satisfied to deal with it at the level ofthis presupposition,30 and it is for this reason 
that Heidegger must also wonder 'how we will henceforth take poetry seriously' . 
As such, therefore, Heidegger plays the already decided seriousness implied by the 
'whether' off against the openness to non-seriousness implied by the 'how', and does 
so through the Leitworte, or key-passages, which guide his reading ofHolderlin. The 
first of these key-passages speaks of the non-seriousness of poetry's seriousness, 
stating that poetry is "'the most innocent of all crafts"', which Heidegger understands 
as saying that poetry' appears in the humble disguise of a game '. And what of this 
game? 'This game is spared the hard necessity of making decisions, of taking sides, 
of an earnestness which is bound sooner or later to lead to guilt'. 31 Even if poetry 
playfully vacillates, therefore, the kind of seriousness it is thereby lacking is a guilty, 
schuldig, kind of seriousness, completely incompatible with poetry's innocent, 
unschuldig, nature. Thus, Heidegger here presents poetry in terms of an innocent, 
non-serious moment resistant to the tragedy of its predetermined nature as already 
senous. 
The importance of this non-serious moment, however, only becomes clear in the 
second key-passage where Heidegger focuses in on the privileged position of 
language: 
'This act [of creating a world], by means of which man truly fulfills 
himself as man, arises out of his own free decision. In this decision he 
takes hold of necessity and answers to the summons of his highest calling: 
to bear witness that he belongs among all that is. This comes to pass in 
the form of history. Language has been given to man to make history 
possible. Language is man's possession and a blessing to man,.32 
The very first sentence puts the innocent openness of poetry to work. On the model 
of the free play of language in poetic verse, man's 'bearing witness'-that is to say, 
30 One could accuse Timothy Torno of doing just this in his book, Finding Time: Readingjor 
Temporality in Holderlin and Heidegger, where he asserts: 'By setting as the goal of his search that 
which compels a decision from us, Heidegger indicates the seriousness with which he takes poetry. To 
do justice to his reading, we too must take it seriously' (p. 102). 
31 Heidegger, M. 'H6lderlin and the Essence of Poetry', p. 457. 
32 Ibid, p. 459. 
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his acknowledgement of belonging-is free and occurs in language. Yet, its open 
innocence does not mean that it can avoid the horizon of decision; rather, it must 
reveal itself in terms ofa 'free decision', which 'comes to pass in the form of history'. 
In history, the duality of seriousness-its non-serious seriousness-plays out. 
This is so, because history, according to Heidegger, appears as a conversation. As he 
says in the third key passage, '[t]o be a conversation and to be historical is one and the 
same,.33 And it is in this notion of the conversation that the political significance of 
poetry's dual seriousness comes to the fore. The phrase he cites from Holderlin's 
unfinished poem, beginning' Versohnender, der du nimmergeglaubt ... " is "'Since we 
are an exchange of words"', and what Heidegger interprets this as saying is that 'we 
are one exchange of conversation'. He continues: 
'And the unity of a conversation consists in this: the essential word 
discloses the one and the same upon which we agree, on the basis of 
which we then are agreed and thus are ourselves'. 34 
Thus, being ourselves--that is to say, bearing witness to our belonging-is tied up 
with agreeing, einigen, or becoming one, and to the extent that we must be one, we 
must agree. However, we cannot understand this consensus as being forced upon us. 
It is not a demand so grave as to accept nothing but blind obedience. Rather, since 
agreement is never truly possible without the will to agree, we must be left free to 
follow the meanderings of the one conversation in our own manner, free to innocently 
play amongst its words. Only in this way can our agreement be a 'free decision', a 
binding but freely given consent. 
That said however, we are indeed bound to say yes, indeed bound to the one 
conversation. Because of the dogged conformism this implies, we cannot help but 
33 Ibid, p. 462. 
34 Ibid, pp 461-62. This reading of '''we are an exchange of words'" as 'we are one exchange of 
conversation' is unnatural in English translation. However, it follows much more smoothly in German 
where ein can be more easily read both as indefinite pronoun and as indicating number. Ifwe read the 
original German, we see that it is precisely the multiple meanings associated with ein, which guide the 
reading-most importantly between 'unity', Einheit, as one-ness and 'to agree', einigen, as becoming 
one: 'Wir sind ein Gespracb, das bedeutet zugleich immer: wir sind ein Gesprach. Die Einheit eines 
Gesprachs besteht aber darin, daB jeweils im wesentlichen Wort das Eine und das Selbe offenbar ist, 
woraufwir uns einigen, auf Grund dessen wir einig und so eigentlich wir selbst sind' (p. 39). 
Julie Kuhlken Page 34 
Why would a philosopher take an artist seriously? 
make connections between it and the politics of fascism. Heidegger's relation to ' 
Nazism has commanded much well-deserved attention, and for this reason we would 
be wrong to just pass it by without mention. At the same time, however, it is 
important not to let this issue serve as an excuse for not reading Heidegger, as 
Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe criticises Victor Farias of doing. 35 For his part, Lacoue-
Labarthe sees Heidegger as guilty of a 'national-aestheticism', whereby an 
'aesthetisation of the political' appears as 'a will to immediate effectuation or self-
effectuation'. For Lacoue-Labarthe, this will is 'the crime-the boundless excess--of 
Nazism' .36 Moreover, Heidegger's identification with this 'national-aestheticism' 
actually appears twice in his thought. The first instance is his engagement with the 
Nazi Party in 1933-34, and the second his writings on Holderlin. 37 That said, 
however, Lacoue-Labarthe does not seem to believe that the notion of a 'national-
aestheticism' exhausts these latter writings, and certainly our interest in them here 
belies this possibility. As it is, then, the approach that will be taken here is 
sympathetic with that expressed by Kathleen Wright in her essay 'Heidegger and the 
Authorisation of Holder lin's Poetry'. She warns that we should not lose perspective 
in an analysis of Heidegger's politics, because 
'the difficulty is to keep in mind what remains thought-provoking about 
Heidegger's 1934-35 reading of Holderlin, and this difficulty arises because 
of the danger of reading Heidegger the way he reads Holderlin. In other 
words, just as Heidegger, by concentrating on the political, leaves out 
something important in this poetry, so too my own interpretation runs the 
risk of leaving out something that remains worthy of thought in Heidegger's 
reading of Holderlin's two poems [i.e. Germanien and Der Rhein]'. 38 
3S See appendix, 'On Victor Farias's Book, Heidegger et Ie nazisme', 
36 Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe. Heidegger, Art and Politics, p. 70. It might be noted that Jacques 
Taminiaux also faults Heidegger for this 'prejudice' that 'closes the existing being within the 
impregnable walls of a self-willing' (p. 210). This passage appears in his essay 'The First Reading of 
H6Iderlin', where he looks at the indebtedness of the 1934-35 lectures to fundamental ontology, Hegel 
and Nietzsche, in an attempt to understand how these relations appear in the light of Heidegger' slinks 
to National Socialism. 
37 Ibid, p. 12. 
38 Wright, Kathleen. 'Heidegger and the Authorization ofH6lderiin's Poetry', pp 166-67. More 
generally, her argument in this essay is that the politics at stake in Heidegger's writings from the mid-
30's is not fascism (or anti-fascism, the 'traditional line' she rejects) per se, but 'antipacifism', and that 
the transformation of the 'fatherland ... from one that is "defenceless" ... into one that is "victorious'" (p. 
170) is reason enough to question Heidegger's reading ofH6lderlin, and thus does not require a 
recourse to an accusation of Nazism. 
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Furthermore, by concentrating too exclusively upon the question of fascism, we also 
risk obscuring important differences between the respective 'national-aestheticisms', 
if you will, of Nietzsche and Heidegger. In Nietzsche's political hopes, the triumph 
of a certain Germanness would come with the 'future hero', whose arrival one can 
imagine in terms of a great, decisive war in which the 'future hero' will emerge 
victorious. In Heidegger's vision, by contrast, 'struggle' will only commence after 
the decisive event-Holderlin, if you remember, 'founded the beginning of another 
history, of this history, which commences with struggle'. In other words, the decisive 
event is not brought about by any sort of conflict; quite the contrary, it is what 
establishes the conditions that make conflict possible at all. Only on the basis of the 
consensus initiated by the event of Holderlin and manifested in the 'one conversation' 
is there the possibility of either agreeing or disagreeing. As such, even if we are, 
according to Heidegger, ultimately bound to say yes, it is not because we are 
externally coerced by acts of war, but because of the consensus that must precede 
dissent and found its possibility. As Heidegger points out, 'If there is to be one 
conversation, essential words must refer to one and the same entity, otherwise no 
conversation and certainly no controversy could take place' .39 Moreover, if indeed all 
essential words 'refer to one and the same entity', then at the limit, agreement and 
unity would be able to assimilate all disagreement, and a world beyond politics is 
imaginable where decisions follow necessarily from a unifying consensus, rather than 
being debated according to relative criteria. 
The irony-and, in the light of Nazism, tragedy-however, is that it takes political 
persuasion to go beyond political persuasion, and this is what we see at the end of 
Heidegger's formulation ofthe question of taking seriously in 'HOIderlin and the 
Essence of Poetry' . Heidegger asks 'whether and how we possess the prerequisites to 
stand in poetry's realm of power'. This expression, 'poetry's realm of power' , 
explicitly associates poetry with force. As such, when Heidegger announces that 'we 
are inquiring into the essential, into what forces us to decide ... ' what he is really 
saying is that what forces us to decide is poetry itself, that it is, on its own, persuasive. 
By itself, this idea is not so controversial; it is not unusual to speak of poetry moving 
39 Heidegger, M. 'Holderlin and the Essence of Poetry' , p. 462 (latter emphases mine). 
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or affecting us. What is eyebrow raising is that Heidegger goes on to hint that it is 
only poetry that is persuasive. In other words, in Heidegger's serious world, all 
power, including political power, is affected by poetry's Machtbereich. 
Language and event 
The argument that would substantiate this notion is less an argument than the 
establishment of a myth. Very much like Nietzsche, who is put in the position of 
trying to make us hope; Heidegger is put in the position of trying to make us 
believe-make us believe in the myth of poetic founding. In 'H6lderlin and the 
Essence of Poetry' this myth appears in the language of the poet himself, in lines from 
'Wie wenn am Feiertage ... ' that describe the poet's exposure to 'God's 
thunderstorm', that is to say, to Being: 
'Yet it behooves us, 0 poets 
To stand bare-headed beneath God's thunderstorms, 
To seize the Father's ray itself 
With our own hands and, wrapped in song, 
To offer the heavenly gift to the people. ,40 
According to these lines, the poet, possessed by a childlike innocence, exposes 
himself to 'God's thunderstorm'-that is to say, to Being-and is struck down. 
However, in spite of, or because of, his exposure to this danger, the poet is able to 
create the appearance of innocence by cloaking the danger of 'the Father's ray' in 
song. Only cloaked in this innocent fashion is the 'free gift' of the founding of being 
possible, whose occurrence constitutes the dangerousness of poetry's works. Only, 
that is, as an event can poetry be both playfully innocent and tragically dangerous, and 
thereby truly live up to its dual seriousness. 
However, as follows from the 'logic of the beginning' identified by Alexander Garcia 
Do.ttmann, and which says that' every inauguration is its own repetition' ,41 there are 
40 Lines cited in 'H61derlin and the Essence of Poetry', p. 466. 
Julie Kuhlken Page 37 
Why would a philosopher take an artist seriously? 
actually two events. The first is the mythical event just recounted, the event whose 
seriousness can never really be in doubt because it is never really serious. As 
mythical, it is beyond questioning, and even precisely what bounds questioning. It is 
an event that is untranslatable into the argumentative language of philosophy, and as 
such, must remain and only be poetry. As for Heidegger, when he speaks of this 
event, rather than discuss, he more nearly sings: 'Speaking with always growing 
assurance and simplicity, out of the wealth of images which crowded upon him, 
Holderlin has consecrated his poetical word to the realm between gods and men'. 42 
What is surprising, though, is that, in spite of the irrefutability of such lyricism, 
Heidegger does indeed offer it as an argument: '[It] is why we must say that 
[Holderlin] is the poet of the poet'.43 By this odd mix of the discursive and the 
rhetorical Heidegger tries to hammer home the seriousness of poetry, to convince us 
that even the rigour of philosophical language is poetic in its essence. However, the 
effort is self-contradictory: the recourse to the argumentative and discursive language 
of philosophy is the very admission that poetry by itself might fail to convince. As 
Andrzej Warminski points out, even if 'Heidegger's language is saturated by 
Holderlin's', there is a persistent distinction between poetising and thinking, and 
Heidegger never really 'does answer the question of where the passage, crossing, 
going-over (Obergang), of poetry and thought takes place,.44 
For this reason we cannot fail to acknowledge the second event of Holderlin. If the 
first event is the mythical moment of the founding of being, the second is the very real 
event by which Holderlin is 'struck down'. In other words, in order to 'prove' that the 
poet does indeed seize 'the Father's ray itself something must happen to him. What 
happens, of course, is the other event ofHolderlin, the insanity of the poet, and for 
Heidegger, this insanity is indeed evidence or 'proof of poetry's essence: '[a]n excess 
of light has thrown the poet into darkness. Do we need further proof of the utter 
41 Dtittmann, Alex Garcia. The Memory of Thought: An Essay on Heidegger and Adorno, p. 174. 
42 Heidegger, M. 'Holderlin and the Essence of Poetry', p. 469. 
43 Ibid, (my emphasis). 
44 Warminski, Andrzej. 'Heidegger Reading Holderlin', pp 46 and 47, respectively. Warminski's 
argument about this lack of iibergang is that Heidegger's attempts to ontologise Holderlin can never 
entirely subsume the ontic element oflanguage, even poetic language, as language: 'One could say that 
"linguistic form," syntax-and the necessity to dismiss it as ontic-mark an irreducible, necessary 
remainder of the technical (Technik) in any language (no matter how "ontologised") as language' (pp 
70-1). 
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danger of his "craft"? The particular destiny of the poet is revealing enough' .45 
Holderlin's insanity, therefore, is called upon to 'prove' the seriousness of poetry. 
However, if the first event is suspicious in its mixture of the discursive and rhetorical, 
this latter one is perhaps even more so for its reliance upon the contingent and 
'historisch'. David Halliburton questions this shift 'from Geschichte to Historie', 
saying: 'The problem is that [Heidegger] asks for more support from the biographical 
"historical" quarter than his own hermeneutic principles give him a right to expect 
and that this quarter is appealed to at a time when the reader is expecting Heidegger to 
be fully Heideggerian' .46 The reason we expect Heidegger to be fully Heideggerian 
here is because this event is at the very crux of poetry's essence and why we take it 
seriously. When confronted with this question, what Heidegger offers are references 
back to poetry and to the life of the poet himself. The very vulnerability of this 
gesture itself triggers the question that it is meant to resolve. In fact, the paradox of 
poetry's seriousness-its dual nature as both tragically decisive and harmlessly 
innocent-is perhaps best captured in this way: namely, that precisely the reference 
which should enthrone poetry's seriousness sets in motion a questioning which 
threatens to undermine it. 
'the new era' 
But as it is conceived of by Heidegger, does the questioning that is set into motion 
really possess the full power of this paradox, that is, the power to completely 
undermine poetry's seriousness?47 To answer this we might look at Heidegger's 
projection of a 'new era': 
'Holderlin's poetry is about the essence of poetry if we do not understand 
by this essence a concept that is universally valid, but admit that it belongs 
to a specific time. Not as though it adjusted to a given situation, but rather 
in the sense that Holderlin, by founding the essence of poetry anew, 
45 Heidegger, M. 'Holderlin and the Essence of Poetry', p. 466 (my emphasis). 
46 Halliburton, David. Poetic Thinking: An Approach to Heidegger, p. 99. We will return to this issue 
of the reCOUfse to the biographical and 'historical' in both chapters two and fOUf. 
47 It is important to note that the power to undermine poetry's seriousness is not simply the power to 
establish it in its non-seriousness, because the latter would just reconfirm poetry's necessary exposure 
to the question of taking seriously and its place in a serious world. 
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determines and defines the new era [my emphasis]. The era is the time of 
the departing gods and the coming of God. It is the time of dearth 
because it stands under the token of a two-fold absence: it is defmed by 
the no-longer of the departed gods and the not-yet of the coming one,.48 
What this passage does is to insist that we pursue our questioning of poetry within the 
horizon determined by 'the new era'. In other words, whatever our line of 
questioning, it will never be able to question the event(s) of Holderlin itself, and 
rather must limit itself to relating us to this event, no matter how implausible. As 
such, our task is to place ourselves within what Michel Haar identifies as the' secret 
history, parallel to that of the [modem] technical world'. 49 Because we are for 
Heidegger inescapably part of the era opened by Holderlin, when we question poetry, 
we can inquire 'into the essential, into what forces us to decide whether we will 
henceforth take poetry seriously', but we cannot inquire into whether the trajectory 
opened by Holderlin is the only possible one, whether he indeed marks the event. 
Heidegger's questioning of whether we take poetry seriously, therefore, even as dual, 
is limited in its scope-not as the consequence of externally imposed constraints (that 
is, poetry's tragic seriousness), nor as the result of the internally conditioned demands 
of paradox 50 (that is, its non-seriousness)-but because it is a temporal question, a 
question which must be posed in a post-Holderlinian world. Heidegger's relentless 
insistence upon Holderlin as the only possible event closes the door to any truly new 
era, and as such, we have to wonder whether the reaffirmation ofHolderlin-which 
can only occur if we ask ourselves whether we take poetry seriously-might 
eventually grow old. In other words, once we sense that the decisiveness of 
Holderlin's poetry is ultimately indifferent to our questioning of it, will we really 
continue to consider it seriously? Or will its seriousness itself simply lapse, passing 
beyond any potential farce and into oblivion? 
48 Heidegger, M. 'Holderlin and the Essence of Poetry', p. 469. 
49 Haar, Michel. "'The End of Metaphysics" and "A New Beginning"', p. 161 (his emphasis). In this 
essay, Michel Haar also notes how 'the idea of a voluntarist passage (transition), the idea of this 
decisive leap', as we find it in essays from the 1930's, gives way to a 'turning' and certain 'passivity' 
(p. 162) in the post-war period without ever completely giving up the notion ofa 'fractured' history. 
50 In fact, one of the weakness ofHeidegger's formulation of poetry's seriousness is precisely that he 
limits the power of paradox, and the chance that poetry's seriousness might be substantially challenged. 
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Interpretation 
Thus, even though Heidegger wishes to constructively present Holderlin's word in the 
light of a 'framework of stability and endurance' ,51 it is not unreasonable to fear that 
this 'framework' will better serve as a barrier than a facility to new and different 
interpretations. Furthermore, Heidegger's explicit statements on interpretation invite 
such critique. They share with the notion of the 'one exchange of conversation' an 
emphasis upon enduring unity to the exclusion of disjunctive change. In his lectures 
on Andenken, he possibly makes his most explicit statement: 
'The goal of true interpretation consists only in making itself superfluous. 
The more complete an interpretation's construction is, the more decisively 
it has in the end dismantled, and thus denied itself, so that only the poet's 
word speaks'. 52 
Heidegger argues very persuasively here against the practice of using poetry as a 
pretext for talking about something else, and yet, he also risks setting up Holderlin's 
word as being so sacrosanct as to be itself beyond question. In fact, a similar 
statement from the lectures on Germanien and Der Rhein reinforce this impression: 
'What we are to do, then, is at best like scaffolding on the cathedral, which is only 
there in order to be dismantled again' .53 It seems quite likely that we would have to 
move beyond Heidegger' s version of interpretation when what we want to do is not to 
renovate the cathedral, but to turn it into something entirely different. In other words, 
when Heidegger asks us to take poetry seriously, he is asking us to do so in the 
context of preservation, and as such he does not significantly question what it is that 
he wants to preserve. 
Theodor Adorno's concern is more akin to the problem of turning the cathedral into 
something different, and that is largely because he fears, if left to the forces of society, 
that it will be turned into a bomb shelter. What makes this fear all the more alarming 
is that for him the bomb shelter would reveal what the cathedral always really was. 
51 Heidegger, M. 'Holderlin and the Essence of Poetry' , p. 462. 
52 Heidegger, M. Holderlins 'Andenken', pp 38-9. 
53 Heidegger, M. HolderlinsHymnen 'Germanien'und 'Der Rhein', p. 23. 
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Adorno is deeply suspicious of arguments that rely on the acceptance that 'that's just 
the way things are', and in response, he advocates a thinking which shuns just 
reproducing how things are, and rather criticises reality-a thinking, in other words, 
which truly interprets. In his view, if thought 'leaves behind the medium of virtuality, 
of anticipation that cannot be wholly fulfilled by any single piece of actuality; in 
short, if instead of interpretation it seeks to become mere statement, everything it 
states becomes, in fact, untrue,.54 The reason for this untruth is twofold. On the one 
hand, to state things as they are is untrue, since the statement itself would not be part 
ofthe being it is supposed to reproduce. On the other, even if such reproduction were 
possible, any attempt to do so would deny thought 'not only its autonomy in the face 
of reality, but with it the power to penetrate reality. Only at a remove from life can 
the mental life exist'. 55 In other words, there is no reason to think, at least in any 
significant way, unless one can think in a way that does more than merely reproduce 
reality as it is. As a consequence, what Adorno advocates is a kind of thought which 
has its meaning in the disjunction it maintains with regard to reality. 
The model for this thought is the autonomous or serious work of art, and one of the 
artists to whom Adorno looks in order to develop his conception of such a work of art 
is Arnold Schonberg. Given the many other artists that Adorno addresses in his 
writings, it would be disingenuous to argue that we can only understand Adorno's 
relation to art by means of his writings on just this composer, and yet it is important to 
note what Robert Hullot-Kentor has to say about Adorno's relation to Schonberg: 
'Adorno and Schonberg are related more integrally than comparisons [of their 
'uncompromising' characters] demonstrate. In The Philosophy o/Modern Music, 
Adorno marshals the resources of the entire theodicean tradition of German 
idealism ... on behalf of the justification of an irreconcilable music'. 56 
This 'irreconcilable music' exposed Schonberg to the criticism that his work was 
difficult to understand, and what singles out Adorno's reception of the composer is 
that rather than see this as an argument against Schonberg, for Adorno, this difficulty 
54 Adorno, T.W. MinimaMoralia, p. 127. 
55 Ibid, p. 126. 
56 Hullot-Kentor, Robert. 'The Philosophy of Dissonance: Adorno and Schonberg', pp 312-13. 
Similar observations, and even the assertion of a certain parallelism in their respective artistic and 
philosophical efforts, can be found in Lambert Zuidervaart's Adorno's Aesthetic Theory: The 
Redemption of Illusion (see pp 5, 48, 123-24). 
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constitutes a kind of protection, and more specifically a protection against what is for 
him a more threatening aesthetic development: namely, the culture industry. In the 
article' Arnold Schonberg, 1874-1951' Adorno addresses this opposition between 
serious, difficult music and comforting entertainment: 
, ... it is precisely because of its seriousness, richness and integrity that 
[Schonberg's] music arouses resentment. The more it gives its listeners, the 
less it offers them. It requires the listener spontaneously to compose its 
inner movement and demands of him not mere contemplation but praxis. In 
this, however, Schonberg blasphemes against the expectation ... that music 
will present the comfortable listener with a series of pleasurable 
sensations' .57 
That is, one cannot just listen to Schonberg's music, one must construct it, and this 
active step between experience and understanding allows for the critical distance from 
reality that provides a model for Adorno's thought. For him, '[works of art] are 
hieroglyphs for which the code has been lost, a loss which plays into their content'. 58 
The new 
The key question, then, might be stated as follows: How do we distinguish those 
works whose 'code has been lost', from, on the one hand, those whose code is well-
known, and from, on the other, those objects which have no significance at all? In 
other words, how do we identify new works of art. As we can already intimate, the 
task is twofold. Before one can worry about the newness of works of art, one must 
have already begun to address what a work of art is itself. 
This dual task becomes clearer if we consider the probable critique Adorno would 
level against Heidegger's notion of 'the new era'. First, Adorno would object to the 
fact that Heidegger equates this 'new era' with the poet Holderlin. This is not 
primarily because Heidegger identifies Holderlin as opposed to some other poet, but 
57 Adorno, T.W. 'Arnold Schonberg, 1874-1951', pp 149-50. 
58 Adorno, T.W. Aesthetic Theory, p. 124. 
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because in his notion of the 'poet of poetry' , Heidegger takes for granted that there are 
such things as 'poets' and 'poetry'. He never really questions whether, or how, 
Germanien and Andenken can be works of art~ he just assumes that they are. Adorno, 
by contrast, is specifically concerned with the questionable and problematic existence 
of works of art, and the danger that they might not be able to continue to exist. In 
this, my reading of Adorno greatly diverges from that of Riidiger Bubner who would 
like to saddle Adorno with a presupposed and 'unqualified work category'. My 
response to Bubner's rhetorical question, '[w]here else can the concrete and the 
universal be reconciled in a way that is far removed from all conceptual 
schematisations, if not within the autonomous sphere created by artworks' ,59 is to ask 
in my tum what reconciliation he is thinking of It is precisely the impossibility of 
thinking such a reconciliation that drives Adorno's thought and brings works of art 
into question. Secondly, Adorno would object to Heidegger's idea that, as post-
H6lderlinian, 'the new era' already confronts us today, because the threat that he sees 
confronting works of art is precisely that the new is, for lack of a better word, past. 
This is not simply an expression of the new's dependence upon tradition, as it is 
identified by Simon Jarvis6°-though it is this, as well-even more radically, Adorno 
recognizes that the possibilities afforded by tradition might eventually point to a 
situation in which the new was no longer possible at all: 'The cult of the new, and 
thus the idea of modernity, is a rebellion against the fact that there is no longer 
anything new' .61 
This does not mean, however, that everything is old. Quite the contrary, the old's 
appearance is entirely dependent on the new: 'The old has refuge only at the vanguard 
of the new: in the gaps, not in continuity' .62 For Adorno, the old never really exists, 
and certainly could never anchor our thought or provide a point of continual reference 
as David Roberts proposes in his reading of Adorno. 63 Rather the old is a 
59 Bubner, Rudiger. 'The Central Idea of Adorno's Philosophy', p. 164. 
60 Jarvis, Simon. Adorno: A Critical Introduction, p. 136: 'What crucially distinguishes the really 
new from the abstract novelty ... of commodity production in the culture industry is that the really new 
work is made in undiminished awareness of the possibilities afforded by tradition'. 
61 Adorno, T.W. Minima Moralia, p. 235 (my emphasis). 
62 Adorno, T.W. Aesthetic Theory, p. 22. 
63 Roberts, David. Art and Enlightenment. He says, for example, on p. 42: 'The critique of the new 
can be understood only in relation to the old, of which it is the consequence'. Because of his reification 
of 'old' or traditional music, David Roberts reads The Philosophy of Modern Music, not as a projection 
of future hopes, but rather as 'the posthumous celebration of classical music' (p. 45). 
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manifestation of the new. As Alexander Garcia Diittmann puts it, the old 'reveals 
itself as what is new to knowledge, laid bare by the visionary destruction of the idea, 
the figure, or the appearance, by the downfall of the image to which we have become 
habituated,.64 To cite Fredric Jameson, 'what is "new" about the old involves a 
sudden intuition of taboos and constraints, negatives, restrictions, prohibitions, 
reluctances, and aversions' ,65 in other words, an intuition into what should no longer 
be. It is only when we have such an intuition that we catch a glimpse of both the 
perpetuating sameness of modern reality as sameness and its possible disruption by 
the new. 
Thus for Adorno, the disruption of the new has immediate socio-political 
significance-it relates to what should and should not be done. He, unlike Nietzsche 
and Heidegger, who almost seem to imagine artistic and intellectual struggles 
replacing socio-political ones, approaches the issues of art and aesthetics as 
inseparable from wider social conditions. He firmly rejects the notion that art could 
somehow stand aloof from society-and therefore be in a position to replace or 
supersede it-and rather emphasizes art's character as a 'fait social'. 66 In fact, he 
deems the false notion of a completely independent art as evidence of a bourgeois 
conscious. Adorno's attention to art, then, is entirely intertwined with his vision of 
society, and his interest in its capacity for the new is due to the latter's revolutionary 
potential. But this is a potential that is seriously menaced. Instead of being an 
unambiguous force for change, the new is 'ambivalent in its enthronement. While it 
embraces everything that strives beyond the oneness of an ever more rigid established 
order, it is at the same time absorption by newness which, under the weight of that 
oneness ... furthers total society, which modishly ousts the new' .67 His vision of a 
serious world, then, is a place where totalisation is so comprehensive that even 
attempts to question it are absorbed and make the totality stronger. It is a world 
marked by the impossibility of the new. 
64 Diittmann, Alexander Garcia. 'A Short Diary of the New', p. 158. 
65 Jameson, Fredric. Late Marxism: Adorno, Or, The Persistence of the Dialectic, p. 192. 
66 See section 'Double Character of Art;jait social and Autonomy; On the Fetish Character' in 
Aesthetic Theory. Moreover, for those interested in how this notion of the social character of works of 
art could impact the latter's technical analysis, one might see Max Paddison's essay 'Immanent 
Critique or Musical Stocktaking? Adorno and the Problem of Musical Analysis'. 
67 Adorno, T.W. Minima Moralia, p. 237. 
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However, if the new is impossible, embracing this fact has in itself revolutionary 
force. But first off, Adorno has to convince us that the new is impossible, that the 
world is so serious that we must question it in spite of the apparent impossibility of 
finding answers. One instance of such argumentation appears in the first part of a 
two-part essay, 'Difficulties: 1. In Composing'. The difficulties are those faced by a 
composer who refuses to produce just 'a tautology of the world' ,68 and rather aspires 
to the new in spite of its impossibility. What Adorno realises is that some people 
might view this obstinacy in the face of impossible odds as nothing more than thick-
headedness, and airs it in an effective show of humour: 
'I could imagine many of you inteIjecting, "If this business of composing 
is such a frightfully precarious and difficult thing that you have to make a 
special trip here to lecture us about it, and throw up your hands and 
exclaim, 'God, is this difficult, is this difficultl' then why do all of you 
even bother? Why don't you stay home and earn an honest living making 
music more or less according to the accepted models that, after all, still 
make many of us happy?" This trivial argument must be taken 
seriously ... it cannot be dismissed with a vague gesture that says "anyone 
who thinks like that is out of step with the times"'. 69 
What is remarkable about this passage is that Adorno's only response to objections to 
obstinacy in the face of seemingly impossible odds-in other words, Adorno's only 
response to an objection to taking the world so seriously-is to say that we must, 
indeed, take it so seriously. What this brings to light is that the impossibility of the 
new-manifested, as it is, by the difficulties of modern composition-cannot be 
defended, because it is a presupposition. Adorno intimates this himself at the outset 
of the essay: 'to the extent that music is made in an umeflected way, to the extent that 
it does not, itself, recognize its difficulties as preconditions and incorporate them, it 
degenerates into the mere repetition of things that have been said a hundred times,.70 
Thus, with Adorno we see the question of taking seriously stripped down to its basics 
as an unjustifiable demand, as presupposition, but what this also means is that it 
68 Adorno, T.W. 'Difficulties: 1. In Composing', p. 646. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid (my emphasis). 
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emerges much more emphatically and unapologetically as a defiant sign of hope. In 
serious works of art, in those which acknowledge the impossibility of the new, what 
most comes to the fore is hope, and the more we despair of this hope, the more serious 
it becomes. 
Aesthetic seriousness 
But we cannot lose sight of the fact that even though he focuses on works of art, 
Adorno does not conceive of the new in terms ofthe creation of new objects. In fact, 
the new could be said to be precisely the failure to create new objects. Adorno 
expresses this failure metaphorically in Aesthetic Theory, when he says that the 
'relation to the new is modelled on a child at the piano searching for a chord never 
previously heard. This chord, however, was always there; the possible combinations 
are limited and actually everything that can be played on it is implicitly given in the 
keyboard,.71 It would seem once again, then, that the search for the new should be 
dismissed as childish obstinacy; and yet Adorno rallies to Schonberg's reflection that 
'[i]fyou do not seek, you will not find', and says it is 'a watchword of the new,.72 So 
if one cannot create new things, what does one achieve in searching for the new? If, 
for example, Schonberg'S search led him to a rethinking of the function of 
counterpoint in music, what is the significance of this 'revolution of the language of 
music,?73 Right off, it must be stressed again that Schonberg created no new things in 
this undertaking; the elements which he undertook to derive 'from an identical core' 
were the 'traditional academic syllabuses', 'such as harmony, counterpoint, form, and 
tone colour' .74 However, even if superficially all Schonberg does is to reorganise 
traditional musical elements, the new still appears in what is rejected by this 
reorganisation: namely, the unquestioned primacy of harmonic tonality. When he 
speaks of 'The Function of Counterpoint in New Music' in 1957, Adorno states that 
what was demanded was 'the creation of a specific coherence as authentic as the old 
universal system of tonality'. 75 What one sees in this is two things: On the one hand, 
71 Adorno, T.W. Aesthetic Theory, p. 32. 
72 Ibid., p. 22. 
73 Adorno, T.W. 'The Function of Counterpoint in New Music', p. 137. 
74 Ibid., pp 124-25. 
75 Ibid., p. 141. 
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Schonberg's development makes harmonic tonality old-as Adorno puts it in 
Aesthetic Theory, perfect chords were 'relegated to exhausted special 
circumstances,.76 On the other hand, this rejection of what up until then was 
considered a constitutive aspect of music becomes part of musical material itself. 
And it is here that we find the new: 'through the new, critique-the refusal-becomes 
an objective element of art itself. 77 The new of new music signals a critical 
disruption in music's trajectory, an explosion which makes things such that music can 
never be the same again: 'Schonberg's revolution of the language of music ... is ... the 
unceasing effort to take its claims seriously and to test them radically-right up to the 
breaking point' .78 It is this explosive aspect of the new, which explains its 
decisiveness. According to Adorno, once the path of new music has been engaged 
there is no looking back; like 'the role played by Don Quixote', it 'is at once 
impossible and necessary'. 79 
A problem remains, however. In order for it to be decisive, the new must be 
necessary, but how do we really know that a breakthrough like 'Schonberg's. 
revolution' is more than a mere 'escape from school', or an otherwise arbitrary 
decision on the part of the artist? It is this problem which leads Adorno to make an 
appeal to the notion of' authenticity'; as he says, 'what is authentic about [Schonberg] 
is authoritative counterpoint'.8o However, 'authenticity' is a notion which Adorno at 
other times rejects,81 and for that reason we might prefer the term he uses in Aesthetic 
Theory: namely, 'aesthetic seriousness'. 
First off, we might note that this term is not of Adorno's invention. He himself 
derives it from the Danish thinker, S0ren Kierkegaard. In the latter's Either/Or, 
'aesthetic seriousness' is presented in the context of the decision between ethical and 
aesthetic life-views, itself the absolute and decisive choice between 'choosing and not 
choosing' .82 However, even if choice is associated with the ethical-' choosing gives 
76 Adorno, T.W. Aesthetic Theory, p. 36. 
77 Ibid, p. 22. 
78 Adorno, T.W. 'The Function of Counterpoint in New Music', p. 137. 
79 Ibid, p. 142: The whole sentence reads as follows: 'Art now finds itself, at the end of the bourgeois 
era, forced into the role played by Don Quixote at its beginning: a role that is at once impossible and 
necessary' . 
80 Ibid, p. 138. 
81 I am thinking, for example, of the aphorism' Gold Assay' in Minima Moralia. 
82 Kierkegaard, S0ren. Either/Or, p. 49l. 
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a man's nature a solemnity, a quiet dignity, that is never entirely lost,83-'aesthetic 
seriousness' is not the indifference of not choosing, but rather the relative choice 
associated with an in-between state lying' at the dangerous transition between the 
aesthetic and the ethical' . 84 'Aesthetic seriousness', therefore, is the recognition that 
it is necessary to choose, even if one is unwilling to choose the ethical. According to 
'B', the spokesman for the ethical in EitherlOr, 'if[a man] has what you [i.e. 'A', the 
spokesman for the aesthetic] so often speak of, namely aesthetic seriousness and a 
little worldly wisdom, he will see that it is impossible for everything to thrive equally 
well. So he will choose, and what decides his choice is a more-or-less, which is a 
relative difference,.85 Like the new, in other words, 'aesthetic seriousness' involves 
decision in the face of indifference and sameness. The problem with such a path, 
according to Kierkegaard, however, is that it leads the aesthetically serious man into 
an abyssal plunge of his own manufacture. Because he has only his own subjectivity 
upon which to base his contingent, relative choices, he will develop this subjectivity 
all out of proportion. According to 'B', the aesthetically serious individual can never 
aspire to being anything more than 'a grimace ofa man,.86 
In Adorno's hands, however, 'aesthetic seriousness' no longer leads to 'paradoxical 
and irregular conduct', but rather the new. Some of this difference is probably due to 
the fact that it is regular conduct, rather than irregular conduct, which most alarms 
Adorno. However, the other important change is that rather than considering 
'aesthetic seriousness' solely as concerns the individual, Adorno does so in the 
context of the work of art, thereby averting the abyssal plunge into pure subjectivity 
identified by Kierkegaard's 'B'. In Adorno's view, a work of art only exists to the 
extent that it follows 'the whippoorwill of objectivity immanent to it', 87 and so 
'aesthetic seriousness' cannot come into play until the subjectivity of an artist 
acknowledges this 'immanent objectivity'. However, and possibly contrary to 
expectations, the highest seriousness is not attained when these two drives-the 
'immanent objectivity' of a work of art and the subjective efforts of an artist to live up 
to it--converge in full accordance. For one thing, this is unlikely to happen, because 
83 Ibid., p. 490. 
84 Ibid, pp 529-30. Kierkegaard does not explicitly link 'A's inbetweenness with 'aesthetic 
seriousness'; yet, the descriptions 'B' gives of 'A' makes it seem warranted to read them as connected. 
85 Ibid, p. 525 (my emphasis). 
86 Ibid, p. 55l. 
87 Adorno, T.W. Aesthetic Theory, p. 38. 
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one is 'without any guarantee that the productive forces-the spirit of the artist and 
his procedures-will be equal to that objectivity'. 88 For another, and even more 
importantly, such adequation of the two forces cannot be the goal, because such 
convergence would eliminate the very possibility of the new. As Adorno puts it, 'if 
such a guarantee did exist, it would block the possibility of the new, which itself 
contributes to the objectivity and coherence of the work,.89 In other words, the new is 
only possible to the extent that an artist is 'aesthetically serious' enough to let a work 
of art race out ahead of him, and not to give up the race in spite of the fact that he will 
never catch up. The' serious in art is the pathos of an objectivity that confronts the 
individual with what is more and other than he is in his historically imperative 
insufficiency' .90 It is only inferior artists who would try to block the new and bring 
the work of art down to their level. 
A non-serious seriousness 
In spite of the rhetoric, however, let us consider the failings of these inferior artists in 
more detail. That is, what they do wrong is to engage themselves in the development 
of works of art too actively, and one could even protest that they are being criticised 
for nothing other than being more conscientious than 'aesthetically serious' artists. 
One of the pitfalls for artists, in other words, is to be too serious. 
How can this be? It would seem that there were much greater dangers in store for an 
artist who does not take things seriously enough, an artist, for example, like 
Stravinsky. 91 However, according to Adorno, Stravinsky's lack of seriousness is not 
an argument against him. Though he does criticise the latter for a certain cynical 
urbanity which is 'clever with regard to aesthetic seriousness' ,92 Adorno is generally 
more inclined to defend a lack of seriousness, and to point out, by contrast, that to 
take things too seriously is 'awkward, pretentious in a characteristically German 
88 Ibid 
89 Ibid 
90 Ibid, pp 38-9. 
91 In this, I am limiting myself to the Stravinsky presented in The Philosophy of Modem Music. 
92 Adorno, T.w. The Philosophy of Modem Music, p. 214 (footnote 47). 
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manner' .93 What is needed for art is not seriousness, but more nearly a kind of non-
serious seriousness, because 'it is precisely in the denial of seriousness, in the 
negation of any responsibility in art ... that seriousness should consist' .94 The reason 
Adorno rejects a sense of serious responsibility in favour of playful irresponsibility is 
that the former would in the end reinforce reality. If we return to the metaphor of the 
child at the piano, we see that an artist who is too conscientious with respect to the 
limitations of the instrument would never be willing to continue the impossible game 
of finding the 'never before heard, virgin chord'. He would stop searching, thereby 
capitulating to how things 'really are', to the sameness, against which the new should 
rebel. 
Therefore, if the non-serious seriousness of 'aesthetic seriousness' implies a certain 
naivety of the artist, Adorno thinks the artist is all the stronger for it. He lauds the 
'provincialism of the Schonberg school' as inseparable from its 'intransigent 
radicalism,.95 In Adorno's view, to take seriously is to play. However, this does not 
in any way deny a work of art's capacity to confront reality: Rather its playfulness, its 
non-serious seriousness, betrays an even deeper awareness of the horrible 
inescapability of reality's sameness. As he says, 'music is seen as a parable of an 
attitude which ridicules seriousness, while this attitude itself is actually rooted in 
terror,.96 Thus, why we take should take the work of art seriously is that in so doing 
we harbour the hope that things can be truly different. 
Risks of regression 
A rapid glance would say that the hope just identified with Adorno in the form of the 
autonomous work of art is not incompatible with Nietzsche's hope for a future 
German hero and Heidegger's for 'the new era'. As was said at the outset, asking 
why we take something seriously has a tendency to lead, though possibly via despair, 
to hopes for a new beginning. However, this rapid glance would miss a revealing 
difference between Nietzsche and Heidegger on the one side, and Adorno on the 
93 Ibid 
94 Ibid 
95 Ibid 
96 Ibid 
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other. That is, the first two view taking art seriously as a stepping stone toward our 
hopes; whereas, for Adorno, the work of art may be the most radical image we have 
of our hopes, but it in no way facilitates their realisation. Whereas Nietzsche speaks 
of a future German hero, a genius, who would bring about a 'German rebirth of the 
Hellenic world', and Heidegger speaks of the Machtbereich of poetry, Adorno muses 
that '[t]hat artworks intervene politically is doubtful,.97 Adorno distances works of 
art from direct political activity, because he views such activity, even when 
revolutionary, as a 'cryptogram of domination' that 'tends towards that which, in 
terms of its own logic, it should abolish' .98 In other words, an actively revolutionary 
art-such as Futurism, or on the other end of the scale, Socialist Realism-tends to 
reproduce the very patterns of domination it opposes. 
It does so, because it loses sight of the fact that for any revolution to be true to itself it 
must remain open to the revolution that would overthrow it. Adorno's awareness of 
this paradox appears in his sensitivity to the possibility of regression: even the most 
revolutionary work of art has within it the possibility to regress, and thus become an 
apology for the state of society as it is. Adorno evokes this poignantly when speaking 
of the danger of kitsch: 'Kitsch is not, as those believers in erudite culture would like 
to imagine, a mere refuse of art, originating in disloyal accommodation to the enemy; 
rather, it lurks in art, awaiting ever recurring opportunities to spring forth'. 99 
In terms of Schonberg, the problem of emerging regression is most obvious in what 
might seem the most innovative of his inventions: twelve-tone technique. Early on 
Adorno defends twelve-tone technique as 'the rational carrying-out of a historical 
compulsion, which the most advanced consciousness undertakes' .100 However, in a 
biographical article written after Schonberg'S death, Adorno makes almost the exact 
opposite claim about Schonberg's consciousness. He points out that 'the beginning of 
the twelve-tone phase dates at latest to 1922; its full development coincides with a 
change in Schonberg's life situation': namely, that 'from then on was he freed from 
the concern of attending to material needs'. Shortly thereafter, Adorno muses that the 
fact that 'many of the later works lack the force of the earlier' may allow one to 
97 Adorno, T.W. Aesthetic Theory, p. 242. 
98 Ibid, p. 241. 
99 Adorno, T.W. Aesthetic Theory, p. 239. 
100 Adorno, T.W. 'Zur Zw6Iftontechnik', p. 364. 
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'suppose a connection with the more comfortable life'. 101 So what has happened? 
Schonberg has been transformed from a robust revolutionary into a comfortable 
bourgeois. Why this portrayal of regression? The answer seems to lie in the relation 
between Schonberg's innovations in counterpoint and in those of twelve-tone 
technique. In both the 1957 biographical sketch just cited and the essay on 
counterpoint from the same year (cited in previous sections), Adorno describes the 
development of twelve-tone technique as following from those of counterpoint, but he 
also presents this in terms disfavourable to twelve-tone, even to the point of 
describing the latter as the death of 'Schonberg's greatest feat', binding counterpoint: 
'Twelve-tone technique, which represents the consummation of the spirit of 
counterpoint, also contains the potential for its demise ... The last frontier of 
contrapuntal thinking becomes visible on the horizon'. 102 In other words, as much of 
a revolutionary achievement binding counterpoint may be, it is threatened by its own 
inner logic to eventually lose its revolutionary character and become regressive. 
Thus, the danger for Adorno is not only that we will somehow miss the decisive 
moment by not taking it seriously enough-a concern he shares with Nietzsc~e and 
Heidegger-but also that we will take any particular decisive moment too seriously 
and miss the next. 
Impossible decision 
The decision to take seriously, then, is a delicately balanced one, and yet the historical 
urgency in which the decision is often placed risks undermining the balancing act. 
For if one decides too quickly to take seriously, one risks projecting oneself into a 
destructive conflict without any promise of re-emergence into a renewed world. If, by 
contrast, one hesitates in one's decision, one risks never deciding and rather watching 
one's resolution fall victim to mocking despair. In that there are no criteria for what 
would constitute the timely decision, there can be only indications and examples. In 
the next two chapters we will attempt to discuss two of these indications through the 
figures of the tragic heroic artist and the blind poet. 
101 Adorno, T.W. 'Arnold Schonberg (1)', p. 317. 
102 Adorno, T.W. 'The Function of Counterpoint in New Music', p. 138. 
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As an introduction to these discussions-and in conclusion to what precedes-we 
should note, however, that these figures can be no more than indications, that they 
must always remain dual and self-contradictory. This is because the extremes that 
constitute them are inseparable, that taking seriously always involves a dual 
movement of simultaneous leaping forward and holding back, of darkest earnestness 
and lightest mirth. And because of the constant motion of renvoi, it is impossible for 
us to ever decisively resolve the questions that motivate our investigations through 
them or any other figures or examples. We cannot stand outside the texts we are 
reading and decide definitively why these philosophers take artists so seriously. 
Rather, like them, and like the figures they trace, we are faced with the impossible 
decision of when to take seriously, of when to risk making their words our own. 
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chapter two 
Tragic heroic artists 
In this chapter we will examine that aspect of a serious world characterised by the 
hope promised by a possibility of answering as it is embodied in the figure of the 
tragic heroic artist. 
Who was that masked man? 
In the figure of the tragic hero, common parlance and philosophical discourse 
converge. For it is quite conceivable that when asked why he takes so-and-so 
seriously, someone might answer that it is because so-and-so 'makes a difference', is 
'his champion', or a 'hero' even. Just the same, don't we struggle to take such 
statements seriously? Don't we view the person who holds them as, at best, 
charmingly naIve, and at worst, deluded? Isn't our tendency to immediately relativise 
heroisation, to smile and comment 'how important so-and-so seems for you'? It 
would be a great boost to our intellectual pride if such 21st century scepticism 
reflected favourably upon us, and to the disadvantage of the likes of Nietzsche, 
Heidegger and Adorno; however, nothing of the sort is possible. It is precisely the 
recognition of their respective ages as heroless-as well as a rejection of smug, faux-
worldly scepticism-which motivates these philosophers to embrace tragic heroism; 
their concern is that herolessness is tantamount to hopelessness, that hope which 
cannot be embodied or realised is no hope at all. Furthermore, we cannot 
misunderstand this herolessness: it is not simply that there happen not to be any 
heroes at the moment, but that the very conditions necessary for heroes have been 
undermined. It is this situation which draws these thinkers to a different, creative 
kind of hero: as it is, the tragic heroic artist. 
To the extent that such heroisation has become, as Adorno would put it, absorbed by 
the culture industry, and the trials and tribulations of Vincent van Gogh have become 
a coffee table book, we must take particular pains to understand what a tragic heroic 
artist really consists of. A tragic heroic artist is not simply an artist who suffers for 
his art. In fact, in that his roots trace back to Aristotle's Poetics, the popular image of 
Julie Kuhlken Page 55 
Why would a philosopher take an artist seriously? 
the starving artist in the garret is a pale vision indeed. This is because if we consider 
the characteristics Aristotle attributes to the tragic hero in order that he can 
accomplish 'by means of pity and terror the catharsis of such emotions', 1 what we 
find is a catalogue of daring virility: a tragic hero is to be virtuous, noble, active, but 
also susceptible to a fault so grave as to lead to his certain downfall. The last is of 
particular interest, for as Walter Benjamin points out in his book The Origin 0/ 
German Tragic Drama, it is possible to design a 'tragedy', a Trauerspiel, which 
otherwise fulfils all of the requirements for tragedy outlined by Aristotle, and yet fails 
to live up to Attic tragedy as regards the hero's downfall. As Benjamin puts it, the 
tragic hero's downfall is a sacrifice that 'differs from any other kind, being at once 
both a first and a final sacrifice'.2 Unlike the tyrants of the Trauerspiel, the true tragic 
hero does not appeal for sympathy~ he does not want the audience or existing 
community to mourn his death. Rather his death is to be of benefit to an 'as yet 
unborn, national community', and thus must be suffered in a defiant 'tragic silence'. 3 
Such defiance on the part of the tragic hero is his acknowledgement of the necessity 
of his downfall, a necessity that 'is neither a causal nor a magical' one,4 and as such 
cannot be averted by any action or appeasement of the gods. But this necessity is also 
the paradox of the tragic hero: he is shouldered with an immense responsibility over 
which he has, in fact, absolutely no responsibility. This paradox intrigued the early 
German romantics, who according to Peter Szondi, engaged in a thinking which 
neglects the 'the effect of the Tragic', in favour of an understanding of 'the 
phenomenon itself. 5 Isolating the Tragic opens the possibility that the tragic hero 
could become conscious of, and thus, to at least some degree, responsible for, his own 
tragic fate. 6 In The Birth o/Tragedy, Nietzsche places himself in such a tradition in 
I Aristotle. Poetics, 49 b, p. 7. 
2 Benjamin, Walter. The Origin of German Tragic Drama, p. 106. 
3 Ibid, pp 107 and 108, respectively. 
4 Ibid, p. 115. 
5 Szondi, Peter. 'The Notion of the Tragic', p. 44. 
6 In her book Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of the Sm/i: A Study of Heroic Individualism, Leslie 
Thiele points to such a possibility in her distinction between classical heroes and 'the radical 
autonomy of the modem individual'. According to her, '[p]revious heroes were always, at least in part, 
representatives. They were incarnations of ideals or descendants of the gods. They were meant to 
serve as paradigms for their peers and their progeny, just as the gods served as models for the heroes. 
Nietzsche understood the modem hero quite differently. He is not a representative of ideals any more 
than he is a divine tool. He speaks only for himself; he represents only himself The paradigm being 
offered is that of one who has become sovereign and unique, a law unto himself, not others. As such, 
he cannot serve as an exemplar, for his virtue consists in his incommensurability' (pp 42-3). As it turns 
out, however, Leslie Thiele turns away from this radical notion of tragic heroism when she goes on to 
describe 'higher men' as exemplary incarnations of heroic individualism. 
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his conception of '[t]he glorious "ability" of the great genius, for which even eternal 
suffering is not recompense enough'. 7 
Now, there is no question that eternal suffering and death have a serious decisiveness 
to them which promises nothing will ever be the same after their onslaught. 
Nevertheless, this seriousness would be meaningless unless it left traces, unless an 
elegy can be written to the fallen hero, by which his deeds are communicated to an 'as 
yet unborn, national community'. But how to write it? If one emphasizes the 
magnitude of his achievement-his heroism even in death-then one removes the 
sting of his death, and as such the tragedy of it. However, if one emphasizes the 
tragedy of his death, then his heroism tarnishes: his image suffers not only from the 
fact that he could not avert death, but also from the suspicion that he could have done 
even more if he had lived. There is, in other words, an excessive, inadequate relation 
between the tragic and the heroic that makes the contradictory demand that death be 
both fooled and triumphant. In Nietzsche's case, this becomes evident in the cyclical 
pattern of birth, death and then rebirth of tragedy: Dionysus, the 'original hero' , 
reappears time and again, always wearing a different mask. 8 
However, if Dionysus is masked, how is it that we are to recognize him? For 
example, even during his early devotion to Wagner, Nietzsche is plagued by doubts 
concerning the composer's claim to tragic heroic status.9 One reason this is the case, 
and one that has implications for our ability to recognize a tragic hero, is the unique 
temporality associated with tragic heroism. As a 'first and a final sacrifice', a tragic 
hero marks the closing of one era and the opening of a new one, and as such the 
cleaving oftime into a before and after. What this means is that we view the tragic 
heroic event, as well as the artist who undertakes it, either as something to come, or as 
7 Nietzsche, F. The Birth of Tragedy, p. 49. 
8 Ibid, p. 51: The full sentence is as follows: 'But we may claim with equal certainty that, until 
Euripides, Dionysus never ceased to be the tragic hero, and that all the celebrated characters of the 
Greek stage-Prometheus, Oedipus and so on-are merely masks ofthat original hero, Dionysus'. 
9 In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche's possibly least ambiguous association of Wagner with the 
rebirth of tragedy occurs where he associates 'German music' and 'its mighty sun-cycle from Bach to 
Beethoven, from Beethoven to Wagner' with 'the gradual awakening of the Dionysian spirit, in our 
contemporary world! ' (p. 94). However, Nietzsche soon thereafter qualifies the association by 
referring to 'the mystery of the union of German music and German philosophy' (p. 95), thereby 
instilling doubts as to whether rebirth can occur in the guise of Wagner alone. I should also note at this 
time that Shaun Whiteside uses the term 'Dionysiac' rather than 'Dionysian' in his translation; 
however, I will consistently use the term Dionysian, making this modification to all citations. 
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something in the past. We cannot be in the cleft itself and view the event as the 
decisive event it is. Our age, in other words, is never the age of heroes; once the 
notion of a tragic heroic artist is embraced, the disjunction between before and after 
means that on one side lies the age of fable or myth and on the other some sort of 
dark, heroless age. 10 When a philosopher writes his eulogy--or prophecy, as we will 
see-he is most often writing in some dark age gazing back (or forward) upon a 
mythical era in which people's lives made sense. And this last point is important 
because it is in the task of making sense of people's lives, of biography, that the figure 
of a tragic heroic artist most notably takes shape. Unlike most lives which drift 
arbitrarily or unexpectedly in and out of existence, a tragic heroic artist is unique in 
that his downfall is tragedy, it is an integral part of the story of his life. 
But here is where the problems start to mount. If death must be considered an integral 
part of a tragic heroic artist's life, not only is it uncertain what happens when a 
philosopher tries to recognize a contemporary as a tragic heroic artist, as Nietzsche 
does with Wagner, but also, even when it is not a question of a contemporary, it is 
difficult to see the justification for treating a real person's life as a fable or myth. Do 
the demands of taking seriously justify such fabulation? And even if they do, why 
philosophically develop the notion of a tragic heroic artist at all? It is the answer to 
this last question which will help us understand why Nietzsche in 'Richard Wagner in 
Bayreuth', Heidegger in the lectures on Germanien and Der Rhein, and Adorno in a 
1957 biographical sketch, present Wagner, Holderiin, and Schonberg, respectively, as 
living out lives that are larger than life itself, that is, the lives of tragic heroic artists. 
10 Gilles Deleuze offers a comparable understanding oftime in his discussion of the 'third synthesis' 
or 'empty fonn' oftime in Difference and Repetition: 'the idea of a totality of time must be understood 
as follows: the caesura, of whatever kind, must be determined in the image of a unique and tremendous 
event, an act which is adequate to time as a whole. The image itself is divided, tom into two unequal 
parts. Nevertheless, it draws together the totality of time. It must be called a symbol. .. Such a symbol 
adequate to the totality of time may be expressed in many ways: to throw time out of joint, to make the 
sun explode, to throw oneself into the volcano, to kill God or the father. The symbolic image 
constitutes the totality of time to the extent that it draws together the caesura, the before and the after' 
(p.89). The figure ofa tragic heroic artist would be one of these symbolic images. 
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The mythical real 
As has already been developed, the most important aspect of a tragic heroic artist is 
his relation to time. And as such, it is not surprising to find Heidegger begin his 
lectures of Germanien by warding off the danger of contemporising Holderlin, of 
taking him 'historically'. According to Dominique Janicaud, this is critical for 
Heidegger, because the latter wants to endow Holderlin with 'an historical privilege" 
'historical' this time understood in the sense of Geschichte. This privilege appears as 
'the assumption that Holderlin's poetry, provided we listen to its most 
intimate message, offers a radically new experience, i.e., a new world and, 
first, a new space-time relationship (a new Zeit-Raum). To experience it, 
we have to perform a massive methodological change in our approach to 
space and time'. 11 
As befits such a radical methodological change, Heidegger engages in a practice we 
noted in the first chapter and relies upon poetical and mythical language at key 
moments in his argumentation. 12 One ofthese moments occurs when Heidegger calls 
Holderlin 'heroic'. 
What Holderlin specifically does to deserve this epithet is, according to Heidegger, to 
veil the 'monstrous necessity of his calling' as poet with 'a unique tenderness': that is, 
to refer to poetry as "'the most innocent of all crafts'" .13 We should recognize this as 
the first key-passage from 'Holderlin and the Essence of Poetry' , and what the veil of 
harmless appearance spread by these tender words does is to both mark and maintain 
the position of the poet as "'thrown" out of ordinary life' .14 Holderlin's heroism 
11 Janicaud, Dominique. 'The "Overcoming" of Metaphysics in the Holderlin Lectures', pp 388 and 
384, respectively. It might be noted as well that, according to Janicaud this assumption is something 
that 'does not change through all the Holderlin lectures (and this could also be said of the 
Erlautenmgen and of "Holderlin's Erde und Himmel"), (p. 384), and in fact could even be said to be 
intensified by its combination with the project of overcoming metaphysics in the later lectures. 
12 We saw this in the previous chapter as regards the event of founding in the section entitled 
'Language and Event' . 
13 Heidegger, M. Holderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und 'Der Rhein', p. 35: The full passage reads as 
follows: 'So kiinden gerade diese Breife an die Mutter in ihrer klaren Innigkeit die ungeheure Not 
seiner Berufung und das walIrhaft Heldische seines Daseins, weil se es in einer einzigen Zartheit 
verhullen' . 
14 Heidegger, M. 'Holderlin and the Essence of Poetry' , p. 467. 
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consists, therefore, in standing excluded from the realm of men and A lltaglichke it, 
'thrown into an in-between'. 15 This in-betweenness has tragic heroic significance, 
because to stand in an in-between is the poet's tragic burden or flaw: ' ... the poet, in 
the necessity of suffering-with [Mit-Ieidens], stands with the suffering of the demi-
gods',16 that is to say, with the Zwischenwesen or in-between beings. The poet's 
tragic heroic fate, then, is to be thrust from ordinary space-time-a fate, if we recall, 
he bears with such heroic stiff upper lip-and into a mythical realm of demi-gods, 
where suffering reigns. Furthermore, what this mythical moment allows is a 
projection into the future. For, the in-between realm's suffering is of a particular sort: 
namely, a 'suffering-in-advance' [Vor-Ieidens] that makes Holderlin's work stand 'as 
a fixed projection in the Dasein of our people: a veiled, poetic founding of our 
being,.17 To sum up using Heidegger's unique vocabulary, then, the poet's suffering-
standing-in-between (i.e. tragic heroism) is, in fact, an excessive-leaping-ahead that 
establishes the Dasein of a people as historical (i.e. in a new space-time). 
But why, we must ask, are we expected to believe in such a tale oftragic heroic 
achievement? Why would we not simply dismiss this as childish fantasy? Why, in 
other words, would a philosopher such as Heidegger rely on a host of demi-gods, 
tragic heroes and in-between beings to advance his arguments? Heidegger's response 
to these questions might be to point out that a tragic heroic artist is, in fact, 'the 
founder of being' . And as such, rather than it being the tragic heroic which is unreal, 
it is '[w]hat we in everyday life call the real [which] is, in the end, the unreal,;18 the 
tragic heroic, by contrast, would be what is most real and essential. However, this 
response is weakened not only by Holderlin's own dependence upon the everyday 
real-something which we will discuss shortly-but also by the fact that this 
15 Ibid, p. 468. 
16 Heidegger, M. Holder/ins Hymnen 'Germanien' und 'Der Rhein', p. 182 (my emphasis): ' ... der 
Dichter in der Notwendigkeit des Mit-Ieidens mit dem Leiden der Halbgotter steht...' 'Suffering-with' 
as a translations of Mit-leiden does not capture the duality of the term as also meaning, without a 
hyphen, 'to have compassion'. This second meaning would give the following translation: ' ... the poet, 
in the necessity of having compassion, stands with the suffering of the demi-gods'. Such a translation 
would also have tragic heroic undertones to the extent that one could imagine the poet being burdened 
bi' a heroic capacity for feeling that forces him to take part in the suffering of the in-between, or cleft. 
1 Ibid, p. 184. We might also note that this passage follows soon after the point where Heidegger 
reveals that the phrase, 'the poet of poets', derives from a statement made by Holderlin concerning 
Homer. The reference to Homer underscores the kinship between Heidegger's conception of the 
establishment of being and Nietzsche's notion of the 'German rebirth of the Hellenic world'. 
18 Ibid, p. 33: 'Dichtung ist Stiftung, erwirkende Griindung des Bleibenden. Der Dichter ist 
Begriinder des Seyns. Was wir so im Alltag das Wirkliche nennen, ist am Ende das Unwirkliche'. 
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dismissive response to the problem of a tragic heroic artist's mythical character will 
not satisfy all philosophers with a penchant for tragic heroism. In particular, it will 
not satisfy Adorno. 
Mythology of refusal 
This is because, in Adorno's conception, there can be no separate mythical realm for 
art and aesthetics-thereby, barring the notion that an artist can be excluded from the 
realm of Alltaglichkeit-and it is evident from a variety of his ideas, not the least of 
which being the notion of art as 'fait social' mentioned in the previous chapter. As 
relates to Schonberg, the inescapable inclusion of art in society is revealed through a 
biographical moment portrayed in both Prisms and a later article from 1957. In the 
Prisms biography, Adorno relates that: 
'[i]n the midst of the blindness of specialization, [Schonberg's] music 
suddenly saw the light that shines beyond the aesthetic realm. His 
incorruptible integrity once attained this awareness when, during the first 
months of the Hitler dictatorship, he unabashedly said that survival was 
more important than art'. 19 
There are three things we might notice about this event in Schonberg's life. The first 
is what we have just stated about Adorno's philosophy, which is that it will not 
tolerate some sort of aesthetic realm insulated from social and political realities, and 
in particular from that of Nazism. In fact, in Minima Moralia Adorno criticises 
Heidegger (though without mentioning him by name) precisely for presenting a 
separate tragic heroic realm as if it were independent of Fascism, when really 
indebted to it: 'To the converted and unconverted philosophers of Fascism, finally, 
values like authenticity, heroic endurance of the "being-in-the-world" of individual 
existence, frontier situations, become a means of usurping religious-authoritarian 
pathos without the least religious content'?O However, and this is the second point, 
Adorno himself is not entirely free of such 'pathos'. The first sentence from the 
19 Adorno, T.W. 'Arnold SchOnberg, 1874-1951', p. 171. 
20 Adorno, T.W. Minima Moralia, p. 152. 
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Prisms' passage reads as a moment ofrevelation-'his music suddenly saw the 
light'-and even though it is impossible not to read this as tongue in cheek, the irony 
is also a form of self-irony. For, Adorno's comment at the end of the Prisms essay 
that Schonberg's Survivor from Warsaw is 'music as the protest of mankind against 
myth,21 is not simply a criticism of the kind of misuse of myth that was undertaken by 
the Nazis, it is also the establishment of another mythology, a mythology of refusal by 
which 'music regains its redeeming power through negation'. 22 Finally, and thirdly 
then, what this passage does is to help establish this mythology of refusal. According 
to this mythology, if survival is more important than art, this is largely because art 
itself, in its most radical manifestations, appears as nothing more than its own 
impossible survival faced with current social conditions. 
The place where Adorno thematically develops the tragic heroism of this mythology 
lies, unfortunately for this investigation, not in his writings on Schonberg, but his 
writings on Beckett. Nevertheless, there are reasons for seeing parallels between that 
'most musical ofwriters,23 and the composer. This is not simply because Adorno 
himself compares Beckett to Schonberg in 'Trying to Understand Endgame', it is also 
because tragedy as Adorno comprehends it in that essay-that is, as an 'asymptote', 
which tends toward silence24-is very much compatible with his conception of 
Schonberg's musical development. Long before the rise of Nazism silenced art and 
necessitated a focus on survival, Schonberg musically anticipated this menacing 
tragedy. That is, his works do not simply react negatively to the events leading up to 
and during the second world war, they apparently prophesy them: as Adorno puts it, 
in the 1930's and 40's '[t]he sounds of Erwartung ... of "impending danger, anxiety, 
catastrophe", finally meet what they had always prophesied' . 25 This ability on the 
part of Schonberg to create works before their time, to prophesy the very catastrophe 
which would silence them, is his tragic heroism. 
21 Adorno, T.w. 'Arnold Schonberg, 1874-1951' , p. 172. 
22 Ibid. (my emphasis). 
23 Paddison, Max. Adorno's Aesthetics o/Music, p. 275. 
24 Adorno, T.W. 'Trying to Understand Endgame', p. 260: The full sentence reads as follows: 'The 
asymptote toward which Beckett's drama tends is silence, which was already defined as a rest in the 
Shakespearian origins of modern tragedy'. As for the analogy between Schonberg and Beckett, see pp 
259-60. 
25 Adorno, T.w. 'Arnold Schonberg, 1874-1951', p. 172. 
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Now, one may be tempted to argue that Adorno's interpretation of Schonberg benefits 
from just a little too much 20/20 hindsight to be taken seriously. In other words, in 
1956 it is simply too easy for Adorno to claim that Schonberg anticipated WWII. 
And yet, this is where the statement by Schonberg comes into play. Adorno does not 
simply assert that, after the fact, we can hear the menace of fascism in Schonberg's 
compositions, rather he more nearly argues that a prophetic temporality offers the best 
way to grasp Schonberg's actions in life-or to put it differently, to see the tragic 
heroism of his life. Schonberg is a tragic hero, because he so deeply lived the hope 
promised by his own music, that he preferred to sacrifice this music than to reconcile 
it with Nazism, and moreover said so as early as 1933. It is this tragic heroic insight 
into, and rejection of, impending catastrophe, which constitutes Schonberg's access to 
the 'seriousness of music': 
'He accepted the collective fate without complaining about his individual 
one, without even dwelling upon it for long; at that time, in early 1933, 
came the word that there were more important things in life than 
composing. Spoken from this mouth, it stated the seriousness of music 
better than any pathetic elucidation of the value of art. After a few 
months of wandering, he emigrated to the U.S.; there the almost sixty-year 
old was stricken with the first serious illness of his life'. 26 
It is this prophetic refusal by Schonberg, his unwillingness to in any way compromise 
music's seriousness, and rather to accept the collective fate, which is the tragic heroic 
event for Adorno. For Adorno, tragic heroism lies not in the commotion of active 
deeds, but in the austerity of a lapsing into silence, not in bold words, but in the 
recognition that because of the catastrophe, 'meaning nothing becomes the only 
meaning' .27 
But how, we must ask, is this tragic heroic refusal to be distinguished from the self-
interested passivity it so resembles? If Schonberg is saving himself, how is it that we 
can argue that his doing so has wider implications? The important distinction, it 
would seem, hinges entirely upon some vision-even if only negative-ofhow things 
26 Adorno, T.W. 'Arnold SchOnberg (I)', pp 320-21 (my emphasis). 
27 Adorno, T.W. 'Trying to Understand Endgame', p. 261. 
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could be otherwise, of some alternative to 'the way things are'. The difference, in 
other words, depends on the notion of a serious world. For a serious world offers the 
hope that things can be otherwise, the hope that by critically engaging the world, we 
can arrive at new answers. It is this hope that allows Adorno to describe Schonberg's 
life as larger than life, the latter's self-preservative action as more than simple self-
preservation. Thus, even though Adorno does not say anything that would positively 
develop some other realm or age of myth as do Nietzsche and Heidegger, he relies 
upon it implicitly and negatively in order to reject the way things are and assert the 
seriousness of his hopes for a different society. 
Allied for better or for worse 
What the gesture toward myth does, however, is to make these philosophers 
dependent upon artists. Not surprisingly, this condition can be a source of 
philosophical discomfort, such as is expressed by Alain Badiou in his thesis of an 
'Age of Poets'. According to the latter, philosophy 'sutured' itself to poetry"in 
recognition of its own weakness. By supposedly being 'at the very locus where 
philosophy falter[ ed]' /8 art helped philosophy continue its task. That said, however, 
for Badiou it is now time for philosophy to reassert itself. As such, not only does he 
want us to believe that an 'Age of Poets' really and historically existed-that there 
really were tragic heroic poets who stepped into the breach and 'cut open a 
space ... within historic pathos,29-but also that it is now possible to end this 'age', 
and to definitively 'de-suture' philosophy from poetry. The problem, of course, is 
that such a de-suturing would depend upon the very sort of mythology of refusal that 
it would like to exclude. Badiou would like to see us safely deposited in a 
philosophical age posterior to that of poets, but the constitutive aspect of this latter 
age would be precisely that it is poet-less-that is, heroless-with the implication that 
it would be yet another mythological age-as it is, one in which negation and refusal, 
rather than artistic creation, have become meaningful. 
28 Badiou, Alain. Manifesto jor Philosophy, p. 69. 
29 Ibid., p. 71. 
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Put another way, what Badiou fails to explicitly acknowledge is that philosophy's 
attempt to reject art would be its presumption of the very independence that its 
relation with art belies.3o More specifically, philosophy's attempt to reject art would 
rob it of the very voice it needs in order to do so. Because philosophy must 
acknowledge its position in the world-and if it doesn't it is open to the charge of 
empty speculation-the philosopher is in the impossible situation of addressing the 
world in such a way that his addressing is already included in it. In fact, this is central 
to the very enjeu of a serious-as opposed to wishful-world. A philosopher's 
alliance with an artist, therefore, is his way of gaining access to a language already 
situated in the world. If the philosopher subsequently tries to reject his relation with 
the artist, he ironically contradicts his own intention by presenting himself as a poet in 
the mould of an 'Age of Poets', able to realise his very own words. 
If we now consider this alliance in terms of tragic heroism, we see that what an artist 
does when he creates a temporal cleft, is to initiate discourse. He does this by 
speaking the first word, the word that says its own saying, and it is the role of the 
philosopher to indicate this unique and original event. Now this almost magical act of 
speaking can be projected into either the past or future, with implications for the 
resulting discourse. When it is projected into the past, the resulting discourse is elegy, 
a nostalgia for a former unity and earlier uncleaved time. When it is projected into 
the future, it gives rise to prophecy, a projection of hopes for a future in which the 
cleft will be healed. The strength of these forms of discourse is that they take the 
speaker's voice into account. Their weakness is that they are locked into the strict 
temporal division that makes them possible, and as such, keep at a distance the very 
hope that they reclaim. 
Thus, as we will discover, the figure of a tragic heroic artist is as much a figure of 
false hope as that of hope. It is striking that all three of the texts upon which this 
chapter primarily depends were redressed by later ones: 'Richard Wagner in 
Bayreuth' was negated and denounced in many of Nietzsche's subsequent writings, 
but most obviously in The Case of Wagner and Nietzsche contra Wagner. In the 
30 It should be noted that Badiou seems implicitly aware of the risk of this presumption. As such, he 
does not as much argue that the philosophy should reject art as he asserts art's desire to separate itself 
from philosophy. 
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lectures on Andenken that followed those on Germanien and Der Rhein, Heidegger 
retreats from his more audacious claims about the political import ofHolderlin's 
work. As for Adorno, he returns to the biography of Schonberg in 1967 in revisions 
to 'Toward an Understanding of Schonberg', and maybe even more importantly, 
substantially revises Schonberg's centrality to art and aesthetics in 'Vers une musique 
informelle' and Aesthetic Theory. Thus, the corollary to the question of why a 
philosopher would present an artist as a tragic hero might be why he would 
subsequently withdraw the compliment. 
The man as myth 
Since the mythical nature of the tragic heroic artist would seem to provide us with the 
best reason for not taking him seriously, it is to this apparent weakness that we will 
now turn. We will first examine the characterisations of the lives of Wagner, 
Holderlin and Schonberg, respectively, cataloguing their mythical traits. Only on this 
basis we will subsequently be able to address the role of the mythical in the 
philosophical discourse of tragic heroic artists, undertaking close readings of it in the 
work of Nietzsche, Heidegger and Adorno, respectively. 
* 
In this examination, we should not be misled by biographical factuality into believing 
these traits do not exist. Adorno, for example, seems especially eager to implant the 
impression of factuality. The very first phrase of the 1957 biography of Schonberg 
reads like a birth certificate: 'He was born on the 13th of September 1874 in 
Leopoldstadt in Vienna,.31 Nevertheless, this factuality comes to have a very 
discordant tone in that Adorno often presents facts about Schonberg's life seemingly 
with the sole intention of denying them. If, for example, we take the next two 
sentences, we already see a pattern emerging: First there is the factual detail-
'Origins pointed to Slovakia ... '.-but then its denial-'However, pre-history and 
31 Adorno, T.W. 'Arnold SchOnberg (I)', p. 304. 
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arrival lie in the dark, as if he came out of a no man's land'. 32 This movement of 
assertion and denial is especially strong as concerns Schonberg's musical abilities. 
Adorno introduces the possibility that Schonberg's mother had been a piano teacher, 
and denies it in the very same breath, explaining that 'neither [Schonberg's] father nor 
his mother were artistically talented; the information that his mother had been a piano 
teacher seems to be based on an error' .33 In that it is just a statement to say that 
someone's parents were not musically inclined, but an enigmatic provocation to 
remark that though it was believed that someone's parents were musically inclined, 
that this was, in fact, not true, we must ask why Adorno writes in this fashion. The 
answer seems to lie in the notion already mentioned of a 'no man's land'; 
Schonberg's existence, talent, and music are all portrayed as if deriving from a region 
of absence. Even though he is said to have parents and other normal familial 
relations, these relations are denied, and denied in particular as concerns his music. 
His music is said to 'come wholly from the outside as that of a foundling'. 34 This 
movement of assertion and denial fictionalises Schonberg, opening up a space of 
mystery and irreality. 
* 
By comparison with Adorno, Nietzsche's approach to Wagner is remarkably up-front 
about its fictionalisation of the composer. Early on in 'Richard Wagner in Bayreuth' , 
Nietzsche explains that 
'in the case of people of out-standing talent, life must not only become, as 
is true for everyone, the reflection of their character, but also above all the 
reflection of their intellect and their own peculiar abilities. The life of the 
epic poet will have something of an epic quality ... while the life of a 
dramatist will take dramatic form' .35 
32 Ibid, p. 304. 
33 Ibid, p. 305. 
34 Ibid 
35 Nietzsche, F. 'Richard Wagner in Bayreuth', pp 262-63. In his essay "'How One Becomes What 
One Is,'" Alexander Nehamas notes this aspect of Nietzsche's thought, and relates it to the 
philosopher's project of self-creation. According to N ehamas' thesis, Nietzsche 'developed his attitude 
toward character and the self in general, as he did in many other cases as well, by considering literature 
as his primary model and generalizing from it' (p. 277), 
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Thus, from the very outset Nietzsche claims his intention to present Wagner as a 
dramatic personage, and justifies such an approach on the basis of Wagner's own 
artistic activity. According to this life drama, Wagner is cleft in twain, 'torn between 
two drives or two sides'. 36 On the one side, or as Nietzsche puts it, 'below there rages 
the rapid current of a violent will that seeks out, as it were all paths, crevices, and 
ravines to bring itself to light and that desires power' .37 On the other, 'a process of 
purification' which expresses itself with 'such a loftiness and sanctity of mood that 
we cannot help but think of the glowing ice- and snow- covered peaks of the AlpS,.38 
* 
The specifics of this division in Wagner's character is noteworthy, because 
metaphorically speaking, it very much resembles the Heideggerian topology of 'die 
Schaffenden', 'the creators'-'the poet', 'the thinker' and 'the founder of states'-in 
the circle of which Holderlin finds his place in the world. Very much like Wagner's 
'process of purification' 'the creators' live upon 'high swelling mountains, the peaks 
of the mountains, which solitarily stick up into the ether, that is to say, the realm of 
the godly' and look down upon 'the flatness of the everyday'. 39 Moreover, what is 
interesting about 'the creators' is that their development takes the place of an absent 
biography in the lectures on Germanien and Der Rhein. 
Early on in the lectures, Heidegger mocks the kind of approach Adorno undertakes, 
saying: 'We begin with a poem and thus neglect to narrate: Holderlin was born on the' 
20th of March 1770 in Lauffan am Neckar as son of. .. etc'. 40 But we must ask: Why 
does Heidegger feel so free in neglecting to recount these details? Answer: Because 
his very own ontology makes them irrelevant. In the section that precedes the first 
36 Ibid., p. 264. 
37 Ibid. (my emphasis). 
38 Ibid. 
39 Heidegger, M. 'Holderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' lind 'Der Rhein " p. 52: 'Die Zeiten der 
Schaffenden-hochaufwogendes Gebirg, die Gipfel der Berge, die einsam hineinstellen in den Ather, 
und das heillt in der Bereich des Gottlichen. Diese Zeiten der Schaffenden ragen heraus tiber das blo13e 
Nacheinander der eiligen Tage in der Flachheit des AllUiglichen ... ' We will shortly address the fact 
that Heidegger presents the notion of the 'three powers' as involving, in particular, a temporal 
distinction. 
40 Ibid., p. 6. 
Julie Kuhlken Page 68 
Why would a philosopher take an artist seriously? 
reference to 'the creators,41 entitled 'Die berechenbare Zeit des Einzelnen und die 
ursprungliche Zeit der Volker' ('The countable time of the individual and the 
originary time of the people'),42 Heidegger dismisses the fonner time as 'ubersehbar " 
both in the sense that it 'can be overlooked' or passed over as unimportant, and in the 
sense that it is 'overlookable' or surveyable-it can be 'stuck between the numbers of 
the dates of birth and death'. By contrast, the 'time of the people' is 'hidden' and 
'true,.43 No wonder, then, that Heidegger focuses on the latter. As regards Holderlin, 
what is of particular significance about it is that the 'time of the creators' is the 'time 
of the people'. As such, the biographical story ofHolderlin as a man is replaced with 
the tale ofHolderlin as popular myth. Additionally, what is asserted by this myth is a 
clear link between itself and Holderlin' s existence as a poet: 'the creators' are 
mythical precisely because of their abilities as creators. The poet, for instance, is 
marked by his power to 'establish', Stiften. And what he establishes-that is to say, 
the Dasein of the people as historical-marks a temporal cleft, a beginning or Anfang. 
* 
Thus, for all three of these thinkers the mythical character of their discourse is 
justified by the life of the artist himself as an artist. In other words, to speak about an 
artist is to mythologize, and vice-versa. Therefore, we should not see in fictionality 
an argument against a tragic heroic artist's seriousness. Rather, as we will see, the 
more effective argument against his seriousness will be, in fact, to expose its 
dependence upon actuality. 
In the breach 
And this brings us to our close readings, as well as back to the shared metaphor. Both 
Nietzsche and Heidegger speak in tenns of heights and depressions, mountains and 
41 It should be noted that earlier-on the same page as the foregoing dismissal of biographical 
details-there appears a reference to 'three powers', 'drei Machte', which are identified as 'Dichten, 
Denken und Sagen'. It is never made clear what the relation is between these 'powers' and the later 
development of 'the creators'; nevertheless, it is interesting to speculate since it is precisely the last and 
most politically controversial element, the 'Staatssch6pfer', which is here missing. 
42 Ibid, p. 49. 
43 Ibid, p. 50. 
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ravines, because though it is the case-as Heidegger puts it in 'Holderlin and the 
Essence ofPoetry'-that 'the valley belongs to the mountains,44-and thus vice-
versa-it is also the case that the mountains overshadow the valley. In other words, 
there is an asymmetry in favour of mountains and heights which makes things such 
that they alone can stand for the pair and close it as a unity. In Heidegger, the 
mountainous time of 'the creators' not only looms over the everyday existence of 
individuals, but also determines it as existence. This is the case, because for 
Heidegger, 'our existence is a knowing' ,45 by which he means that even though 
neither we nor 'the creators' know 'who we are', the temporal unity ofthe latter offers 
the hope that we can know who we are.46 And what this hope depends upon is 
precisely that we take seriously the temporal unity of 'the creators': 
'Because our existence is a knowing ... for this reason there never again is 
for us a pure poetic becoming of existence, as little as [ there is] a pure 
thinking and even as little a solely active one. We will be required not 
only to furnish accommodating and regular equalizing between the 
poetising, thinking and doing powers, but also to take seriously their 
hidden, culminating temporal unity [my emphasis] and thereby to 
experience the mystery of their originary belonging together and to form it 
originarily into a new, till now unheard of, structure ofbeing,.47 
Now the question is how this temporal unity-which we have just been asked to take 
seriously-is possible. The answer is the sacrifice or downfall of the poet. 
44 Heidegger, M. 'Holderlin and the Essence of Poetry', p. 467. The original context of this phrase 
fits in perfectly with the asymmetry we are trying to establish, because what Heidegger says is that 
'this hannless appearance belongs to the essence of poetry as the valley belongs to the mountains'. In 
other words, 'hannless appearance', and its playful non-seriousness, must defer to the tragic 
seriousness of poetry as bound to the 'one conversation'. 
45 Heidegger, M. Holderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und 'Der Rhein', p. 184: 'Das abendlandische 
geschichtliche Dasein ist unausweichlich und unaufhebbar ein wissendes'. The following discussion 
also depends upon the section on pp 56-7: 'Das Wissen der Schaffenden, wann die Zeit des Ereignisses 
des Wahren nicht ist'. 
46 A statement to this effect can be found on pp 58-9 where Heidegger concludes: 'Jetzt zeigt sich: 
Wir wissen nicht nur nicht, wer wir sind, wir mussen am Ende sogar erst und gerade teilnehmen an der 
Dichtung, urn allererst die notwendige Bedingung dafiir zu schaff en, daB es die Zeit wird, in der wir 
dann uberhaupt erfahren k6nnen, wer wir sind'. 
47 Ibid, pp 184-85: Note that the references to 'pure poetic', 'pure thinking', and 'solely active' 
becomings of existence correspond to the poet, thinker, and founder of states, respectively. 
Julie Kuhlken Page 70 
Why would a philosopher take an artist seriously? 
This tragic fate of the poet is actually Heidegger's solution to a problem he has 
created for himself through the notion of 'the creators'. He says there are three 
'creators'; however, unless at least one of these plays a unificatory role and closes the 
ranks of the three, then there is no reason not to suppose a fourth, or even fifth, 
'creator'. We see this closing of the ranks when Heidegger explains that the 'truth of 
the people is the particular openness of being as a whole, according to which the 
carrying and structuring and leading powers [i.e. 'the poet', 'the thinker', and 'the 
founder of states', respectively] receive their rank and achieve their unanimity'. 48 
And how does this occur? 'The fundamental tone, that is to say the truth of the 
existence of a people, is originarily established by the poet' .49 Thus, it is the poet who 
originarily establishes the possibility of the unity of 'the creators'. 50 What this means, 
however, is that the poet is both inside and outside, both excluded from and included 
in, the temporal unity he himself establishes; he is at the cleft of the Anfang because 
he himself forms this cleft. However, we should not think ofthis formation in some 
sort of instrumental fashion, whereby the poet is the heroic figure of action. Rather, 
his heroism follows from his Entbehrenwollens, from his willingness to endure the 
cleft, whose formation is his tragedy. And Heidegger describes this tragedy in terms 
of sacrifice; the poet is a 'firstling', who 'must be sacrificed' 51 Thus, the poet is a 
tragic figure to the extent that he forms the cleft, and a heroic one to the extent that he . 
endures it. 
Nevertheless, a question mark remains, which is, once again, 'Why the poet?'-as 
opposed to one of the other 'creators', for example. A possible response is to refer to 
the privileged position of language in Heidegger's philosophy. A particularly 
relevant indication of this privilege comes when Heidegger apparently digresses to 
speak of the 'Kameradschaft der Frontsoldaten " the 'camaraderie of soldiers at the 
front'. 52 He relates it to the 'nearness of death'. According to him, facing the 
48 Ibid, p. 144. 
49 Ibid 
50 As we will see, however, it still takes the other two, and in particular 'the founder of states' to seal 
this unity. 
51 Ibid, p. 146: 'FOr diesen Kampf der Unstimmung der jeweils noch herrschenden und sich 
fortschleppenden Stimmungen mOssen die Erstlinge geopfert werden. Das sind jene Dichter. .. ' 
52 The particular relevance of this passage derives from the fact that it ties Holderiin, the poet, to the 
actuality of soldiers at the front. This association is strengthened by repeated reference throughout the 
Holderlin lectures to Norbert von Hellingrath, who helped prepare the collection of Holder lin's poetry 
used by Heidegger, but who died at the front in 1916. 
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nothingness of death becomes a 'source of unconditional belonging together', where 
'belonging together' itself, Zueinandergehoren, supposes our 'ability to hear', our 
HorenkOnnen. In this way, even in a context as seemingly far removed from language 
and poetry as existence at the front, Heidegger comes back to their realm. He says: 
'The ability to hear from one another is first possible when each is exposed 
beforehand to the nearness and distance of the essence of things. This occurs through 
language ... as the originary establishment of being'. 53 The implication of this is that 
even the heroism of the soldier at the front is grounded in the poet's. 
At the same time however, doesn't the heroism ofthe poet himself depend upon that 
of the soldier?54 In other words, in that Holderlin's heroism consists in his endurance 
of the cleft-the trench, if you will-he does not entirely become a hero until he 
overcomes it, until the unity, which his suffering makes possible, realises itself as a 
unity. And the role of sealing the unity falls to 'the founder of states', the ultimate 
soldier. As long as 'the founder of states' does not place Being in 'the last and first 
seriousness of beings' , and bring 'the people to themselves as people' 55_that is to 
say, to knowing who they are-the poet's heroism and 'the creators' unity remain 
undecided; there is an opening of an era, but it is undecided whether it will really 
affirm itself as an era. Another way of putting this is to say that the opening the poet 
establishes resists its closing under the banner of unity, and Heidegger, as we have 
already seen, decides in favour of unity. This is the significance ofHeidegger's 
demand that we take the unity seriously: it is the inconceivable decision needed in 
order for the serious world of the tragic heroic artist to come into existence. The 
problem is, however, that this taking seriously, this actualisation of the tragic heroic 
artist as soldier, is also his exposure to certain death, his self-denial as poet. Such 
actualisation inaugurates, as Veronique F6ti, eloquently puts it, 'a refined form of 
53 Heidegger, M. Holder/ins Hymnen 'Germanien' und 'Der Rhein', p. 73. 
54 When Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert addresses the notion of the three creators in her essay, 
'Heidegger and Holderlin: The Over-Usage of "Poets in an Impoverished Time''', she presents the tie 
between the poet and the founder of states as relating to Heidegger's ambiguous treatment of the notion 
of genius: 'In contrast to Holderlin, Heidegger generally rejects the notion of the genius, Schelling's as 
well as Schopenhauer's, taken from the tradition of the Critique of Judgment, but he does so in such a 
sweeping way that he retains essential moments without being able to know or realise it'. One of these 
moments is the philosophical identification of poet and statesman, which he apparently inadvertently 
retains because he 'loses sight of the difference between theoretical and practical Philosophy' (p. 71). 
55 Holderlins Hymnen 'Gennanien' und 'Der Rhein', p. 144. 
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totalization,.56 Just the same, if we do not rise to the demand to take the unity 
seriously, the poet wavers undecidedly in the breach. 
* 
If we now return to Nietzsche, we confront precisely the situation of an artist left in 
the breach. Whereas Heidegger focuses primarily on the establishment of a before, an 
origin, Nietzsche finds himself in the odd position of arguing for an after that is before 
itself. As we have already seen, Nietzsche undertakes his biography of Wagner as if 
addressing a dramatic personage; nevertheless, this fictionality is book-ended by two 
very real events. The first is the foundation laying ceremony of the Bayreuth 
F estspielhaus in May 1872, and the second is the impending festival itself scheduled 
for 1876. Though the biography is ostensibly guided by the temporal cleft which the 
latter will mark, it is rather the first event which decisively cleaves time. During this 
rainy day in 1872, Wagner is said to turn his gaze inward, gaining what Nietzsche 
calls a 'Wagnerian perspective', a point of view likened to that of Alexander the Great 
'in that moment in which he had Europe and Asia drink from one and the same CUp,.57 
And what Wagner saw with his penetrating perspective was 'how he had become 
what he is, [and] what he will be'. 58 In other words, he saw his life temporally 
divided, cleft into a before and after, where everything 'he had accomplished 
previously was but a preparation' . 59 Furthermore, the portent of this cleft is not 
limited to just Wagner himself, it apparently relates to humanity as a whole. As 
Nietzsche says in the very first sentence of the essay: 'For an event to be great, two 
things must come together: the great sensibility of those who create it, and the great 
sensibility of those who experience it,;60 those who are meant to experience Bayreuth 
are 'human beings of the future', 'a freer humanity'. 61 
56 Foti, Veronique. 'Textuality, Totalization, and the Question of Origin in Heidegger's Elucidation 
of"Andenken"', p. 56. 
57 Nietzsche, F. 'Richard Wagnerin Bayreuth', p. 262. 
58 Ibid 
59 Ibid 
60 Ibid, p. 259. 
61 Ibid, pp 326 and 325, respectively. 
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But where does this leave the actual festival of Bayreuth? If Wagner 'does not belong 
to this generation' and is 'the messenger of another age' ,62 then how can anything be 
expected of the 1876 festival, which can only be attended by those of this generation 
and age? In other words, if the festival actually takes place, isn't it unlikely that the 
'idea of Bayreuth, 'the transmission of Wagner's art to 'a distant, merely 
possible ... future' ,63 will continue to be taken seriously? Only as long as the hope for 
ideal transmission can be maintained-only as long as the full realisation of the 
already initiated 'after' can be deferred--can its decisive seriousness remain 
immeasurable and disjunctive. For this reason, Wagner must stay in the breach ofthe 
'Wagnerian perspective', and the impending festival moved into the realm of myth. 
To accomplish the latter, Nietzsche offers two strategies. The first concerns the 
spectators of the Bayreuth festival: they will have to be 'unfashionable people', who 
'have their home elsewhere than in the fashions of the present time,.64 Only these 
unfashionable sort can be, like Nietzsche, the 'disciples of resurrected art', who 'have 
both the time and inclination for seriousness, for profound, holy seriousness!,65 Such 
a demand transforms the festival of Bayreuth into a mythico-religious gathering of 
initiates, probably modelled on those of the cult of Dionysus. The second strategy 
concerns Wagner's tragic heroic sacrifice: 'Here [i.e. in Bayreuth] you encounter the 
most devoted self-sacrifice of the artist and the drama of dramas' .66 As such, on this 
'day of battle ',67 the artist is displaced by his dramatic characters, who 'can live in no 
more beautiful way than by preparing themselves to die and sacrificing themselves in 
the battle for justice and love,.68 In this version of things, the festival of Bayreuth 
models itself on the self-sacrifice of its author, and becomes an event as mythical as 
the events of the Ring of the Niebelungen themselves. Unlike Heidegger, therefore, 
who relies upon the realisation of the poet's promise, Nietzsche toys with the idea that 
the 'Wagnerian perspective'-its decisive cleaving of time-is actually most serious 
if it remains mythic. To this effect, he describes the 'intervals of quiet before and 
during the battle', 'those moments when looking backward and ahead we understand 
62 Ibid, pp 326 and 327, respectively. 
63 Ibid, p. 307. 
64 Ibid, p. 260. 
65 Ibid, p. 261. 
66 Ibid, p. 276 (my emphasis). 
67 Ibid, p. 277: The full sentence is the following: 'For us, Bayreuth signifies the morning 
consecration on the day of battle' . 
68 Ibid, p. 278. 
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the symbolic'. Even though these mythic moments cannot last, even though the 'day 
and battle dawn together', their 'comfort accompanies us the entire day,.69 The actual 
battle itself-the festival and its tragic heroic artist-may after all offer nothing but 
false hope. 
* 
The disillusionment that Nietzsche vents once he attends the festival of 1876 and 
concludes that Wagner is indeed a false hope is much more traumatic than anything 
Adorno ever expresses about Schonberg, and yet they confront comparable dilemmas. 
Adorno, like Nietzsche, seems to have felt himself in the presence of a 'great man' ,70 
and as such one of the questions that haunts him is that oflegacy. The reason that talk 
of legacy is so importunate is that it has the same effect of closure as the Bayreuth 
festival in 1876 or the realisation of temporal unity by 'the founder of states': They all 
mark actualisations which entomb the tragic heroic artist by sealing him in the very 
temporal cleft that he makes possible. In a vain attempt to stave off such a fate, 
Adorno proposes that Schonberg's 'extravagant power spumed ever to exhaust one of 
the possibilities it created itself.71 Such open-endedness leaves room for future 
developments that would keep Schonberg from being shelved amongst the composers 
of the past, but does so at the cost of ambiguity concerning his legacy. Adorno wants 
to argue that Schonberg's place in the history of music is that of the total innovator, 
that his 'new music' is the only future for music. For that to be possible, all music 
must respond to the possibilities created by his 'extravagant power'. However, to the 
69 Ibid 
70 One of the ways in which Adorno may have expressed this is in his own compositions. In fact, in 
his book Augen.Blick: Eine Skizze zu Bildern Arnold SdchOnbergs und Texten Theodor W. Adornos, 
Severin Hansbauer makes such a connection when he comments upon Adorno's professed experience 
of being 'too late' in his arrival in 1924 in Vienna to study composition with Alban Berg: 'Die 
Entiauschung tiber das Zuspatgekommensein schlug sich nicht zuletzt in den Komposition Adomos 
nieder. H.K Jungheinrich versteht sie als nostalgischen Rekurs "auf einen musikgeschichtlichen 
Kairos, der lange vobei war ... " Diese nach- and hervorholende Erinnerung eines musikgeschichtlichen 
Kairos bezeiht sich auf die Zeit um 1910, als Arnold SchOnberg in freier Atonalitat zu komponieren 
begann'. We should also point out that this understanding of Adorno's compositional relationship 
holds equally well with regard to his philosophical one in that Adorno imagines 1910 to mark a 
temporal disjunction that can subsequently only be observed in the form of eulogy. In her work, Exact 
Imagination, Late Work, Shierry Weber Nicholsen develops the notion oflateness in terms of an idea 
of 'late work' that she sees has having central philosophical importance for Adorno. '[L]ate works are 
the catastrophes in the history of art', embodying 'radical discontinuity' (p. 8). They are signals that 
the state of disintegration (of individuals, of works of art) has proceeded just beyond the reach of a 
unifYing grasp. 
71 Adorno, T.W. 'Arnold SchOnberg (1)', p. 314. 
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extent that all subsequent music must respond solely to these possibilities, and to no 
others, Schonberg must be able to reclaim these possibilities as his legacy, and 
exclude all possibilities that lie outside of it. Thus, very much like Holderlin who is 
said to open an era but cannot reclaim such an achievement until it has confIrmed 
itself as an era, Schonberg cannot reclaim his legacy until the possibilities he has 
created eliminate all others. To assure Schonberg his legacy, then, Adorno must also 
say that the composer's work builds 'a cosmos for itself, a model as it were, which 
Schonberg left to others to follow further'. 72 In positing such a universal model, 
Adorno blocks the path to any innovation which would lie outside the Schonbergian 
legacy. Such a move encloses new music in a casket of Schonberg's own making. 
There is tragedy in this, but it is in fact Schonberg's heroic triumph, his reach beyond 
the grave; his tragedy would have been to be without a legacy, to have opened up the 
possibility of new music, but been tragically unable to see its promise affirmed in 
realisation. As it is, he is guaranteed his place and a seriousness of a sort, but 
unfortunately it is as the dictator of new music. 
* 
Thus, the question of legacy brings us back to the same conclusion we keep reaching: 
Realised seriousness is not so serious after all. The disjunctive seriousness promised 
by a tragic heroic artist is denied precisely by his heroic compulsion to realise the 
disjunction. If, for example, new music marks a complete disjunction within music, it 
is assured of seriousness only to be threatened by irrelevance, by its branding as an 
aberration doomed to disappearance because of its own oppressiveness.73 As Thomas 
Mann puts it in Doctor Faustus: 'Far be it from me to deny the seriousness of art; but 
when it becomes serious, then one rejects art and is not capable ofit'.74 If, on the 
other hand, new music-or the Bayreuth festival, or 'the founder of states' --does not 
72 Ibid.: Therefore, the full sentence is as follows: 'Ein jegliches mu/3 einen Kosmos fur sich seIber 
bilden, gewisserma/3en ein Modell, das weiter zu verfoigen SchOnberg anderen uberlie/3; seine 
verschwenderische Kraft hat es verschmiiht, jemaIs eine der Moglichkeit auszuschOpfen, die sie seiber 
schuf. 
73 In an article from 1960 entitled 'Music and New Music', Adorno recognizes the untenability of the 
relation between music and new music, but in his view, what I am calling oppressiveness was 
necessity, and as such music had to fade in favour of new music. In support of his hypothesis, he 
points to an 'objective trend toward unity' (p. 268), but does not seem to see the danger of paralysis 
implied in new music becoming what music must be. 
74 Mann, Thomas. Doctor Faustus, p. 179. 
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mark a complete disjunction, it has no claim at all to the decisive seriousness implied 
by taking seriously in a serious world. It is the tragic heroic need for realisation that 
converts hope into false hope. 
The sidekick 
So we return to our main question: Why does a philosopher take an artist seriously? 
Our response up to now has centred upon how the myth of a tragic heroic artist feeds 
into the notion of a serious world. In this version of things, a philosopher has 
constructed a world such that it is an artist who promises the possibility of an 
answering to our questioning. And even though, as we have just seen, this promise is 
betrayed by the need to realise this answering as an answer, before we move on, it is 
important to re-emphasize how this tragic heroism depends upon something about the 
artist as artist. 
On the one hand, artists are described by these philosophers as having sensual 
particularities which could account for their unique abilities. In the case of Wagner, it 
is the so-called 'Wagnerian perspective', the enchanted stopping of the clock, which 
conjures 'those moments when looking forward and backward we understand the 
symbolic, those moments when with the feeling of mild fatigue a refreshing dream 
comes to us' .75 This access to a dramatic pause constitutes the 'spell of art', and 
thanks to a blurring of the distinction between the lifework and life of the dramatist, 
for Nietzsche such moments are not just reserved for the stage.76 As for Heidegger, 
the key notion is language. The poet can be said to establish the Dasein of a people 
because of his special relation to language, a relation possibly best expressed by 
Heidegger's claim that the 'poet names the gods and names all things for what they 
are'.77 Moreover, this special relation depends upon the poet's unique ability to hear 
the call, Rufen, of the gods, which Jacques Derrida identifies as the 'ear of the poet,?8 
75 Nietzsche, F. 'Richard Wagner in Bayreuth', p. 278. 
76 This is a reference to the passage cited earlier where he says that 'the life of a dramatist will take 
dramatic form' (p. 263). 
77 Heidegger, Martin. 'H6lderlin and the Essence of Poetry', p. 464. 
78 Derrida, Jacques. 'Heidegger's Ear: Philopolemology', p. 185: 'This ear of the poet stands firm 
beside the origin that the poet has a passion for. The poet is steadfast in hearing what originarily and 
properly happens and what in general "is". This ear of the poet, which is distinguished from that of the 
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As for Adorno, he also focuses on hearing, and refers at various times to the notion of 
'an awakened ear,79 and 'Schonberg's restlessly probing hearing,.8o 
On the other hand, artists are significant as artists to the extent that they are creators 
of works of art. Adorno signals the importance of the latter when he says: 
'Scarcely is it possible to estimate what Schonberg, the individual, gave 
and achieved in the history of music as a whole; not so much through the 
material changes and renewals ... as through the compositional work which 
he struggled from the grasp of objective-social and spiritual conditions, 
which already no longer wanted to tolerate such success'. 81 
So it is his works that make Schonberg the artist so important in a serious world. At 
the same time, however, to the extent this is the case, and his works exceed his 
actions-his 'changes and renewals '-we have to wonder whether we are still correct 
in talking about his works.82 For this points to an ambiguity in Adorno which also 
finds resonance in Nietzsche and Heidegger, and opens up another approach to a 
tragic heroic artist's place in a serious world: namely, who decides which works?83 
Does an artist decide by himself which part of his 'social labour' are works? And if 
not, who does? And in any case, whose works are they really? It is tempting to make 
vague references to society and culture, but this averts a much more pressing question 
for us: namely, what role does a philosopher have in the drama of tragic heroes and 
historic beginnings. It would seem quite plausible that the relation between a 
philosopher and the artist he addresses is not irrelevant to any serious world the 
former constructs. Furthermore, this is most likely not invisible to the philosopher 
himself. Heidegger, for example, very explicitly writes himself, or a projection of 
gods as well as from that of the common of the mortals ... hears the "ist" before or at the origin of 
~hilosophy' . 
9 Adorno, T.W. 'WarumZwolftorunusik?', p. 117. 
80 Adorno, T.W. 'Arnold Schonberg (J)', p. 314. 
81 Ibid, p. 323 (my emphasis). 
&2 We will return to this question of the artist and 'his' works in Part Two. There I will argue that the 
focus upon works of art very often signals a strategy of exclusion that treats the artist as a counter-
example. 
83 Those familiar with Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe's reading of Plato, through Heidegger and Girard, 
should recognize this formulation as closely related to 'the question we must not read in Plato', and yet 
Plato himself poses in the form of 'What is?': namely, 'Who manufactures what?' As such, it is a 
question fundamental to the relation between philosophy and art ('Typography', p. 85). 
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himself, into the tale he is weaving about 'the creators', including 'the thinker' as the 
second of them. He, furthermore, undertakes a practice which Adorno also maintains 
of making little distinction between references to statements by the artist and the 
latter's actual works, thereby blurring the line between art and (philosophical) 
reflection on art. This complicity between artist and philosopher is not always a 
happy one as is bluntly admitted by such undertakings as that of musique informelle 
by Adorno.84 But even when a philosopher does not go so far as to tell artists what 
their job should be,85 he is still hard-pressed to deny his entanglement in the process 
of producing works. He is very much like a narrator, whose neutrality is placed into 
doubt by the very fact that there is a tale to tell. 
However, could it be otherwise? What would be the meaning-or even how would it 
be possible-to speak of art and works of art (or anything really) in such a way that it 
excludes our experience of them, and thus the relation by and to our voices? In this 
perspective, the philosophical attractiveness of a tragic heroic artist takes on new 
contours. Embracing this figure offers philosophers a way to shed the pretence of 
neutrality, and gives them, if you will, a say in what they are saying. They cannot, of 
course, say just anything. They have a duty to say the truth of their tragic heroic 
artist. For instance, in the case of Heidegger on Holderlin as it is understood by Paul 
de Man, the philosopher relies upon the artist as a 'witness' to the 'moment of truth': 
'As one reads the last commentary on Holderlin C ... "dichterisch wohnet 
der Mensch [poetically man dwells] ... "), one understands why Heidegger 
is in need of a witness, of someone who can say that he has named the 
immediate presence of Being. This witness is Heidegger's solution to the 
84 Adorno introduces this essay with an open admission that he is dissatisfied with contemporary new 
music, and is quite frank in allowing that younger musicians may feel justifiably inclined to disregard 
his criticism. Nevertheless, he still goes on to propose the task ofmusique informelle as the proper task 
of new music. In defence of Adorno-if one feels such a necessity-one might point out that this 
unwillingness to just accept things as they are, even the state of new music, is a central aspect of his 
philosophy. 
85 I am referring to the fact that he identifies the state of new music in 1910 as being the moment 
when musique informelle became a real possibility, however that instead there came after it the 'vastly 
overrated twenties'. He rejects, in other words, the development SchOnberg, the musician, actually 
took, saying the latter should have developed differently: 'the task [of musique informelle] is to resume 
the process which SchOnberg throttled at the very moment when his brilliant innovation appeared to 
give it fresh impetus' (p. 275). This passage will be considered in greater details in chapter four. 
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problem that had tormented equally poets and thinkers, and even mystics: 
how to preserve the moment of truth' . 86 
However, if a poet or artist is a philosopher's 'witness', what does this make the 
philosopher? Isn't he simply a hanger-on to the other's greater deeds? A philosopher 
sidekick to a tragic heroic artist? And this is not the only issue at hand, because the 
very insight on the part of a philosopher sidekick that makes him stand by the side of 
a tragic heroic artist-that is, his insight as regards the 'moment oftruth'-requires a 
complicity which throws it into doubt. 
Another way of approaching this is to return to the issue of temporality. As said 
throughout this chapter, a tragic heroic artist cleaves time, and as such can only be 
addressed from the perspective of a before or after. What this implies is that his tale 
is never a report upon what 'really happened' liable to corroboration by facts, but 
requires, as Andrzej Warminski puts it, that the philosopher 'think... that which is not 
there ,.87 As such, the resulting discourse can only prophesy beforehand or eulogise 
after the fact. Such self-referential discourse points to the relation between the 
speaker and the spoken of, but is not usually able to claim authority beyond the 
proximity that grounds it. And yet, this authority is precisely what the philosopher 
sidekick reclaims, presenting his privileged position as the model for wider circles. 
Consider, in this light, Nietzsche's appeal to 'the few' and their special claim to the 
'Wagnerian perspective': 
'But what Wagner inwardly saw on that day [i.e. in May 1872]-how he 
had become what he is, what he will be-that is something that we, those 
closest to him, are also able to see to a certain degree. And only from this 
Wagnerian perspective will we ourselves be able to understand the 
greatness of his deed-and with this understanding vouch/or its 
frUitfulness ,.88 
86 De Man, Paul. 'Heidegger's Exegeses ofHolderlin', p. 252. 
87 Warminski, Andrzej. 'Heidegger Reading Holderlin', p. 46. 
88 Nietzsche, F. 'Richard Wagner in Bayreuth', p. 262 (Nietzsche'S emphasis). 
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Nietzsche's relation to Wagner, therefore, is that of an exemplary closeness which 
others are claimed to share. Moreover, the insight it makes possible involves a dual 
responsibility, which brings it to an even wider circle. According to the ftrst aspect of 
this responsibility, Nietzsche must be 'able to understand the greatness of [Wagner's] 
deed'; that is to say, he must foresee Wagner's future action, and grasp it in advance 
as great. According to the second, he must 'vouch for its fruitfulness'. In other 
words, he must affirm that what he grasps ahead of time will indeed be great. Now it 
would seem initially that the second part ofthe relationship is unnecessary: ifhe's 
already grasped the great deed, what is the need of affirming it? He has it. But then 
again, greatness is not exactly like a loaf of bread; it isn't much use unless others 
affirm one's possession of it. So Nietzsche must be prepared to perform his 
possession, and vouch for this greatness to others, in order for the initial grasping to 
have any signiftcance. This is what makes his relation exemplary. However, there is 
a risk involved in this double commitment, because there is nothing to guarantee that 
what is grasped as great can be affirmed as such. For example, Nietzsche is 
prophesying the greatness of the Bayreuth festival, and he is bound by his special 
relation to Wagner to affirm its greatness when it does indeed take place, but what if 
he can't? What if he really doesn't think it's so great when it comes time to affirm? 
This, as we know, is an essential moment in Nietzsche's break with Wagner. The 
problem is that the special relation of tragic heroic artist and philosopher sidekick 
solders together two moves-grasping and afftrming-whereas, for critical thought to 
be possible, and in particular the thought that would be in the best position to 
recognize greatness, they must remain distinct. 89 
* 
If we now turn to the pair of Heidegger and Holderlin we ftnd that their relation-
assuming, as I am, that it is reasonable to see some inspiration for 'the thinker' of 
Being (ofthe three 'creators') in the thinker of Being of 1930's Germany-again 
89 The notion of recognition is central to this analysis, and in particular as it is developed by 
Alexander Garcia DOttmann in his book Between Cultures. In brief: he criticises the hypostatisation 
involved in a dogmatic notion of recognition which 'recognizes as ... ' Along these lines, he might 
observe that Nietzsche's difficulties with Wagner commence with the fact that he limits his own room 
for critical manoeuvre by recognizing the composer as great. 
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centres upon two moves. These are detailed in Heidegger's explanation of the various 
creative roles 'the poet', 'the thinker' and 'the founder of states' undertake: 
'The fundamental tone, and that is to say the truth of the Dasein of a 
people, is originarily established by the poet. The thus shrouded Being of 
beings is then grasped and structured as Being [my emphasis], and 
thereby first disclosed, by the thinker, and the thus grasped Being is 
placed in the first and last seriousness of beings, that is to say, in the 
determined [be-stimmte, Heidegger's emphasis] historical truth, so that the 
people are brought to themselves as people. This happens through the 
creation by the founder of states of the state appropriate to its essence' .90 
As with Nietzsche, a thinker's first responsibility is to grasp something as something. 
His second is to structure it as the same, and this can be understood as a performative 
affirmation91 to the extent that structuring is thought in terms of a disclosure: in other 
words, the thinker grasps the 'shrouded Being of beings' as Being, and then affirms 
by his dis-closure that it is, indeed, Being. Thus, if the Heideggerian thinker is, like 
Nietzsche, bound to the artist by a dual responsibility, does it mean that he, as well, is 
menaced by a divergence between the duties of grasping and affirming/structuring? 
That is to say, what would happen ifHolderlin said something which could not be 
affirmed as the truth of a people? According to Heidegger, such a thing would be 
impossible, since the truth is what was established by the poet himself. Heidegger can 
say this, moreover, with some confidence because he is eulogising rather than 
prophesying Holderlin; the philosopher has everything the poet said neatly bound for 
him by Norbert von Hellingrath. 
It is important to mention the latter because it is his eulogy which marks the whole 
Holderlin project as being one of eulogy, of 'remembrance,;92 and to insist upon 
90 Heidegger, M. Hoiderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' lind 'Der Rhein', p. 144. 
91 Alexander Garcia Diittmann also suggests that the action of the thinker can be understood as a 
'performative act' in his book Memory of Thought: An Essay on Heidegger and Adorno: 'Hence the 
repetition [by the thinker] is a performative act-to use a vocabulary alien to Heidegger-and does not 
content itself with being a constative act which refers to something already stated' (p. 153). 
92 In the very first paragraph of the interpretation of Germanien, Heidegger draws our attention to the 
co-editor of Holder lin's collected works, and admonishes us to keep him in our memories: 'Vielleicht 
wird eines Tages die deutsche Jugend den SchOpfer ihrer Holderlin-Ausgabe, Norbert v. Hellingrath, 
der 28jahrig vor Verdun 1916 gefallen ist, in ihr Gedachtnis aufuehmen-vielleicht auch nicht' (p. 9). 
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keeping someone in our thoughts, as Heidegger does in the case of von Hellingrath--
and in a way not unlike his repeated entreaties that we not simply read Holderlin but 
become 'living bearers of poetry's power,93-this insistence is not a statement about 
the past as much as it is a projection into the future. Furthermore, it is in this 
dimension that the moves of grasping and affirming do indeed diverge in Heidegger. 
We perhaps see this most clearly in the term, 'das Nationelle '. In a footnote to a 1959 
essay entitled, 'Holderlin's Earth and Heaven', Heidegger takes care to avert us 
against misinterpretation: 'We must, of course, hear Holderlin's discourse on the 
"patriotic" (Vaterliindischen) and "national" (Nationellen) according to the meaning 
of his thought, which means that we must free it from our current narrow 
representations ... the "national" means the land of birth (nasci, natura)'.94 So why is 
he telling us this? Is this an indication that he himself might have at some time 
projected 'das Nationelle' as meaning something other than the land of birth? Such a 
projection would constitute a divergence between the moves of grasping and 
affirming to the extent that it would feed off a tension between the native meaning 
and a hoped for meaning. It would also, of course, feed the suspicions that surround 
Heidegger's political leanings, and there is material for reading the end ofthe 1935 
lectures on Der Rhein as uncomfortably compatible with Nazi ideology. There is, for 
example, Heidegger's claim that Holderlin's notion of '" der freie Gebrauch des 
Nationellen'" can be understood as the 'creation oflatitude [des Spielraums], in 
which the national can freely realise itself in history'. 95 Just the same, perhaps it is 
the ambiguity itself which is most important, because as it is, this divergence is 
actually essential to the seriousness of the poet. In other words, ifHeidegger's 
lectures had not implied there could be a divergence between what he grasps-' das 
Nationelle' as 'land ofbirth'-and what he affirms-'das Nationelle' as a certain 
historical configuration of the state-then there would be much less at stake in the 
poet's relation to the nation or people. 
In the lectures on Andenken themselves, a whole section is devoted to von Hellingrath and even 
concludes with a 'Gedenkwort' entitled Norbert by Stefan Georges. 
93 Heidegger, M. Holderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und 'Der Rhein', p. 19. 
94 Heidegger, M. 'Holderlin's Earth and Heaven', p. 206 (footnote 3). 
95 Heidegger, M. Holderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und 'Der Rhein', p. 292. 
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* 
For, what is it that happens when the grasping and affinning moves actually 
converge? It is Adorno who best addresses this question. This is not to say that he, 
like Nietzsche and Heidegger, doesn't struggle with divergence; twelve-tone 
technique in particular found him at great pains to uncritically affirm.96 Nevertheless, 
it is his reflections upon the problems of convergence, which may most effectively lay 
the myth of tragic heroic artists to rest. As we said at the outset, an artist's 
seriousness as tragic hero consists in the possibility of answering; this is the hope he 
embodies. And yet, this hope is the denial of hope. For if the grasping and affirming 
moves converge, then the anticipation and remembrance upon which the hope is 
based become nothing more than scheduled appointment and reminder. In other 
words, when the two moves converge, a tragic heroic artist loses his disjunctive force, 
and his great deed, or historic founding, or revolution becomes just another entry on 
the calendar. It is this situation which Adorno is referring to when in Aesthetic 
Theory, he observes that '[i]fthe utopia of art were realised, it would be art's 
temporal end,.97 Such convergence makes disjunctive force turn upon itself and 
disappear. The problem, then, with the hope represented by a tragic heroic artist is 
that its highest moment is the moment of its realisation, and thus also the moment of 
its disappointment. 98 
96 We sense his difficulty in the odd compromises he crafts between his need to accept all of 
SchOnberg's development as necessary, on the one side, and his aesthetic disappointment with the 
composer's later works, on the other. For example, in a passage from the 1957 biography addressed in 
the previous chapter, he veils his criticism of SchOnberg's artistic achievement by reaffirming the 
musician's radical technique: 'Wenn vielen der spateren Werke der Stachel der f'ri.iheren fehlt; wenn 
manche, das Wort recht verstanden, einen gewissen Konservatismus zeigen-Konservatismus nicht der 
Mittel, die folgerecht weitergetrieben werden, sondem der kOnstlerischen Gesinnung, die nun auf gro/3e 
runde Werke zielt-,dann mag man einen Zusammenhang mit dem beruhigteren Leben vermuten' (p. 
317). 
97 Adorno, T.W. Aesthetic Theory. p. 32 (cited with slight modification to translation). 
98 In his essay, 'Concept, Image, Name', Rolf Tiedemann, addresses Adorno's notion of hope, and 
points out that even though it must find 'fragmentary points of reference in the here and now', that is, 
in what is realised, Adorno will not thereby' concede that hope is a principle' that could itself be 
realised (p. 126). 
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A heroless world ... ? 
When it is all said and done, therefore, one is disappointed in any case with a tragic 
heroic artist: if grasping and affinning converge and he realises himself, it is a 
disappointment, and if they don't and he doesn't, it is a disappointment. All three of 
these thinkers experienced disappointment in some fonn or fashion-with the result 
that Nietzsche rejects Wagner, Heidegger turns from 'the founder of states', and 
Adorno critically revaluates Schonberg-and yet none of them really abandons tragic 
heroism. Why is this? Why is it that even though Heidegger ceases to speak of 'the 
creators', that there is no triumvirate, no Kampf, and no fiihrende Macht in the 
lectures on Andenken, there is still the situation ofHolderlin leading us back home? 
Why is it that his disappointment leads Nietzsche not to tum from Wagner as much as 
to try to surpass him, to challenge him, to delight in the 'ominous sound' of swords 
crossing?99 And why is it that Adorno-who questions the notion of the genius, who 
identifies a 'crisis of semblance' which undennines positive realisation-why is it 
that his hope still relies on the negation of tragic heroism, on the artist as victim, on 
the anti-hero? That is to say, why should Adorno muse in a late article: 'It is scarcely 
imaginable that in an age when the individual is so diminished and is conscious of his 
impotence and apathy, he should feel the same compulsion to produce as did 
individuals in more heroic epochs'?lOo 
The more complex answers to these questions are well beyond our scope; 
nevertheless, it is worth briefly considering one hypothesis. And that is to say that the 
reason a tragic heroic artist can have such a lasting impact upon a philosopher's 
thought is that such an artist compels the latter to take him too seriously. Once 
motivated by the promise of a serious world, any disappointment a philosopher might 
experience is as likely to be attributed to his own 'disloyalty' as any fault with the 
tragic heroic artist himself. lOl For consider a philosopher's situation: Ifhe attributes 
his disappointment to his own disloyalty, and refuses to question the tragic heroic 
artist, then he at least retains the possibility of answering initially promised by the 
99 Nietzsche, F. Ecce Homo, p. 63: 'This crossing of the two books-it seemed to make an ominous 
sound. Was it not as though two swords had crossed?' 
100 Adorno, T.W. 'Vers une musique informelle', p. 283. 
101 This, in fact, would be another way of interpreting the peregrinations of the term, 'das Nationelle '. 
In this version, Heidegger 'corrected' himself in 1959 for his disloyal deviance in 1935. 
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artist. However, and on the other hand, ifhe does question the tragic heroic artist, 
then he does not advance his position one bit, since questioning a tragic heroic artist is 
just another way of taking him seriously. Once taken too seriously, in other words, a 
tragic heroic artist is essentially beyond question; one can neither not question him, 
nor question him. No wonder, then, the temptation to try for another new beginning, 
in other words, the compulsion to continue thinking in his terms. 
Nevertheless, isn't there another possibility in face of so much dead seriousness? 
Isn't this 'damned if you do, damned if you don't' situation a bit ridiculous? 
Nietzsche, at least, seems to enjoy the joke: 
'To laugh at oneself as one would have to laugh in order to laugh out of 
the whole truth-to do that even the best so far lacked sufficient sense for 
the truth, and the most gifted had too little genius for that. Even laughter 
may yet have a future ... Perhaps laughter will then have formed an 
alliance with wisdom, perhaps only "gay science" will then be left. 
'For the present, things are still quite different. For the present, the 
comedy of existence has not yet "become conscious" of itself. For the 
present, we still live in the age of tragedy, the age of moralities and 
religions' . 102 
The seriousness of a tragic heroic artist asserts that everything has already been 
decided, and yet this decisiveness itself depends upon our decision to take him 
seriously, on our decision to believe in his myth. But what if we refuse to decide? 
This is not to say that we decide not to take him seriously; this would be still to admit 
the possibility of his seriousness. Refusing to decide, by contrast, would be to place 
the decision in suspense, not unlike the way in which Nietzsche proposes to 'freeze' 
ideals,103 or the way laughter interrupts a discourse. Furthermore, if the decision can 
be placed in suspense, it may not be so necessary after all. Such a refusal, therefore, 
opens the possibility that the world is not so serious. 
102 Nietzsche, F. The Gay Science, p. 74. 
103 From Ecce Homo, pp 56-60: 'One error after another is calmly laid on ice, the ideal is not 
refuted-itfreezes ... Here for example "the genius" freezes; on the next comer "the saint" freezes; "the 
hero" freezes into a thick icicle' . 
Julie Kuhlken Page 86 
chapter three 
The blind poet 
Why would a philosopher take an artist seriously? 
In this chapter we will examine the other aspect of a serious world, that characterised 
by the demands of the necessity of questioning, such as it is appears in the notion of a 
blindpoet. 
Is there anybody out there? 
Someone might wish to point out that the foregoing chapter fails to significantly 
address an important characteristic of tragic heroic artists: namely, that they are 
models, that their deeds are held up for imitation by others. As a model, a tragic 
heroic artist is not simply a figure of disjunction, but also of continuation. 
Furthermore, such continuation does not simply extend into the future, it also reaches 
into the past; any innovation that an artist arrives at only has meaning in relation to 
some tradition or culture or society. In the case ofHolderlin, for instance, Heidegger 
takes great care to say that the poet lies 'in der griechisch-deutschen Sendung '.1 But 
what, then, is the nature of this relation of an artist to the art and artists which precede 
him? And subsequently, to that and those which follow? We would like to simply 
look for relations of influence and imitation; however, this is not possible. On the one 
hand, and as we have seen, the problem of slavish imitation complicates any question 
oflegacy. And on the other, and even more disconcertingly, if a tragic heroic artist is 
only imitating those who come before him, then there is nothing disjunctive in his 
deeds. As such, if it is imitation which accounts for the historical relation between 
artists, it must be of a particular sort, it must be a missing imitation. One way of 
approaching such a notion is to first imagine its opposite, a supra-sensorial 
perspective which would be so powerful as to be able to see or hear all of that which 
had occurred in art up until then, alongside the capacity to render what had been 
perceived-in other words, the ability to imitate art as a whole. What, then, would be 
the product of this stupendous, godlike power? An enormous pastiche. Ironically 
enough, then, for imitation to be innovative, there must be something missing. There 
must be something lacking in the tradition of art itself, in the perception of it by the 
1 Heidegger, M. H6lderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' lind 'Der Rhein', p. 151. 
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artist, or in his ability to render what he perceives. Moreover, this lack must be 
excessive: it cannot, for example, be simply that he is lacking learnable technical 
skills; it must be, as Adorno says, that the insufficiency of an artist's production is 
'historically imperative ,. 2 Only with such a blind spot is there an opening for 
innovation, a chance for the kind of missing imitation, which avoids both slavish 
copying and simple pastiche.3 
But how or why does such blindness arise? In that innovation is not considered a 
daily event, such blinding must be out of the ordinary. Indeed what marks a blind 
spot is precisely its unique particularity. If general notions are round holes, it is 
always eccentrically shaped. And whereas, we can predict the appearance of regular 
shapes, a blind spot's particular contour can never be calculated or planned for. This 
is its resistive force. It resists, because its 'deficiency', its eccentricity, is not due to 
the weakening or absence of some positive trait-its blindness is certainly not a loss 
of sight-but rather the absence of the kind of generalizability that would identify it 
as a deficiency. In fact, if a blind spot is in any way deficient it is in its lack of 
generality. It lacks the general, conceptual framework which would allow us to 
explain why and how it arises. As such, the only way to talk about a blind spot is to 
discuss its already achieved particularity as it is found in instances of it. 4 
* 
Perhaps one of the most evocative of these instances lies in Heidegger's 
"'Homecoming / To Kindred Ones'" from 1943. Heidegger reads this essay as a 
meditation on the possibility of poetic homecoming, that is of poetically naming what 
it means to be at home. In this meditation, he appeals to the figure of the 'mourning 
2 Adorno, T.W. Aesthetic Theory, p. 39. We have cited this passage in chapter one as somewhere 
Adorno argues that such insufficiency is necessary for the new, and constitutes the seriousness of art. 
3 One might recognize in this notion Derrida's understanding of imitation as developed in 'La 
Pharmacie de Platon': 'L'imitation ne repond a son essence, n'est ce qU'elle est-imitation-qu'en 
etant en quelque point fautive ou plut6t en defaut' (La dissemination, p. 160). 
4 Which instance we choose to start off with-and we will begin with Heidegger-will obviously 
have a significant impact upon what we say, and as a consequence it would seem reasonable to make 
the demand that the choice be defended. However, this is precisely what is not possible, because such 
a defence would require the very general, conceptual framework denied by the notion of a blind spot. 
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poet', who pines for the 'fatherland' by searching for the 'naming word' that might 
identify it. What interests us about this 'mourning poet' is that he is a 'blind poet'. 5: 
'The naming word is missing for He who is himself and dwells in the 
holy, for He who says and in saying lets himself appear. This is why 
poetic "singing" ... still remains a song without words-"lyre music" 
[Saitenspiel]. To be sure, the player's "song" follows the high one 
everywhere. The "soul" of the singer does indeed glance into the 
brightness, but the singer does not see the high one himself The singer is 
blind,.6 
What is distinctive about the blind poet is his search for the 'naming word', and what 
is distinctive about this word is the fact that it is missing. And what we can say about 
this conjunction of a blind poet and the lack of a naming word is that it implicates the 
latter in an event, whereby the blind poet becomes the blind poet. 7 But this is already 
to say a great deal, because what this event implies is that whatever the relation 
between the poet and the naming word, this relation is not an eternal one: something 
5 Even the most distracted of readers will immediately notice that Heidegger does not, in fact, speak 
of a blind poet, but rather of a blind singer, though some translations do state 'poet '. Moreover, in that 
neither Adorno nor Nietzsche speaks specifically of a poet, it would be perfectly reasonable to question 
the term, 'blind poet '. My response to these observations is dissatisfactory to the extent that I propose 
the term as no more than an attempt to name a recurring notion of artistic blindness. Just the same, and 
as will be developed, the fact that such blindness appears as figures in the work ofthese thinkers is 
significant, and needs to be indicated by a name. Moreover, 'poet' allows for an allusion to Greek 
thought, which lies very near the surface in many of these writings. 
6 Heidegger, M. "'Homecoming / To Kindred Ones"', pp 45-6. Because I have made modifications 
to the translation, here is the original German: 'Wer Er selbst ist, der im Hei!igen wohnt, das zu sagen 
und sagend ihn selbst erscheinen zu lassen, dafur feWt das nennende Wort. Darum bleibt jetzt das 
dichtende "Singen", wei! ihm das eigentliche, das nennende Wort feWt, ein wortloses Lied-"ein 
Saitenspiel". Zwar folgt das "Lied" des spielenden Mannes liberall dem Hohen. Die "Seele" des 
Sangers blickt zwar in die Heitere, aber der Sanger sieht nicht den Hohen selbst. Der Sanger ist blind '. 
f,Erlautenmgen Z/I H61derlins Dichtung, p. 27). 
Just a quick outline of possibilities: the 'naming word' is missing because the poet is blind. In this 
version of things He, 'who says and in saying lets himself appear', does indeed appear, but because the 
poet cannot see Him, the former misses the 'naming word '. This version of things is only interesting if 
we imagine that it is the excessive appearance of Him who first robs the poet of his sight. A similar 
logic would also allow us to reverse the sequence and say that the poet is blind because of the absence 
of the 'naming word " where it is His disappearance, rather than appearance, which first removes the 
poet's sight. A second, comparatively undramatic approach would be to note that the 'naming word' 
could never be missing unless someone were looking for it. However, if this looking is indeed what 
constitutes the missing, then this looking could be said to be blind; it is a looking which never sees 
what it is looking for. It WOUld, however, beg the question of what started the poet in his looking, and 
would as such bring us back to the necessity of some sort of initiating event. A third reading of this 
passage returns to straightforward theatricality. Here it is only when the poet names Him, who 'lives in 
the heavens', that He will appear. 
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happens to make the poet blind, and it is only in this transfonnation that he becomes 
connected to the lack of a naming word. As such, even if 'for now' there is only 
'poetising "singing"', his blindness implies that things could be otherwise. 
Moreover, it is this transfonnative aspect of the blind poet, which indicates his 
filiality with the tragic heroic artist. Like the latter, the blind poet offers a hopeful 
song for the future, but unlike him, the poet does not make the demand that these 
hopes be realised. If one recalls, it is the demand for realisation that makes a tragic 
heroic artist a disappointment. The blind poet averts this fate by offering nothing but 
hopefulness. This may sound like a great advance upon the foibles of the tragic 
heroic artist, but if so, it is dearly bought. For when one says that the blind poet offers 
nothing but hopefulness, it is important to emphasize the nothingness of this 
hopefulness. In other words, the blind poet eliminates the problematic nature of 
realisation precisely by ensuring that nothing can ever be realised. Hope remains 
hope only as long as it is deferred; this is its irony, and it is the blind poet who sets 
this irony in motion. 
He does so by means of a self-manifestation that recalls the heroic deed of the tragic 
heroic artist precisely by tracing its ironisation. Whereas, the tragic heroic deed 
cleaves time into a before and after, the blind poet's song manifests itselfby means of 
an intenninable, self-obsessive repetition which never even manages to catch up with 
its own moment. His search for the missing word is a search which doubles back to 
imprint its own looking-as its failure to find-upon itself This failure guarantees 
the search will continue; however, and as we just indicated, its manifestation only 
sings of hope by operating its perpetual deferral. Only by missing hope is hope 
maintained, and thus, whereas the tragic heroic artist offers himself as a model for 
imitation, the blind poet eludes the aporias of mimesis by means of missing imitation. 
By doubling back in a search that is an example of its own searching, he breaks down 
the relation between original and copy at the core of tragic heroic mimesis. Rather 
than be a model or example, the blind poet sets exemplification itself in motion, 
endlessly doubling back upon itself as yet again its own example. 
Since it is a description of this process of self-manifestation, of the poet's' song 
without words', we might look for more clarification in Heidegger's notion of Him 
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'who says and in saying lets himself appear '. His self-manifestation occurs through 
speech, and as such opens the possibility of comparing His talking Himself into 
existence with the more banal case of someone talking about his existence. In the 
latter case, a person mirrors himself to the extent that his words offer an adequate 
depiction of his state of mind, regardless of the nature of their saying. In the case of 
Him, by contrast, self-manifestation follows directly and necessarily from saying. 
When someone talks about himself, his appearance might be a useful gauge as to the 
degree of correspondence between his words and state of mind; however, it offers no 
assurances since the appearance could just as easily be a mask or disguise. When He 
says, no such deception is possible. His appearance must correspond to His word 
since He will not appear without it. Furthermore, since in the case of someone talking 
about himself, saying is not appearing and is external to the relation between what is 
said and who says it, the words themselves can be retained and imitated in other 
contexts and by other people. Nothing of the sort is possible when saying is 
appearing. In fact, this constitutes the further necessity of His appearance: if He does 
not appear, all His saying will flow away like words lost to the wind. Therefore, what 
distinguishes the blind poet's song is its dual necessity, as both consequence and 
origin of its own appearance. It is the only possible example of itself, and thus can 
never fall victim to the contingencies of realisation, as does the exemplarity of the 
tragic hero. 
* 
To be its own example, a blind poet's song marks itself with its saying, and in 
marking, appears. It is this marking which constitutes its missing imitation. It is 
missing because it is always excessive-always missing its mark, if you will-always 
anticipating what will be said next, always lacking since awaiting the next mark. At 
the same time, because of its dynamism, this excessive lack is inimitable. It reveals 
the inadequacy of imitation of the adequate sort. If an attempt was made to imitate 
Him, then all we would have is a retrospective picture as to what was said, or to use 
Heidegger's distinction, Historie not Geschichte. A blind poet's song is Geschichte, 
because he does not try to imitate adequately; he sings searchingly and in singing 
blinds himself. In this way, his blindness marks the dual necessity of his singing. On 
the one hand, it guarantees the hopes he sings. His blindness bars him from seeing 
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who we are today, and therefore from the temptation of suiting his song to who we 
seem to be; he is undeceived by appearance, and thus cannot deceive us in turn. On 
the other, his blinding is necessary, since it is what sustains our hopes. His insight 
into our hopes is retained by his blinding such that it cannot be replaced by any sight. 
Such a situation is as tragic as it is ironic, and it is for this reason that we cannot be 
misled by the blind poet's 'Saitenspiel' into believing that his song is not serious. The 
blind poet is as central to the notion of a serious world as the tragic heroic artist. His 
saying is a persistent and necessary questioning driven forward by the hope that the 
world is indeed susceptible to questioning, a hope whose main solace is that it does 
not fall silent. 
A 'figure' of irony 
Just the same, there is something in the notion of a blind man wandering around 
singing at the clouds which demands our scepticism. In other words, rather than be a 
philosopheme, doesn't a blind poet seem more nearly a loony, the kind of person we 
might try to avoid in the streets? What distinguishes a blind poet is his particularity, 
his unique insight, but this can also be said of the loony. As such, we must 
differentiate a blind poet from such a clown, and ask what makes the fonner seem 
compelling, and the latter deranged. 
To this end, we might start by considering the role of irony in our thinking. For 
instance, we have said that a blind poet is a 'figure of irony', but the very idea that 
there could be such a 'figure' is highly doubtful. Such a 'figure' would always 
remain in inverted commas, because the essential difficulty with irony-and the one 
this chapter is most concerned with--is precisely that it resists coalescing into 
anything so generalizable as a figure or concept. That said, there is at least one 
philosopher who explicitly ignores these inverted commas and presents a figure of 
irony in the flesh, so to speak. The philosopher is SNen Kierkegaard, and the figure 
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is Socrates.8 In fact, the thesis of The Concept of Irony with Constant Reference to 
Socrates is quite simply that 'Socrates' existence is irony'. 9 What this means is that 
in Socrates a world historical moment is reached where 'one development ends and a 
new development begins '.10 Such a role puts Socrates in direct relation with the 
tragic hero. For Kierkegaard, if the tragic hero primarily 'fights for the new', the 
ironist ensures that the old is 'displaced and seen in all its imperfections ',11 Because 
of his engagement in bringing about the new, 'the ironist is in one sense prophetic'; 
'he constantly points to something future', 12 Just the same, his pointed witticisms 
remain something' a poetiser'-to refer to the notion of Witz developed by Jean-Luc 
Nancy and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe in L 'absolu litteraire13-because he is blind to 
the very future he ushers in. Thus and in another sense, '[h]is position and situation 
are .. , the opposite of the prophetic'; '[t]hat which shall come is hidden from him, 
concealed behind his back " 14 
Such a posture once again resembles that of a clown, who entertains us by blindly 
backing into his own comic undoing. However, it is important to see these comedic 
histrionics l5 first and foremost as indicators of irony's ambivalent relation to 
seriousness. Kierkegaard observes that linguistic irony 'is not serious about its 
seriousness ',16 and such a paradoxical statement could be made about irony more 
generally, Irony reveals what is ridiculous about taking seriously, and by the same 
token is serious in its lack of seriousness. Irony is, as Alexander Garcia DUttmann 
puts it, 'a construction of seriousness ',17 
8 Possibly another example can be found in Nietzsche's treatment of Socrates in The Twilight of the 
Idols, though it must be noted that Nietzsche fundamentally presents the ancient Greek as a dialectician 
rather than as an ironist. 
9 Kierkegaard, S0ren. The Concept of Irony, p. 157. 
10 Ibid., p. 234: The full sentence reads quite directly: 'In Socrates one development ends and a new 
development begins '. 
11 Ibid., p. 277. 
12 Ibid., p. 278. 
l3 Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe and Nancy, Jean-Luc. L 'Absolu Litteraire, p. 76. 
14 Kierkegaard, S0ren. The Concept of Irony, p. 278. 
15 Walter Benjamin notes the theatrical proclivities of irony in his text 'The Concept of Criticism in 
German Romanticism': 'Among all the literary forms, dramatic form can be ironized to the greatest 
extent and in the most impressive way, because it contains the highest measure of the power of illusion 
and thereby can receive irony into itself to a high degree without disintegrating' (p. 163). 
16 Kierkegaard, S0ren. The Concept of Irony, p. 265. 
17 DOttmann, Alexander Garcia. 'Odd Moves. Obertreibung und Ironie', p. 74. 
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One of the things that this construction reveals, moreover, is once again, the danger of 
taking too seriously. In the previous chapter we related this to the disappointment 
meted out by a tragic heroic artist. Such a disappointment arises because taking 
seriously is always ridiculous, always blind to what it takes seriously. As Simon 
Critchley puts it in his examination of a possible displacement of the tragic-heroic 
paradigm, 'one might say [that] the problem with the tragic-heroic paradigm is that it 
is not tragic enough and that only comedy is truly tragic '.18 This irony shows up in 
philosophy to the extent that a philosopher's inherent inability to question what he is 
taking seriously makes him risk taking it too seriously. By his very seriousness, he 
himself risks being made into clown, of being seduced-and subsequently betrayed-
by his own words. According to Adorno, it is for this reason that a philosopher is 
always in need of a corrective, a non-serious redressing, which allows him the 
necessary 'clownish traits' without, for that, making him into a clown: 
'As a corrective to the total rule of method, philosophy contains a playful 
element which the traditional view of it as a science would like to 
exorcise ... The un-naIve thinker knows how far he remains from the object 
of his thinking, and yet he must always talk as if he had it entirely. This 
brings him to the point of clowning. He cannot deny his clownish traits, 
least of all since they alone can give him hope for what is denied him. 
Philosophy is the most serious of things, but then again it is not all that 
serious '.19 
An 'un-naive thinker', then, ironises, always thinks according to an as if, and namely 
an as if of mastery. He must do so because claiming his subject matter as mastered 
would be to deny its dialectic and potential for development, in other words, to 
tragically doom it to a premature grave. 
18 Critchley, Simon. 'Comedy and Finitude: Displacing the Tragic-Heroic Paradigm in Philosophy 
and Psychoanalysis', p. 114. An interesting aspect of this comment is that it would seem to weaken the 
very hypothesis Critchley is trying to advance, indicating the impossibility of truly displacing the 
tragic-heroic paradigm with comedy-or as he thinks of it, with a certain version oflaughter. To put it 
in the language we are using here, comedy and laughter cannot displace the tragic-heroic because they 
share with it the same serious world. Lawrence J. Hatab points to such a condition when he says in his 
essay, 'Laughter in Nietzsche's Thought': 'If tragedy and comedy can each be called an affirmative 
response to negative limits, it would not be surprising that a boundary line between them is often hard 
to draw' (p. 72). 
19 Adorno, T.w. Negative Dialectics, p. 14. 
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Of clowns and blind poets 
But what does this have to do with blind poets? It is tempting to simply pair such un-
naIve philosophy with artistic blindness in such a way as to form a couple analogous 
to that of the tragic heroic artist and philosopher sidekick; however, this is not 
possible. For to do so would be to fall into the very 'irony of irony' identified by 
Schlelgel, and to forget the ironies of our own philosophical efforts. To call anyone 
an ironist is to invite upon oneself the irony that it 'takes one to know one '. In this 
rhetorically charged atmosphere, then, rather than call Adorno an ironist, we should 
probably simply note that Adorno's description of'un-na'ive thinking' bears striking 
resemblance to the artistic blindness he attributes to Schonberg. And this raises the 
question of what it means when an 'un-naIve' philosopher acclaims one artist as a 
blind poet, only to denounce another as a clown, as Adorno does in his opposition of 
Schonberg and Stravinsky in The Philosophy of Modern Music: 
'Everything depends, however, upon whether this music, by its attitude, 
advertises this authenticity as something which it has already attained, or 
whether-with closed eyes, as it were-it surrenders itself to the demands 
of the entire matter in the hope of mastering it ... Schonberg's school obeys 
without excuses the reality of a perfected nominalism in composition '.20 
Like the 'un-naive thinker', the composer of a 'perfected nominalism', is a composer 
who acknowledges any claimed mastery as premature, and instead plunges himself 
into the unknown of the as if. Whereas Schonberg approaches authenticity as if it 
were something achievable, and thus with hope, Stravinsky presents it as achieved. 
As such, if Schonberg is a blind poet, Stravinsky is a clown. That is, the latter is a 
clown who ' assures [the listener] that [music] is not to be taken seriously', whose 
music 'manifests clear traits of such conciliation, reminiscent of the master of 
ceremonies, who tells jokes to reconcile his audience with whatever else strikes them 
squarely and directly'. 21 
20 Adorno, T.W. PhiiosophyojModernMusic, pp 212-13 (my emphasis). 
21 Ibid, p. 157 (footnote 18). 
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Nevertheless, the difference that would separate Stravinsky as clown from Schonberg 
as blind poet is slight, as inappreciable as the words 'as if' themselves. The problem 
is twofold. On the one hand, it is not really evident that Schonberg'S closed eyes 
submit to the open-ended nature of the 'as if'. It would seem that ifhe can already 
obey 'the reality of a perfected nominalism " then the hope in question is not too 
much in doubt, and as such, Schonberg's approach to composition is more nearly to 
treat it as master-able than as if master-able. On the other hand, it is quite possible 
that it is precisely Stravinsky's much maligned 'attitude " which more nearly observes 
an as if of mastery. According to Adorno, one can recognize 'by its attitude' the signs 
of an attempt by Stravinsky's music to arrest the dialectic of new music and claim 
mastery, not as ifachieved, but as achieved. However, if we, then, enquire into the 
nature of this 'attitude', we find out that it is precisely such as would erode the kind of 
certainty Adorno wants to attribute to it. What Adorno accuses Stravinsky of doing is 
writing 'music against music ',22 that is to say of parodying music. And since parody 
is just as readily self-parody, it is much more a questioning of fixed attitude than any 
attitude of its own. In fact, one might say that as regards mastery, parody is more 
inclined to place it in doubt than the kind of blindness attributed to Schonberg. At the 
very least, Stravinsky's parodying fully observes the 'if' of as if. 
But why does Adorno not see it this way? Why is he so critical of Stravinsky's 
parody and humour? The answer seems to be that the kind of hope he imagines in 
Schonberg as blind poet would be threatened if it were possible to consider 
Stravinsky, the parodist, a blind poet as well. As Christoph Menke puts it-noting 
that Adorno's 'criterion of progress is, at the very least, ambiguous'- '[w]hat 
Adorno criticizes in the name of aesthetic progress as regressive can also base its 
claim to aesthetically stringent experienceability on a different conception of the 
genuine progress of musical rationalization'. 23 Resisting this different conception, 
Adorno invokes a criterion of dynamism, denouncing Stravinsky's music as static; 
however, such an accusation itself depends upon a very significant state-ment, or 
more to the point, fixing of the essence of music. Adorno's statement is that '[a]s a 
temporal art, music is bound to the fact of succession and is hence as irreversible as 
22 Adorno, T.W. 'Stravinsky: A Dialectical Portrait', p. 153. 
23 Menke, Christoph. The Sovereignty of Art, p. 135. 
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time itself'. 24 His claim, then, is that music is essentially historical, and this does not 
simply mean that it exists in history, but more nearly that it is history, that it is 
sedimented history. According to Krzysztof Ziarek, this is a claim Adorno shares 
with Heidegger: 'They both see art in terms of history: not as containing universal or 
unchangeable truth but as figuring a happening of historical truth'. 25 It is only based 
on this claim that Adorno's criticism of Stravinsky makes any sense, because only if 
music is necessarily and irreversibly a development of history, would music that is 
supposedly static, and even backward-looking, be such an affront. Only under such 
constraints would it be 'music that has been stifled '.26 
A revealing connection, furthermore, can be made between the position Adorno 
claims Stravinsky is maintaining and Nietzsche's notion of a 'suprahistorical 
standpoint'. He, who occupies such a 'standpoint ',27 is said to 'have recognized the 
single condition of all events: that blindness and injustice dwelling in the soul of those 
who act. From that point onward he would be cured of taking history overly 
seriously,.28 Such a 'standpoint', of course, is impossible--Nietzsche himself 
indicates as much by presenting it entirely in conditional language-and anyone who 
would claim to occupy it would be as offensive and ludicrous as Stravinsky the 
parodist seems to be for Adorno. Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge the 
challenge such a standpoint throws out: such a 'standpoint' is impossible, yes-and 
according to Nietzsche, even nauseating29-but there is still some advantage in 
thinking as if one could occupy it. The benefit of this as if is that it allows us to 
question history, to question its seriousness, to ask critically 'Why and to what 
purpose people live?,30 In other words, itallows us to question our hopes for the 
24 Ibid, p. 150 (my emphasis). 
2S Ziarek, Krzysztof. 'Radical Art', p. 342. 
26 Adorno, T.W. 'Stravinsky: A Dialectical Portrait', p. 151. 
27 The inverted commas are necessary because, of course, no such standpoint is possible. In fact, it 
might be related to 'the paradoxical point of indifference at which irony and seriousness become 
indistinguishable' ('Odd Moves', p. 85) as it is understood by Alexander Garcia Diittmann in his notion 
of irony as a 'construction of seriousness '. The attempt to occupy such an impossible position leads 
either to a subordination of seriousness to irony or the reverse, and the artificial arrestation of their 
dialectic. 
28 Nietzsche, F. 'On the Utility and Liability of History for Life', p. 93. 
29 As Nietzsche puts it, 'given the infinite superabundance of events, how could he [i.e. the 
suprahistorical thinker] possibly avoid being satiated, oversatiated, indeed, even nauseated!' (p. 94). 
Nietzsche's own dismissal of suprahistoricity would seem to belie our reasons for being interested in it, 
and yet nevertheless, we are doing no more than Nietzsche himself, who considers it in detail before 
denouncing it. 
30 Ibid, p. 93. 
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future. For there is just as much risk that we take too seriously our hopes as anything 
else, and in the case of Adorno, it may indeed be that he takes too seriously the hope 
implied by music as history, the hope that its development points to utopia, even if 
only negatively. 
Therefore, what Adorno fails to see in his attack on Stravinsky--<>r more probably, 
what he does see, but resists-is that the innovation he so desires in music is just as 
much dependent on parody a la Stravinsky as seriousness a la Schonberg, that the new 
must ironise itself and question its own hopefulness to ever have any hope?} 
Nevertheless, before we further address this duality, we should indicate what it is that 
makes the ironist blind. For this is where Adorno's suspicions about Stravinsky 
appear the most justified. When Adorno evocatively says that the latter's music 
'takes the side of those who laugh', 32 what he means is that Stravinsky's music sides 
with the oppressors, that it is a hopeless reaffirmation of power relations, in which 
laughter is 'the echo of power as something inescapable ,.33 Regardless of how far 
one is willing to follow Adorno in this critique, one must acknowledge his insight into 
the inherent conservatism of parody. In order to function, parody takes seriously 
precisely that which it makes fun of. As a result, and appropriately enough ironically, 
it preserves precisely that which it attacks. This, one might say, is the blindness of 
parody. Such blindness appears in Nietzsche's notion ofa 'suprahistorical standpoint' 
to the extent that for it 'the world is complete and has arrived at its culmination in 
every individual moment ,.34 A mockery of history by history is blind to change, and 
as such even more exposed to history than ever. For Adorno, for whom music is 
essentially historical, this blindness is a-musical. For Nietzsche, however, this 
blindness can be that of a blind poet. 
31 One even has reason to speculate that the very reason Adorno speaks about his own philosophy 
being 'un-nalve' is precisely that he assigns to philosophy this ironic role. Such a reading would also 
go some distance in explaining Adorno's blindness to Stravinsky. Nevertheless, it would also risk the 
'irony of irony' mentioned above. By talking of a 'figure of irony', as forced as this can be, we at least 
we avoid the more dangerous path of structurally identifying irony with individual philosophers and 
artists. 
32 Adorno, T.W. Philosophy of Modem Music, p. 144. 
33 Adorno, T.W. Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 140. 
34 Nietzsche, F. 'On the Utility and Liability of History for Life " p. 94. 
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Dual blindness 
What turning to Nietzsche makes one realise is that by opposing Schonberg to 
Stravinsky-the former's seriousness to the latter's parody-Adorno masks the 
degree to which the former's seriousness is also ironic. In fact, its very seriousness 
derives from its ironic character. When Schonberg writes 'serious music', he is 
writing music that treats all former composition as just so much fodder for new music. 
Everything older composers considered binding rules, Schonberg treats as exceptions, 
as 'exhausted special circumstances ,.35 Such manipulations of the 'tradition'-such 
playful exposure of it as a tradition-are ironic; that is, one can only refuse the 
tradition if one is already, and in all seriousness, a part of it. 
There are, therefore, really two modes of being a blind poet: one whose blindness is 
the blindness of a dreamer who neglects the limits of the known world in favour of a 
leap into the unknown, and another whose blindness is that of the sceptic who 
eschews the merely possible in favour of critical engagement with the totality of the 
known. Schonberg's 'closed eyes' are the blindness to the known rules of music that 
allow him to forge ahead in the creation of new music; whereas Stravinsky's parody is 
his conscious grasp of the tradition of music as a whole, a critical engagement which, 
nevertheless, blinds him to the way in which this very grasp opens up new 
possibilities that are always, and ironically, just beyond its reach.36 As it is, however, 
because Adorno tends to attribute the productive aspects of both of these roles to 
Schonberg, and to deny Stravinsky the least bit of ground, he does not allow us to 
fully investigate this duality. 
In Nietzsche, by contrast, both modes of being a blind poet find their voice. We 
encounter a Schonbergian version in a 'useful blindness' that makes action possible. 
For Nietzsche of The Gay SCience, this blindness to what is known is a 'faith in 
oneself that blinds 'the few' who are 'endowed' with it to the 'skeptic inside them '. 
35 Adorno, T.W. Aesthetic Theory, p. 36. 
36 If Adorno in any way develops Stravinsky's role in new music in terms of artistic blindness as we 
understand it here, it is by describing Stravinsky's music as mechanical and lifeless. A memorable 
phrase to this effect, and one that also inadvertently indicates the parodist's broad access to known 
materials and forms, is Adorno's quip that 'the basic phenomenon in the spiritual movement perfected 
by Stravinsky is his substitution of the hand organ for the Bach organ '. (The Philosophy of Modem 
Music, p. 145). 
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In fact, '[ e ]verything good, fine, or great they do is first of all an argument against' 
this scepticism. It is, in fact, their 'genius ,.37 Like Schonberg, this sort of blind poet 
forges ahead and creates new things by positioning himself in opposition to 
scepticism. It should be no surprise, therefore, that the reverse situation holds for a 
sceptical/parodic sort of blind poet. 
We fmd the latter in the preface to Human, All Too Human. There Nietzsche 
addresses critics who label his writings 'a School for Suspicion', acknowledging that 
indeed he does not believe 'that anyone has ever looked into the world with such deep 
suspicion, and not only as an occasional devil' s advocate, but every bit as much, to 
speak theologically, as an enemy and challenger of God ,.38 By this acknowledgement 
he asserts his writings as the work of a sceptic and ironist, someone who goads our 
ignorance just as did Socrates as the gadfly of ancient Athens. But what is interesting 
about this assertion is not that a philosopher can be an ironist-the case of Socrates is 
the prototypical example-but that for Nietzsche this sort of philosopher must also be 
an artist. For what he says is 'often I tried to take shelter somewhere, to recover from 
myself, as if to forget myself entirely for a time ,.39 In these moments Nietzsche 
becomes blind to himself and indulges in the 'shared blindness' of 'repose in a trusted 
friendship '.40 But very significantly, if he can not find such an alliance, he has 'to 
gain it by force artificially, to counterfeit it, or create it poetically'; these alliances, in 
other words, are instances of' some sort of "art"', by which he deliberately and 
wilfully overlooks the blind faith of others.41 What a sceptical blind poet creates, 
therefore, is not anything tangible or even conceptual, but rather a relation that 
couples him with the faithful, projective action of a blind poet such as Wagner, whose 
37 Nietzsche, F. The Gay Science, p. 229. The relevant part of fragment 284, entitled 'Faith in 
oneself', reads as follows: 'Few people have faith in themselves. Of those few, some are endowed 
with it as with a useful blindness or a partial eclipse of their spirit (what would they behold if they 
could see to the bottom of themselves!), while the rest have to acquire it. Everything good, fine, or 
great they do is first of all an argument against the sceptic inside them. They have to convince or 
f:ersuade him, and that almost requires genius '. 
8 Nietzsche, F. Human, All Too Human, p. 4. 
39 Ibid 
40 Ibid 
41 Ibid, pp 4-5. The latter phrase runs as follows, and it should be read with an eye to the repeated 
visual imagery: 'Perhaps one could accuse me in this regard of some sort of "art," various sorts offiner 
counterfeiting: for example, that I had deliberately closed my eyes to Schopenhauer's blind will to 
morality, at a time when I was already clear-sighted enough about morality; similarly, that I had 
deceived myself about Richard Wagner's incurable romanticism, as if it were a beginning and not an 
end ... ' 
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'Wagnerian perspective', or inwardly turning gaze, makes him blind to known limits, 
and thus able to achieve the seemingly impossible.42 
What the self-referential nature of the sceptical blind poet means-the fact that he 
points to his own need for the other sort of blind poet, the faithful, active producer of 
works, as well as the fact that his very creativity stems from his ability to provide 
himself with this needed companionship-what this means is that there is an 
asymmetry between the two sorts of blindness. In other words, even though each 
mode of being a blind poet is dependent upon its complement, a sceptical blind poet is 
superiorly endowed with the ability to acknowledge this dependence and fulfil his 
needs by himself. For this reason, it is possible to imagine an ironic artist able to 
respond to the imperatives of both sorts of blindness. At least, this seems to be 
Nietzsche's thought when he speaks in On the Genealogy a/Morals of an artist 
(namely, Wagner) who 'is capable of laughing at himself'. 43 On the one hand, such 
an artist is a sceptic who is able to question 'ascetic ideals', because he is blind to the 
possibility of his soul's eternal damnation, such as is promised by 'the whole horror 
of earthly seriousness and misery as it has existed from time immemorial'. 44 On the 
other hand, he is a productive artist with the faith needed to create works of art. His 
ability to laugh at himself is his blindness to the kind of self-doubt that plagues lesser 
mortals. However, there are two things that we might note about this kind of dual 
blindness in an artist. The first has implications for his work. He is seemingly only 
capable of parody, and as such his work becomes exposed to the question Nietzsche 
poses here with regard to Parsifal: namely, whether it is 'meant as a joke ,.45 
Moreover, and this is the second point, if an artist is only capable of parody doesn't 
this have implications for the artist himself? Doesn't his relation to himself come to 
resemble that of self-parody, what Sander L. Gilman recognizes as parody's role as 'a 
means of introspection', whereby an artist is able to engage in 'self-examination' and 
'self-abnegation,?46 Such a contradictory combination of personal insight and the 
42 Nietzsche, F. 'Richard Wagner in Bayreuth', p. 262. This is another point of contact between the 
blind poet and the tragic heroic artist. Both are wedded to an evenementiality, which endows them 
with a unique perspective. 
43 Nietzsche, F. On the Genealogy a/Morals, p. 79. 
44 Ibid 
45 Ibid We might note, in fact, that both Nietzsche and Heidegger use the same term to descibe such 
work: 'satyr play'. 
46 Gilman, Sander L. 'Incipit parodia: The Function of Parody in the Lyrical Poetry of Friedrich 
Nietzsche', p. 67. 
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wilful refusal of what this insight reveals culminates in a moment of self-overcoming 
by which the artist achieves 'the ultimate, highest artistic freedom, artistic 
transcendence ,.47 But in this transcendent moment when an artist is 'capable of 
laughing at himself is he anything but his own laughter? As a 'satyr play', can 
Parsifal be anything other than an 'epilogue', the 'fitting and worthy way' in which 
'the tragedian Wagner wanted to take his leave of us, of himself, above all, of 
tragedy'? In other words, it would seem that the only way a tragedian can ever take 
leave of tragedy is for him to become its last tragic victim. Such a dissolution brings 
out the full irony of the artist as blind poet.48 
It also, of course, brings out its seriousness. For even if a blind poet is a figure of 
irony, and thus of parody and even laughter, his importance lies precisely in the 
seriousness of his non-seriousness. On the one hand, a blind poet demands to be 
taken entirely seriously, to be seen as someone whose blindness constitutes a faith in 
himself that allows him to project into the future. On the other, a blind poet must not 
be taken seriously, because ifhe is, he will be incapable of blinding himself to himself 
and achieving the kind of self-overcoming his projection demands. A blind poet, in 
other words, can only be understood with regard to a dual necessity: in order to 
question the world, he must not question himself, but in order to transform the world, 
it is necessary that he does. Regardless of his mode (as either faithful or sceptical) a 
blind poet questions, and it is according to this necessity of questioning that he stands 
at the heart of a serious world. 
Struck blind 
As might have been noted, an equivocation is sneaking into this chapter between, on 
the one hand, describing a blind poet as an attitude or mode, and on the other, calling 
him a figure. In many ways, it would be better to only do the former, and yet the only 
reason we speak of blind poets at all is that they explicitly appear as figures in the 
work of Nietzsche, Heidegger and Adorno. It is our next task to understand this 
47 Nietzsche, F. On the Genealogy o/Morals, p. 79. 
48 Daniel Conway identifies this irony as Nietzsche's VerslIcherkunst, his art of both experimentation 
(VerslIch) and temptation (Versuchllng). According to it, Wagner must tempt (versucht) tragic fate in 
order to attempt (versuchen) to parody 'ascetic ideals '. 
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appearance. To do so we might consider one of the most famous appearances-in 
fact, perhaps even the first appearance--of a blind poet. 
* 
Plato's 'Allegory of the Cave' plays on the notion of blindness. The poor prisoner 
who is 'forced suddenly to stand up, turn his head, and walk with eyes lifted to the 
light; ... [who] would be too dazzled to make out the objects whose shadows he had 
been used to see,49 is a blind poet. As in the case of other blind poets, he is a parodic 
figure whom others 'would laugh at', saying 'that he had gone up only to come back 
with his sight ruined '. 50 At the same time, he is a creative figure in that he is 
instrumental to the founding and preservation of the Republic. As such and 
furthermore, then, his blindness is dual: first, it is the blindness of a prisoner just 
released, unable to distinguish the reality of the images he was accustomed to; and 
second, it is the blindness of a returned prisoner, whose sight has been overwhelmed 
by all that he has seen. What Plato's argument in favour ofthe Republic depends 
upon is that a privilege is accorded the latter blindness, that rather than 'laugh 
thoughtlessly' at it, that we would be better to take it seriously. 51 
The problem, of course, is that in order to take it seriously, we must be able to 
distinguish it from the prisoner's first blindness, his blindness when first released. 
We could differentiate these two blindnesses by contrasting the ability to see that they 
each correspond to. According to this approach, the task would be to differentiate an 
early, inferior sight, which can only observe shadows, from a later, profound insight, 
which can gaze upon the sun. But this is exactly what Plato does not do. Instead he 
insists upon the essential sameness of these two capacities to see. 52 Rather what 
49 Plato. The Republic of Plato, p. 229. 
50 Ibid, p. 231. 
51 Ibid, p. 232: The relevant parts ofthis passage read as follows: 'a sensible man will remember that 
the eyes may be confused in two ways-by a change from light to darkness or from darkness to light; 
and he will recognise that the same thing happens to the soul. When he sees it troubled and unable to 
discern anything clearly, instead oflaughing thoughtlessly, he will ask whether, corning from a brighter 
existence, its unaccustomed vision is obscured by the darkness ... or whether, emerging from the depths 
of ignorance, it is dazzled by excess oflight. If so, he will rather feel sorry for it; or, ifhe were 
inclined to laugh, that would be less ridiculous than to laugh at the soul which has come down from the 
light'. 
52 Ibid In fact, what he says is that what distinguishes them is only a matter of the eye being 'turned 
the way it ought to be '. His point is that learning does not bring sight to the blind, but rather accesses a 
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distinguishes the blindness of the recently released prisoner from that of the returned 
prisoner is precisely that the latter has returned In other words, what distinguishes 
the returned prisoner's insightful blindness is the act of returning itself. 
This is possible, because Plato establishes the Cave and its environs as a site of 
perfect visibility. As if caught between two mirrors, the Cave spins out endless 
reflections-shadows reflect objects, the interior of the Cave reflects its exterior, 
sunlight the sun itself-and this play of reflections means that no darkness or 
invisibility escapes the endless play of light. As such, nothing is hidden from he who 
looks. And the returned prisoner is he who has looked. Because of his round trip, the 
returned prisoner has seen everything ... twice! ... and thus can see the reflections in the 
Cave as the reflections they are. His blindness is an insight, a supplement that allows 
his sight to reflect upon itself. If compared with fellow prisoners, the returned 
prisoner sees before he sees; he has a (in)sight that precedes sight. 
Moreover, this is not simply a personal revelation for the returned prisoner. Because 
he has returned, he is now in a position to educate others. Significantly, what he 
teaches is not as much a recounting of what he has seen-this would be to propagate 
yet more reflections-but more nearly to account for what is and is not to be seen. In 
other words, the returned prisoner's blindness turns visual receptivity into a 
performative act that points to its own seeing, and thus shows what should be seen. 
The returned prisoner's blindness may indeed be his inability to take reflections for 
objects, but it is also his ability to show that they are reflections, and to point to the 
objects that cast them. It is this pedagogical skill that makes the blind poet the first 
citizen of the Republic. 
* 
But-as I am sure many are dying to ask-how is it reasonable to call this first 
citizen, blind as he may be, a poet? The answer to this question lies in the violent 
event hidden in the seemingly leisurely excursion of the Platonic prisoner. However, 
capacity everyone already has: 'education is not what it is said to be by some, who profess to put 
knowledge into a soul which does not possess it, as if they could put sight into blind eyes. On the 
contrary, ... the soul of every man does possess the power of learning the truth and the organ to see it 
with'. 
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in order to recognize it, we need the help ofHeidegger's version of the originary poet. 
In the latter's writings and lectures, Holderlin is in various ways described as a first 
citizen~ he is the one who 'comes home beforehand', 53 and who 'establishes' the 
grounds for das Vater/and. And very much like the first citizen of the Republic, he is 
said to be blinded by what he has seen. This blinding is due to the necessity of the 
poetic vocation, to the fact that '''a sign is needed''', and that 'the sign can only be the 
name for the poet,:54 
'The poet, as poet, is the one who points, thus something that shows, and 
is thereby a "sign"-not a thing-like sign, not some sign-thing, which is 
what we mistakenly take to be the specific nature proper to a "sign". The 
poet is a sign that has a "soul" in which the thoughts of spirit quietly end: 
a sign to which a "mind" is appropriate, in which it bears the stars of the 
heavens. The showing is of such a kind as to first let appear that which is 
to be shown. Yet such a sign can, in saying, let appear that which is to be 
said only because it has before this already been shone upon by that which 
thus appears as what is to be poeticized. This sign must therefore be 
struck and blinded in the face of the "fire". This is why it is initially 
unable to find the word, so that it seems as though this showing had lost 
its tongue ,.55 
As in Plato, the concern is with a showing, and more specifically with what is 'to be 
shown'. Moreover, access to this showing is clearly marked as an event, whereby the 
poet is 'struck and blinded in the face of the "fire" '. And our question is whether such 
an event, such a moment in which the poet is struck blind, also plays into Plato's tale 
of the returning prisoner. It would be tempting to take the moment the freed prisoner 
53 Heidegger, M. Hoiderlins Hymn 'Andenken " p. 167: 'Der Dichter ist als einziger zuvor 
heimgekommen in das Eigene ... ' 
54 Heidegger, M. Holderlin's Hymn 'The Ister', p. 150. The first citation is from line 51 of the poem 
by Holderlin. The argumentation that leads up to this statement relates to the need for demi-gods, for 
in-between beings, between gods and men, something we should recognize from the lectures on 
'Germanien' and 'Der Rhein', and elsewhere. The difference here is that Heidegger unambiguously 
assimilates the poet with the demi-gods, saying that Holderlin comprehends 'the demi-god as the 
essence of the poet '. 
55 Ibid, p. 151 (my emphasis). 
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is 'able to look at the Sun and contemplate its nature,56 as constitutive of this event; 
however, this would miss an essential aspect of a blind poet's blinding. 
That is to say, what makes the blinding of a blind poet an event is not really the 
blinding itself, but the relationship this blinding establishes with regard to what is 
proper and improper. In other words, to the extent that the poet's blinding is the 
appearance of an ability to show, it is also a decisive differentiation between what is 
to be shown and what is not to be shown, that is, between what is proper and 
improper. In Heidegger, this corresponds with the blind poet's role as a sign. As a 
sign, his Zeigen-konnen, his ability to show, allows 'the belonging to one another of 
human beings and gods' to first attain 'the fortune of appearing'. 57 His showing 
decides the proper relation between human beings and gods, 'the becoming homely of 
human beings as historical'. 58 It thereby excludes any improper, ahistorical 
understanding of the world. Because of his blinding, because of this event in which 
he is 'shone upon by that which thus appears as what is to be poeticized', the blind 
poet comes to see in advance of any sight. Blind, he 'bears the "world" in [his] 
mind,.59 
* 
If we now return to Plato, we have a better basis for recognizing the event at work in 
his account of the Cave. It may indeed be that it is the image of the Platonic sun that 
corresponds most closely to the 'world' that Holderlin bears in his mind, and yet this 
image languishes as long as it resides only in the mind of the freed prisoner. He too 
must activate his Zeigen-konnen, and instruct others. And to do this, he must return to 
the Cave. However, as Plato notes, there is every reason to expect that once he has 
gazed upon the sun, the freed prisoner would 'endure anything rather than go back to 
his old beliefs and live in the old way,60 inside the Cave. As a result, therefore, 
'compulsion' must be brought 'to bear upon the noblest natures', and once they have 
climbed 'the ascent to the vision of Goodness " they must 'by persuasion or 
56 Plato. The Republic of Plato, p. 230. 
57 Heidegger, M. HolderUn's Hymn 'The Ister', p. 153. 
58 Ibid, p. 154. 
59 Ibid, p. 150. 
60 Plato. The Republic of Plato, p. 230. 
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constraint' be returned to the Cave in order to 'watch over and care for the other 
citizens ,.61 It is this compulsion that marks the event of the Republic. 
But where does this compulsion come from? Once the Republic is up and running, it 
can be the role of teachers to cajole candidate philosopher-kings into participation--
because the latter will have been educated for their country's sake, they will be duty 
bound 'to be like leaders and king-bees in a hive ,.62 But what about the first citizen, 
the blind poet? The founder of the Republic is not in his country's debt, and thus 
cannot be persuaded to return to the Cave on that basis. Just the same, this does not 
mean that he does not owe some credit to others for his innovation; his creation is not 
ex nihilo. Rather, to create the Republic, the first citizen imitates the self-educated of 
other states, those who discover the world outside the Cave on their own. However, 
unlike these 'self-sown plants' of other states, the first citizen of the Republic does 
not subsequently 'refuse to collaborate' in the affairs of his country and remain above 
ground in blissful contemplation of the sun.63 As such, he imitates, but only 
incompletely; his imitation is a missing one. Furthermore, what is missed is precisely 
that which constitutes the proper identity of the Republic. Precisely by excluding the 
foreign practice of allowing the best educated to 'spend all their days in the pursuit of 
culture', the Republic establishes the rule of those 'least desirous of holding office': 
namely, philosophers.64 The first of these philosopher-kings is unlike all those who 
follow him; though he must imitate as they do, he must also do so in such a way that 
his imitation fails. In this failure, he distinguishes what is proper from what is 
improper, 'life in our commonwealth' from the 'dream, as it is in most existing states, 
where men live fighting one another about shadows ,.65 This missing imitation is a 
creative act because it allows for the founding ofthe Republic; it is an ironic one 
because it takes a foreign practice as the basis for what is most properly one's own. It 
is a violent event because it forces upon the blind poet and his fellow philosopher-
kings 'a worse life than they might have' had had they remained above ground.66 It is 
not for nothing, in other words, that one says a blind poet is struck blind. 
61 Ibid, pp 233 and 234. 
62 Ibid, p. 234. 
63 Ibid 
64 Ibid, pp 233 and 234. 
65 Ibid, p. 234. 
66 Ibid This is actually a polemical moment within the (Allegory '. Glaucon, quite reasonably 
concerned that this just Republic is to be founded upon injustice, questions Socrates at this point as to 
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Out in the open 
This violence is particularly notable since a blind poet is very often called upon as a 
guarantor of peace and stability. In fact, that is precisely what he is for Plato, who 
hails his return to the Cave as that which will 'unite the citizens in harmony', and 
'ensure the welfare of the commonwealth as a whole ,.67 But isn't this the irony of 
such stability? That since it must be wrested from chaos-that since the foreign 
practice of self-education must be displaced from its origin in dysfunctional states-
that stability always involves suppression, the violent exclusion of the destabilizing 
improper? Moreover, the violence doesn't end with the establishment of a realm of 
harmony. In the case of the Republic, for instance, since the first citizen imitates a 
foreign practice, he carries impropriety right into the heart of the state. Because self-
education is constitutive of the Republic, it lurks beneath the peaceful surface as a 
constant threat. If a 'self-sown plant' appears within the Republic, he can challenge 
the supremacy of the philosopher-kings. Moreover, this threat can never be 
eliminated. Even if the blind poet, the 'firstling' and apparent source of the threat, is 
expulsed,68 the irony of his missing imitation survives his individual fate. This is 
because all philosopher-kings are meant to imitate him, and yet not imitate him; they 
are all to be educated like him, but not self-educated like him. As such the Republic 
cannot escape what Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe identifies as the 'double bind' of 
mimesis, the dual, contradictory demand, "'Be like me" I"Don't be like me" ,.69 Its 
own persistence as a haven of peace and stability requires that it betray its own 
promise by means of ever-vigilant suppression. 
This irony shows up in the writings of Nietzsche, Heidegger and Adorno to the extent 
that they, like Plato, are in search of a haven, turning to art as if to a protector and 
whether it is fair to compel those who have seen the light to return to the Cave to rule. But Socrates, 
seemingly refusing to see the irony in his response, argues 'that there will be no real injustice' in such 
compulsion. Of course there won't; real injustice will not spring into existence until the philosopher-
kings return to the Cave and take their place in the Republic. In other words, the whole founding of the 
Republic depends upon this twist of irony, this metamorphosis of injustice into the basis for justice, of 
the improper into the basis for the proper. 
67 Ibid. 
68 This, in fact, is Plato's response to the danger posed by the blind poet. We will discuss this episode 
from Book X in Part Two. 
69 Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe. 'La cesure du speculatif inL 'imitation des modemes, p. 55 ('double 
bind' in English in original). 
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guardian. Nietzsche wants art to help him escape from 'his' seriousness; for 
Heidegger, poetry's 'harmless appearance' preserves and maintains the 
founding of 'our' history; and Adorno marvels at art's survival 'in the naked existence 
it contradicts and resists ',70 a survival that promises that things could be otherwise. 
The irony is that the protective power of art seems most threatened, not by what it is 
meant to ward against-not by the improper at its gates-but precisely by these 
thinkers' efforts to assure themselves of it. Every attempt made to freeze the 
oscillating movement of the 'double bind', and exclude its irony, ends in tragedy. 
Every time a blind poet is struck blind, the violence of the Republic reappears, and 
with it two threats which menace to completely undermine the hoped for peace and 
stability. 
The first threat is that of irrelevance. As we indicated above as regards the Republic, 
when a poet is struck blind, he internalises the very violence that his blinding is meant 
to exclude. If for example, as in the case of the first citizen, he is meant to exclude 
the chaos of the improper, he can only do so by founding the proper on the basis of 
this very same chaotic foreignness. This necessary relation exposes the proper both to 
subversion from within and mockery from without. The subversion stems from the 
fact that the original event invites its own repetition. As we have seen with the 
Republic, Plato depends upon the chance of event of a prisoner discovering the world 
of Forms outside the Cave, but subversively invites this same chance right into the 
heart of his Republic when he ushers this prisoner back in as its first philosopher-
king. The founding of the Republic, and the peace it is supposed to guarantee, is 
irrelevant if it cannot even guard itself against its own imitation, an imitation all the 
more likely to the extent that the Republic is a model state.71 
However, this is not the only type of irrelevance that can befall a blind poet, because 
there is also the chance that changes external to the realm of peace he establishes will 
throw his achievement into doubt. For example, what happens to our assessment of 
the Republic if other states also achieve the kind of stability and peace it promises, but 
70 Adorno, T.W. 'Is Art Lighthearted?', p. 248. 
71 Christopher Fynsk says something similar in criticism ofHeidegger's search for the 'way to 
language', a search for the stillness and silence of language. Even though Heidegger tries to evade the 
repetitive aspect oflanguage, its noise, as Fynsk points out, the original essence oflanguage as 'noisy' 
means that we must 'start from the fact of broken silence and begin to dwell with noise', that is 
repetition. ('Noise at the Threshold', p. 117). 
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in a different manner? Won't its proper identity as a philosophical oligarchy seem all 
the more oppressive when it is placed beside peaceful egalitarian states rather than 
chaotic despotisms? Because what is proper to the Republic is formed on the basis of 
a particular reaction to a particular situation-that is, a particular ironisation upon a 
particular foreign impression-it is forever indexed to that original problematic and 
moment in time. That is to say, the Republic's achievement can become irrelevant 
simply by becoming out of date. 
Such a risk of irrelevancy is evident in a formulation from The Philosophy of Modern 
Music. Adorno is searching for a way to understand the appearance of works of art in 
the world; how their objective form emerges out of and in opposition to the relentless 
'horrors of history': 
'[The work of art] assumes a tense position against the horrors of history. 
At one point it is insistent, at another it forgets. It relents and grows hard. 
It endures or it renounces itself, hoping to outwit its doom. The 
objectivity of art lies in the fixation of such moments. Works of art are 
similar to those childish grimaces which the striking of the clock causes to 
become permanently fixed ,.72 
The 'striking of the clock' that fixes the work of art's expression, its 'grimace', is 
very much like the moment in which a blind poet is struck blind. It is a moment that 
determines a work of art's stance toward the world. Like the blind poet, the 
grimacing work of art will not relax its posture and reconsider its attitude; it has seen 
all that it needs to see. Ifthis is its seriousness, however, it also has 'childish' aspects, 
because this 'striking of the clock' links the work of art irrevocably to the hour of its 
making. Like a child who stubbornly refuses his dinner, the renunciation rings rather 
hollow once the food that was rejected has been replaced by hunger. Because works 
of art must be products of the age in which they are created-because they must, as 
Adorno states here, be 'objective answers to objective social configurations,73-their 
72 Adorno, T.W. PhilosophyojModemMusic, p. 132. 
73 Ibid 
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self-reflective reference to their own 'striking of the clock' means that they risk the 
same irrelevance as the events ofyesteryear.74 
If we now move on to the second threat posed by the striking blind of the poet, what 
we find is that such striking, as reification, constitutes the basis for idolatry. 
Moreover, this risk is, like the previous, dua1.75 On the one hand, once fixed by the 
moment of striking blind, a blind poet maintains his significance to the extent that he 
commands idolatry, that he obliges reverence and wards off criticism. Only to the 
extent that he is taken-and takes himself-too seriously, can he maintain the rather 
implausible claim that the event of his blinding is the event proper to us all. In this 
rather traditional sort of idolatry, a blind poet suffers from a deficiency of self-irony, 
such as it is cultivated by Nietzsche in his moments of 'shared blindness' when he 
'closes his eyes' to the blindness of others, and indulges 'in some sort of reverence, or 
enmity, or scholarliness, or frivolity, or stupidity'. 76 In these relationships Nietzsche 
requires self-irony of neither himself nor his idols; in fact, their 'shared blindness' 
marks precisely their lack of self-scepticism. 
This is not the only way idolatry can manifest itself, however. Thus and on the other 
hand, to the extent that a blinded poet must still engage in questioning-even to ward 
off questioning one must acknowledge its possibility, and thereby anticipate it in self-
questioning-the subsequent self-reflexive questioning can itself become fetishized, 
leading to a kind of excess of self-irony. We see this at work in another formulation 
from The Philosophy of Modern Music, where again Adorno is searching for a way to 
illustrate the appearance of works of art, this time by emphasizing their' cognitive 
content': 
'Works of art attempt to solve riddles designed by the world to devour 
man. The world is a sphynx, the artist is blinded Oedipus, and it is works 
74 This, of course, introduces the temptation to counter the risk of irrelevance by declaring some event 
as absolutely decisive for works of art, as Adorno does with Auschwitz. A detailed discussion of the 
implications of this move for philosophy can be found in Alexander Garcia Diittmann's book 
Heidegger and Adorno: The Memory of Thought. His critical notion is that such a move involves a 
'naming of the name', and risks undermining the very disjunctive power it hopes to evoke. 
75 This is the case because irony is always and simultaneously self-irony. 
76 Nietzsche, F. Human, All Too Human, p. 4. 
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of art of the type resembling his wise answer which plunged the sphynx 
into the abyss ,.77 
Initially, we might read this passage as a case of traditional idolatry. There is nothing 
immediately in it to suggest that either we or the blind poet himself, that is Oedipus, 
are supposed to question the wisdom of his 'wise answer'; however, further reflection 
reveals a rich opportunity for self-irony. For what is it that happens once the sphinx 
has indeed plunged 'into the abyss'? Ifworks of art resemble his wise answer, what 
is their wisdom once their question has disappeared? This irony cannot be invisible to 
Adorno himself; the enigmatic character of works of art, which he himself develops, 
depends precisely on art's self-questioning stance. A 'wise answer' deprived of its 
question is itself a question, and this self-ironisation on the part of works of art is an 
extension of the self-irony of the artist himself. His very action as an artist is to bring 
his own action into question, to constantly offer us works of art that question the very 
possibility of works of art. His self-irony is that of a man whose business is to put 
himself out of business. The paradox of this undertaking threatens the artist with 
fetishization. If his activity becomes an end in itself, its own pointless repetition, the 
artist himself becomes an idol, a kind of grinning, shadowless mask ready for the 
billboard. 
It is important pause here, moreover, and consider the implication of this self-
ironisation. For if there is a protective aspect to art, it involves this self-protective 
gesture on the part of idols. Even if idols are empty, they tend to survive their own 
deaths.78 In this the 'Case of Wagner' is prototypical. Wagner is Nietzsche's most 
persistent idol, and the philosopher's task, his 'destiny' even, is 'to turn his back' on 
him.79 But how can he achieve such an 'untimely' "'self-overcoming'" in his daYS?80 
If his idol 'summarizes modernity', how can he escape from its influence when he 
himself is just as implicated in the modem era, is its 'bad conscience' even?81 
Straightforward rejection is not an option since, as relating itself directly to its target, 
it is part of the very modernity it refuses. That is to say, Wagner is already and also 
77 Adorno, T.W. Philosophy of Modem Music, p. 132. 
78 This is an allusion to Adorno's phrase from the 'Draft Introduction' to Aesthetic Theory, where he 
says: 'Art, for its part, seeks refuge in its own negation, hoping to survive through its death' (p. 338). 
79 Nietzsche, F. Der Fall Wagner, p. 3. 
80 Ibid, p. 4. 
81 Ibid. 
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anti-Wagner, just as modernity is already and also its own rejection. Nietzsche calls 
this self-ironisation 'decadent', but it is, in fact, the very grounds for hope. When one 
wishes that things could be otherwise, one can only sustain this hope as long as it is 
deferred, as long as it self-ironically denies its own realisation by presenting reality as 
something to be overcome, something decadent. 82 As such, Nietzsche's hope to 
overcome his idol only has any potency to the degree to which it takes account of this 
self-ironisation, to the extent that its 'untimeliness' is also, and ironically, 'timely'. 
It is for this reason that he turns to Bizet. What he looks for in Bizet is not any sort 
of anti-modernity, but rather a modernity that is even more self-ironic than Wagner's 
is. What he finds is amor fati. He does not call it by this name, but it is 'love as fact, 
asfatality, cynical, innocent, cruel'. It is the love ofa 'more southern, browner, and 
more tanned sensibility', that contrasts with Wagner's 'Senta-sentimentality,.83 For 
Nietzsche, the latter is a kind of 'refined parasitism' that tries to possess its object, to 
make it one's own.84 It has a the kind of barely repressed violence of appropriation as 
it is undertaken by the first citizen of the Republic. By contrast, love in Carmen is 
love that acknowledges its own possessiveness, its own self-ironic tendency to destroy 
its object. It is the love expressed in 'Don Jose's final cry': 'Yes! [have killed her,! 
I-my beloved Carmen! ,85 This self-ironic love saves the lover for love. It preserves 
its hopefulness, precisely by deferring it. Very much as can be said about Nietzsche 
as regard Wagner~ he does not overcome his idol as much as he is saved for him, 
becoming healthy enough to have idols.86 
82 See the very first section of this chapter for a discussion of the temporality of the figure of the blind 
poet. I say there that the 'blind poet's song manifests itself by means of an interminable, self-
obsessive repetition which never even manages to catch up with its own moment '. By never catching W' with itself, the blind poet's song keeps alive the hope that the present itself could be otherwise. 
Nietzsche, F. Der Fall Wagner', p. 9. 
84 Ibid., p. 12. On p. 10, Nietzsche explicitly accuses Wagner of the latter: 'Auch Wagner hat [die 
Liebe] miBverstanden. [Die Ki.instler] glauben in ihr selbstlos zu sein, well sie den Vortell eines andren 
Wesens wollen, oft wider ihren eigenen Vorteil. Aber dafiir wollen sie jenes andre Wesen besitzen ... ' 
85 Ibid., p. 9. 
86 A perhaps more critical reading of this possibility than the one presented here would be to 
emphasize how this possibility points back to Nietzsche's original idolatry of Wagner, making Bizet 
seem nothing but a temporary detour in his on-going relation with the German composer. Rene Girard 
presents such a view in his essay 'Strategies of Madness-Nietzsche, Wagner, and Dostoevski', where 
he says: 'In order to undermine the Wagner cult, Nietzsche has resorted to many ruses, as when he 
suggested Bizet as a substitute musical god. Even a child would not be fooled ... ' (p. 62). His point is 
that for Nietzsche the rivalry must always be maintained, and so even ifhe is, as we say, saved for 
love, it is a love dependent upon the existence of his rival. 
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In this light, the protective power of art is as much a boon as it is a bane. And as 
such, if the figure of a blind poet is indeed a guarantor of our hopes, it is only as long 
as we can put up with his demands, his relentless questioning and self-irony. This is 
his non-serious seriousness, his wager with us; his wager that we are not quite as 
serious about our hopes as we claim to be. 
The necessity of questioning 
For, one only imagines a blind poet if one has hope that either the world in which one 
lives, or some world to come is so constituted that our questioning of it is decisive. In 
other words, it is only meaningful for an artist to be thought of as a blind poet if, to 
use the language ofHeidegger, his Zeigen-kOnnen points to a serious world. In fact, 
part of what makes this world serious is precisely that it demands this reference, that it 
demands to be questioned. Such a demand is the necessity of questioning that we 
have repeatedly associated with the figure ofthe blind poet. To conclude, then, we 
want to look at this necessity in its full duality. 
On the one hand, the necessity of questioning refers to the necessity of the questions 
themselves, the way their posing traces the contours of the world. What makes such a 
questioning possible is the evenemential structure of a serious world, what we have 
examined under the rubric of the striking blind of the poet. Every question implicitly 
or explicitly refers back to this grounding event, this violence by which the distinction 
between what is proper and improper to the world is forged. What we have found, 
however, is that this necessary questioning-to be necessary-must also be able to 
sustain its own self-questioning. Otherwise, it risks irrelevance. Therefore, and on 
the other hand, a serious world must constantly face up to its own potential 
obsolescence, the fact that it can, and must, question itself out of existence. It is this 
self-questioning that we now want to consider more substantially, because such self-
ironisation leads to a situation very much reminiscent of the man who kills himself in 
order to outwit death. 
What the dual necessity of questioning encourages, therefore, is a strategy that will 
indeed outwit death, but can forego the killing part, as well. Rather than kill-to see 
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how serious death really is, no doubt-a philosopher turns to someone for whom 
death has proved non-fatal, that is to a blind poet.87 By having survived the event that 
blinded him, the blind poet is effectively the walking dead. The event that blinded 
him probed him in his very essence-just think of the earth-shattering shock 
experienced by the poor released prisoner-and as such, he is henceforth immunised 
against the dissolute effects of self-questioning. By turning to a blind poet, a 
philosopher is able to engage with self-questioning, while suspending his own. He is 
able to take seriously an attitude that otherwise brings itself into question as serious, 
and to project hope where one might otherwise identify nothing but despair and 
trepidation. 
* 
A model for this relationship between philosophical thought and artistic self-
questioning might be seen in Heidegger's notion of Gottes F ehl, a notion called upon 
in order to elucidate none other than the vocation of the poet: 
'Error [Fehl] means to miss [Ver-fehlen]. In this lies a desire to be on 
target and therewith the anticipating connection with the setting of goals. 
But this missing is no failure to reach in the sense of not-arriving, of 
falling short of a goal, but rather missing in the sense of over-shooting, of 
over-rewing, and indeed not once, but as attitude ,.88 
At first glance, such an attitude of futile obstinacy would seem more likely to 
engender disappointment, or even derision, than to sustain hope. And yet, it is hope 
that Heidegger finds in it, because such an attitude questions itself without allowing 
87 It is tempting to view this gesture on the part of a philosopher as that of an ironist pairing himself 
with a blind poet. We will resist the temptation to say so, however (and not for the first time), since 
such a claim would require us to make very unironic decisions as to who was being ironic when. 
Nevertheless, if there is an irony in the pairing of a philosopher with a blind poet, it is precisely that it 
makes it very difficult to disentangle who is the artist and who is the philosopher. Something of this is 
captured in Heidegger's notion of the 'poetising thinker' and the 'thinking poet '. (Hiilderlin Hymnen 
'Germanien' und 'Der Rhein', p. 226). 
88 Heidegger, M. Holderlin Hymnen 'Germanien' und 'Der Rhein', p. 236: 'Fehl meint Ver-fehlen. 
Darin liegt ein Treffenwollen und damit die vorgreifende Bindung an das Zielgebende. Aber dieses 
Ver-fehlen ist kein Nichterreichen im Sinne des Nicht-hin-kommens, des Zuriickbleibens vor dem Zie~ 
sondern das Verfehlen im Sinne des Uber-schieBens, des Uber-Dranges, und zwar nicht einmalig, 
sondern als Haltung '. Unfortunately none of the word play onfehl, and only some of that upon iiber-, 
survives translation. 
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this questioning to be cut short by an answer. That is, it neither gives into frustration, 
nor connives by means of calculation or manipulation to nominally achieve success.89 
At the same time, however, Heidegger's attachment to such an attitude involves a 
certain distance. In other words, he surmises its strengths on the basis of observation 
rather than introspection. This couldn't be otherwise. For if one imagines for a 
moment what could be the state of mind of someone endlessly over-shooting a target, 
in spite of a 'desire to be on target " one would have to design a portrayal of deranged 
obsession. And even this would be an external picture in that if asked what he was 
experiencing, the unfortunate marksman would, at best, be able to mumble 'target, 
target, target'. Thus, the hopefulness of such an attitude only has any real meaning 
when observed, that is, only as a gesture. 
This would seem to doom it to a certain superficiality, a kind of hopeful gloss. And in 
fact, to the extent that this gesture corresponds to the poetic vocation, it exposes the 
latter to the critique of being nothing more than rhetorical flourish. For this reason, it 
is no surprise that Heidegger goes on to substantiate this gesture in terms of an event: 
'The error-the missing out of overabundance and excess, overwhelms 
the demi-gods. Thus can the error be named, Gottes Fehl: the over-
shooting missing-out-of-excess of determination transferred from the 
gods ,.90 
In this, we find a replay of the originary scene of blinding, an event in which the poet~ 
in the guise of a 'demi-god', is 'overwhelmed' and his vocation 'named' such that 
what should and should not be said is distinguished. However, in the spirit of the 
poet's own self-questioning, we have to ask why we would believe in such an event. 
IfHeidegger is relating an experience that neither we nor he himself could ever have, 
why should we believe the poet had it? In other words, without the philosopher's 
89 This 'success' would not, of course, be successful since it would make a mockery of the failure that 
preceded it, thus leaving room for the self-questioning, which would set the marksman upon a new 
round of attempts. 
90 Ibid: 'Der Fehl-das Verfehlen aus UberfiiUe und Uber-Mal3, das von den Gotter her die 
Halbgotter OberfaUt. Daher kann der Fehl genannt werden: Gottes Fehl, die Oberschiel3ende 
Verfehlung aus dem Ubermal3 der von den Gottem Obertragenen Bestimmung '. To appreciate this 
passage's significance one must be aware that Heidegger develops a strong association between the 
'demi-gods' and the poet. This is something that was introduced in chapter one and taken up again in 
this chapter during our discussion ofHeidegger's lectures on The Isler. 
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readiness to name it, the poet's gesture remains ambiguous. So ambiguous, in fact, 
that we have to reconsider the philosopher's interest in it in the first place. 
* 
For if we are disinclined to be generous toward a philosopher's intentions, we can 
accuse him of taking advantage of a blind poet, of using him for philosophical ends. 
Certainly a blind poet, with his unseeing gaze fixed (depending on the philosopher) on 
the brightness, the Forms, or the abyss, is in a vulnerable position vis-a.-vis a 
philosopher. If the latter wants to philosophically appropriate the poet's insight, the 
poet is unlikely to put up much resistance. However, such an interpretation suffers 
from the fact that it evades the very question it is meant to address. We asked why a 
philosopher might be interested in a blind poet, so saying that he wants to use or 
appropriate him just begs the question why. For this reason, we should set aside the 
search for guilty intentions, and at least for a moment, entertain the possibility that 
when a philosopher stops to observe a blind poet, he does so in all innocence. 
Perhaps the blind poet just caught his eye. This is a very important, and yet 
philosophically challenging, possibility: that things can catch our eye, that things 
amuse us. And in fact, before we can ever bring to bear the kind of thinking that 
would allow us to determine what it is that catches our attention, something must first 
arrest it. One may want to subsequently hold that what it is that catches our eye is 
either a mirror image of our philosophical prejudices, or indeed, the traces of an 
originary scene. However, this secondary task, by which we would distinguish 
between blind poets and clowns, only underlines the fact that indeed a blind poet does 
not simply resemble a clown, he is a clown. His 'clownish traits'-to return to the 
language of Adomo--are part of who he is. That he catches our eye, that he amuses 
us and holds our attention is the non-seriousness of seriousness. A blind poet is a 
clown, because the first thing he must do is to get us to stop and look, to suspend our 
own self-questioning in order to observe his. 
If we want to give this phenomenon a name, we might again refer to Adorno, who 
identifies it as art's 'lightheartedness'. For him, lightheartedness 'holds for art as a 
whole, not individual works ... What is lighthearted in art is ... its demeanour, the 
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abstract fact that it is art at all .. ,.91 We should not, in other words, misunderstand the 
association between artists and clowns, between art and amusement: artists do not 
have to make us laugh, and works of art do not have to be enjoyable. Nevertheless, 
they do have to offer a 'promise of happiness'; they do have to present themselves 
favourably to our attention just as 'in Beckett's plays the curtain rises the way it rises 
on the room with the Christmas presents ,.92 Furthermore, by focusing on the way in 
which art must be 'a source of pleasure for people, in however mediated a form ',93 
that is, by focusing on its attitude, we can understand why it is the self-questioning of 
art, or of a blind poet, that is said to constitute a necessary aspect of a serious world: 
With its lighthearted attitude, art is uniquely able to implicate us in its self-
questioning. The moment we stop to observe a work of art, or giggle at the antics of a 
blind poet, we are already taking seriously, we are already being plunged headlong 
into the questioning of questioning, that is, into a serious world, because already we 
don't know why we are looking, why we are laughing. That we are amused, that 
attitude of a blind poet, is the initial question mark of a serious world. 
Based on this, the originary scene of blinding, which all three of these thinkers 
imagine in some form or another, could be re-read, not as some sort of mythic 
moment, but more prosaically as an indication of a necessary first 'Wow!' What 
could not be said, however, is that these thinkers are open to people being 'wowed' by 
just anything. All three want to exclude those things which might compete with their 
visions of seriousness. And this is the problem with the notion of a serious world-as 
well as its primary denizens, the tragic heroic artist and blind poet-it is exclusive. 
Tragic heroic artists and blind poets do nottolerate competitors for the crown, and 
even if there is jesting in the court, a serious world is a kingdom. As such, the only 
way to offer an alternative to it, is to overthrow it. Serious worlds can only be 
historically, and as such, the singular history which traces them forces us to perform 
ever more elaborate ironic acrobatics to maintain the-in fact, constitutively 
impossible-position needed to think them. All the while, they exclude the quite 
reasonable possibility that we can, and even must, inhabit multiple histories and a 
plurality of worlds, that we cannot always be at work constructing the ideal state, 
91 Adorno, T.w. 'Is Art Lighthearted?', p. 248 (my emphasis). 
92 Ibid 
93 Ibid 
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because to do so would be to neglect all those that don't share our political vision.94 It 
would be to abandon all hope of reclaiming anything proper that did not already 
belong to the homeland. Rather, to maintain the latter hope and to aspire to the 
potential plurality of our existence, we must, as Nietzsche suggests, be able to 'freeze 
ideals'. We must place seriousness in suspense and observe that as ideals, the tragic 
heroes and blind poets have a lot in common, and that their claim to singularity indeed 
depends upon the universal history we just put on hold. 
It is in order to think this latter possibility that we will now turn to Part Two. Rather 
than think the question of why a philosopher would take an artist seriously 
immanently, in relation to a serious world, we will think it in terms of the model-like 
character of art and artists--their potential to be examples. According to this 
approach, Heidegger on Holderlin, Nietzsche on Wagner, and Adorno on Schonberg 
would be examples in a dual sense: On the one hand, the artists concerned would be 
the examples taken by the respective philosophers. To the extent that we think of it in 
this fashion, Part Two's approach is continuous with the fIrst's: the artists can be 
thought of as examples of what they would have to be for there to be a serious world, 
and even, what they are, as if such a world existed. On the other hand, Heidegger on 
Holderlin, Nietzsche on Wagner, and Adorno on Schonberg are themselves examples, 
the examples we have taken in order to understand why a philosopher would take an 
artist seriously. As has already been said, we cannot exhaustively defend the choice 
of just these examples. Any historical account offered to locate them decisively 
would reinstate the necessities of a serious world, and the pretence of the singular 
narrative-with this investigation as its culminating moment, no less. Rather this 
philosophical effort, like those it takes as its examples, can only hope that others will 
stop and take it seriously. 
94 This is to refer to the problem of introversion that haunts this manner of thinking. Thinking in 
terms of a serious world encourages a focus upon self-questioning that carries with it the risk that the 
singular history one is in the process of tracing, as proper as it might be to oneself, may turn out to be 
irrelevant to others. Heidegger's almost exclusive focus upon the fate of the German people in his 
writings on Holderlin is a case in point. 
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chapter four 
The exemplarity of an artist 
In this chapter, we will develop the idea that an artist is an exceptional sort of 
example, who stands at the locus of a world dominated by examples. 
Just an example 
If any of these thinkers were asked about the examples of artists in their writings, they 
would balk at the question. Heidegger might exclaim (though in German, of course): 
'Holderlin is not just an example!' Moreover, it is this 'just' of 'Just an example' that 
would most incisively signal his vexation, because if something is just an example, it 
isjust one example among many. In a very trivial way, one could say that one takes 
such an example seriously; however, it would not be a very substantial claim, given 
that it leaves open the option to discard the example at any moment and take another 
seriously instead. That said, Wagner, Holderlin and Schonberg are composers, poets, 
and artists, that is individual creators amongst others, and described as such. As a 
consequence, their exemplarity is inherently a problem for Nietzsche, Heidegger and 
Adorno, respectively. 
Heidegger explicitly grapples with this problem at the outset of 'Holderlin and the 
Essence of Poetry'. He admits that 'Holderlin's poetry is merely one sample of 
poetry among many', 1 that is, it is just an example. Nevertheless, he seems to make 
this admission with the sole thought of refuting its significance. For as we discover, 
the significance ofHolderlin lies precisely in the rejection of him as just an example:2 
Holderlin's work is not chosen because it embodies, beside the work of 
others, the general essence of poetry. It is chosen because Holderlin is 
I Heidegger, M. 'HolderIin and the Essence of Poetry', p. 456. 
2 It is important to note that a similar procedure-of mentioning a false exemplarity with the sole aim 
of refuting it-can be found in the first pages of the lectures on Germanien and Der Rhein (see pp 19-
20), as well as, interestingly enough, in 'What are Poet's For?' where Heidegger tries to make the 
transition from an introduction based on Hoiderlin to a discussion ofRiIke (see p. 96 in Poetry, 
Language, Th(mght). 
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concerned in his poetry solely with the essence of poetry. He is for us 
emphatically the poet of poetry ,.3 
The distinction between Holderlin as just an example and Holderlin as the poet of 
poetry hinges, then, upon the difference between two notions of essence. A first, 
'general' notion is 'indifferent' to particularity; it is a rootless essence which only 
appears through the accumulation of examples. In fact, we might relate it to Giorgio 
Agamben's notion of an example as an 'exclusive inclusion'.4 What Agamben means 
by this is that if an example is usually considered included in the class of things it 
exemplifies, it is also the case that, in order to exemplify, it must refer to that class 
and thereby be excluded from it. What an example does, in other words, is 
simultaneously to be part of a class and to show' its belonging to [that] class'. 5 Just 
the same, by showing its belonging, an example also' shows its own signifying and, in 
this way, suspends its own meaning'. 6 As a consequence, any essence that depends 
upon an accumulation of examples is similarly vitiated. Heidegger wants to oppose 
such a hollow notion of essence with a unique essentiality. His notion of essence is 
wholly particular; it is the site of a decision; it is an historically determined 'sphere', 
or source, of signification.7 He wants to establish Holderlin as the poet of poetry, 8 but 
as the phrase itself suggests, doing so will not allow him to escape from the notion of 
exemplarity altogether. Rather, he must portray Holderlin's essentiality as an 
essential exemplarity, as an exemplarity that negates the empty accumulation of 
examples .. 
Before we substantiate this argumentation, however, we must pause to address an 
objection that is almost certainly in the minds of some: namely, can we really speak of 
the exemplarity of the poet, when what more nearly seems at stake is the exemplarity 
3 Ibid, p. 457. 
4 Agamben, G. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, p. 21. 
S Ibid, p. 22. 
6 Ibid. (latter emphasis mine). 
7 Heidegger, M. 'H6lderlin and the Essence of Poetry' , p. 457: This is a reference to a sentence we 
looked at in great detail in the first chapter: 'And we are inquiring into the essential, into what forces us 
to decide whether we will henceforth take poetry seriously, whether we accept our being placed within 
the sphere where poetry can affect us' . 
8 When David Halliburton takes up the issue of Holder lin's exemplarity in a section entitled, no less, 
'The Example of Holderlin' , he makes a connection between Holderlin as the 'poet of poetry' and the 
existential problematic ofDasein: 'There is, to begin with, a parallel between the poet and Being-there, 
as described in Being and Time. Just as Dasein is that being for which its Being is at issue, Holderlin is 
the poet for whom poetry is at issue' (Poetic Thinking: An Approach to Heidegger, p. 79). 
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ofthe poet's poetry? As we have seen, for Heidegger, it is a question of dissuading us 
from considering Holderlin's poetry as 'merely one sample of poetry among many' , 
and not Holderlin as one poet among many. Part of the problem we face in trying to 
respond to this objection is that Heidegger almost exclusively speaks of poetry as the 
poetry of Holderlin. Even in 'What Are Poets For?' where he does make an 
exception and writes about the poetry of Rainer Maria Rilke, Heidegger still places 
the latter in relation with Holderlin-the philosopher's undertaking is to decide 
whether Rilke can be understood in accordance with Holderlin's notion of 'poets in a 
destitute time'. Furthermore, in that Holderlin's relation to 'poets in a destitute time' 
is that of a 'pre-cursor', whom 'no poet ofthis world era can overtake' ,9 what is 
implied is that no poet' of this world era' would know what to do as poet--or in other 
words, that there would effectively be no poets-without the model of Holderlin to 
indicate 'what poets are for'. And it is here that we see why it is the exemplarity of 
Holderlin, rather than his poetry, which is essential. For what is at stake with 
Holderlin is less the works of art that he has given us than the work that he has made 
possible. It is his poetic activity, his poetising, which makes him essential. 
But what is this poetising? There are two false interpretations we could make at this 
juncture. One would be simply to equate it with the poetic activity of the historical 
person born on the 20th of March 1770 in Lauffan am Neckar. This activity by itself, 
though perhaps of some interest to a history of art or ideas, is of little philosophical 
interest. As strange as it may sound, it is an entirely contingent detail that Holderlin's 
poetising was undertaken by a man named Holderlin born in the latter part of the 18th 
century. Just the same, we cannot completely forget Holderlin the man either, 
because if we err to the opposite extreme and think of poetising as something 
completely abstract and divorced from artistic activity as it occurs in the concrete 
production of works of art, then we have no way of explaining how works of art 
appear except by reference to divine intervention. Thus, we must think of Holderlin's 
poetising as some sort of event whereby Holderlin leaves his works to us. This event 
is Holderlin's work, his poetising, and it is only to the extent that his works exist first 
and foremost as testimony of this work, that he can found our history. Furthermore, 
we only belong to this history to the extent that each of us, if you will, repeats 
9 Heidegger, M. 'What are Poets ForT, p. 142. 
Julie Kuhlken Page 123 
Why would a philosopher take an artist seriously? 
Holderlin's work and 'bears witness that he too belongs to this inwardness by his 
creation of a world' .10 It is because of the importance of creative work-as founding, 
as bearing witness-that we must not confuse the poet's exemplarity with any 
possible exemplarity of his works of art. 
Now those familiar with Heidegger's essay 'The Origin of the Work of Art' will 
probably experience some sort of tension between what is argued here and the 
emphasis upon the work of art in the 1930's essay. We will be addressing this essay 
in the following chapter, but provisionally I want to re-emphasize the degree to which 
Holderlin is exceptional in Heidegger's philosophy. Like Paul de Man, I believe that 
'Heidegger's attitude [toward Holderlin] differs fundamentally from the one he adopts 
toward all metaphysicians' ,11 and that means also toward all other poets. As a result, 
general notions about Heidegger's philosophy of art, which one might gain from a 
reading of 'The Origin', cannot simply be applied to the case ofHolderlin. In this 
light, Christopher Fynsk's readings of 'The Origin' and the texts on Holderlin are 
quite helpful. He recognises that it is precisely as concerns 'the question of the 
human Dasein'-such as it is necessary to the task of poetising, for instance-that the 
latter texts find their greatest salience: 'Heidegger may well turn aside from the 
question of the relation between Being and human being in "The Origin of the Work 
of Art." But in the reading of Holder lin that begins to take shape at approximately the 
same time ... Heidegger addresses forcefully the question of the human Dasein in 
relation to the problem of art' .12 As it is, then, and possibly surprisingly, the thinking 
about the artist that Heidegger evidences with Holderlin does not come fundamentally 
into conflict with an insistence upon 'human labour as the source of literature and 
music',13 such as Peter Uwe Hohendahl sees it developed by Adorno. In fact, this 
insistence upon the human, rather than require that Adorno stand 'in clear opposition 
to Heidegger's assumptions about the origins of poetry' ,14 as Hohendahl would have 
it, instead indicates a point of connection between the two thinkers. Even the thinking 
10 Heidegger, M. 'Holderlin and the Essence of Poetry', p. 459. 
11 De Man, Paul. 'Heidegger's Exegesis ofHolderlin', p. 254, footnote 3. 
12 Fynsk, Christopher. Heidegger: Thought and HistoriCity, p. 174. Fynsk also pursues a notion of 
the exemplarity ofHolderlin; however, we will have to leave off a discussion of it until chapter six, 
since Fynsk develops this exemplarity in such a way-namely, in relation to (the exemplarity of) the 
work of art-that it more nearly a counter-exemplarity of the artist. 
13 Hohendahl, P.D. Prismatic Thought, p. 150 (my emphasis). 
14 Ibid 
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of the work of art evidenced in 'The Origin' depends upon Holderlin's human activity 
as 'pre-cursor'. Heidegger needs this 'pre-cursor', because he never questions the 
existence of works of art, taking them, more or less, for granted. The role of this 'pre-
cursor' , of the exemplary poet Holderlin, is precisely to grant works of art, to 
guarantee their existence by offering them in 'gift'. 
The 'exemplars' 
He can give this gift, moreover, because he himself is gifted. The artist is endowed 
with a sort of Midas touch, by which he can raise to philosophical attention even 
things which do not usually sit in the category of art objects. In Heidegger, the 
exemplarity ofHolderlin means that the poet's letters hold the same interpretative 
rank as his poems-most notably the letter to Casimir Bohlendorff from 4 December 
1801, which will occupy us at some length later in this chapter. Furthermore, similar 
remarks can be made with regard to Nietzsche on Wagner-who freely mixes 
observations about the composer's music with citations from the latter's theoretical 
writings-and about Adorno's approach to Schonberg-according to which he is as 
likely to talk about Erwartung's place in the Schonbergian revolution as he is to cite 
Schonberg's belief that courage was 'the attribute of "those who accomplish acts 
which exceed their confidence"'. 15 
Adorno, moreover, is instructive, because he explicitly addresses this Midas-like 
exemplarity of the artist in his writings on Schonberg. What he argues is that it is not 
so much the latter's works as the movement between them-the way in which the 
composer's activity determines a history of works-which is most essential to our 
understanding. 16 As he points out, individual works and their technical innovations 
can be, and have been, imitated, and for this reason, these individual works can only 
15 Adorno, T.w. 'Arnold SchOnberg, 1874-1951', pp 150-51. 
16 There would seem to be some contradiction between what is argued here and a passage cited in the 
section called 'The sidekick' in chapter two. There, in an evaluation of Schonberg'S importance, 
Adorno would seem to put the emphasis upon works of art. However, it is important to note that, as in 
the passage here, the emphasis is determined by Adorno's wish to reject any hypostatisation of the 
composer's activity according to 'categories of development and the organic'. Furthermore, the 
emphasis upon works of art is presented there in the context of an issue we are presently deferring 
(until chapters five and six)-namely, the role of the philosopher with regard to the artist's 
production-and in whose light appears the counter-exemplarity of the artist. 
Julie Kuhlken Page 125 
Why would a philosopher take an artist seriously? 
fonn a part of what he describes as the challenge, or 'difficulty' , of Schonberg's 
mUSIc: 
'What is difficult, rather, is the movement itself between the extremes [of 
Schonberg's development]. For just as it fails to provide a safe center for 
enjoyment, it also radically refuses to submit to the categories with which 
intellectual history, no matter how progressive it would like to seem, 
inevitably and in a banal way seeks to create unity in the variety of an 
artist's work-[based on] categories of development and the organic. 
Although each work by Schonberg follows the previous one in a 
compulsory way, they by no means grow out of each other'.!7 
What we should recognise here is a fonnulation akin to Heidegger's argument against 
'indifferent' essence. The banal unity established by intellectual history is very much 
like an indifferent essence in that it considers works only in relation to general notions 
of style and influence-and thus as just examples-and does not consider them in 
their particularity. Like Heidegger, then, Adorno wants to assert an understanding 
which would acknowledge this particularity. To do so, however, he cannot abandon 
the notion of unity altogether, since it is required in order to establish the necessity of 
the movement between works. To establish this necessity, then, a different sort of 
unity is posited, one which corresponds with the activity of the artist himself. 18 
Adorno puts this unity into practice in The Philosophy of Modern Music, where he 
develops a history of modem music, which would avoid the banalisation wrought by a 
history ofthe spirit. In this history, Schonberg'S development is the development of 
modem music-as progressive, we might note, since in The Philosophy of Modern 
Music it is also a question of a history of regression in the person of Stravinsky. The 
way in which Adorno expresses this is to say that the development of modem music 
occurs in accordance with 'objective demands' made by music upon the composer. 
17 Adorno, T.W. 'The Dialectical Composer', p. 203 (translation slightly modified). 
18 It is important to note that the discussion undertaken in this chapter focuses on those texts in which 
a privilege is accorded SchOnberg. As with Heidegger on Holderlin, Adorno's thought on SchOnberg 
stand out from his more general considerations of works of art. Unlike Heidegger, however, Adorno 
evolves in such a way as to move beyond a privileging of SchOnberg. The culmination of this 
development is Aesthetic Theory, and is something we will touch on below in a reading of essays from 
the 1950's and 60's. 
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The composer of modem music, then, is to be obedient to these demands-ironically, 
and dialectically, by being disobedient to them-and thereby advance the 'total 
niveau of technique' .19 Schonberg, for reasons that are never elucidated, 20 is always 
at the extreme point of this advancement. In fact, it is interesting to contrast this 
claim with what would be the case if it were works of art, rather than the artist, that 
were exemplary. If it were works of art that were exemplary, a philosophy of modem 
music would have to zigzag through the works of a variety of composers, rather than 
simply following the trace of Schonberg's touch. 
Furthermore, if we return to Heidegger, we recognise a similar gesture with regard to 
Holderlin. Heidegger does not name specific works when he claims the latter's 
essential role. Instead, he proposes doing something very similar to what Adorno 
does: namely, to 'interpret Holderlin's poems in closed sequence'.21 Who created 
these works, and not their content or style, determines their inclusion in an 
investigation of the essence of poetry. The poet is the way in which we identify 
which poetry is essential, and not the other way around. 
However, even if it is the poet, rather than the works, who is closer to the essential, 
we still have to ask whether it is really possible to consider him an example. It would 
seem, based on Heidegger's explicit exclusion of exemplarity, that this could not be 
the case. And yet, this explicit exclusion is precisely the paint. For if on the one 
hand, it excludes us thinking ofHolderlin as just as example, on the other, it makes it 
the rule that we think of everything other than the poet as indifferent instances of 
general concepts and notions, that is, asjust examples. In other words, Holderlin's 
essentiality is his exceptionality with regard to the rule of exemplarity. What he is 
19 Adorno, T.W. The Philosophy of Modern Music, p. 36. 
20 The introduction to The Philosophy of Modem Music, where one would expect such an elucidation, 
is notably unhelpful on this point. Basing himself on Benjamin's notion of "'the history of philosophy 
viewed as the science of origins"', Adorno explains his approach as follows: 'Such an investigation, 
restricting itself essentially to two independent protagonists, can even be founded within the subject of 
music itself For only in such extremes can the essence of this music be defined; they alone permit the 
perception of its concept of truth ... It is for this reason and not in the illusion of grand personality that 
only these two composers-SchOnberg and Stravinsky-are to be discussed. For if the total product of 
new music-as defined by its inner qualities rather than by chronology-were to be scrutinised in its 
entirety, including all transitions and compromises, the same extremes would again be encountered' 
(pp 3-4). In other words-and in more clearly circular fashion-SchOnberg and Stravinsky's technical 
innovations define new music's inner quality, and for this reason only in them can new music's concept 
of truth be perceived. 
21 Heidegger, M. 'HOlderlin and the Essence of Poetry', p. 457. 
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excluded from is a representational realm, in which appearance and essence are 
forever separated, in which only examples of essential concepts ever appear, and 
never the concepts themselves. Against this background, the event of Holderlin is a 
moment of essential poetising, by which essence itself appears. As a consequence, in 
order to privilege Holderlin's activity, we must also accept that we ourselves inhabit a 
realm of representation from which the essential is constitutively excluded---that if 
'man as such lives Geworfenheit, the poet lives a kind of Hinausgeworfenheit', as 
David Halliburton puts it. 22 Only if we accept the rule of empty exemplarity, can we 
see Holderlin as its essential exception. 
Moreover, the rule of exemplarity is not just any rule. Unlike other rules, which 
might be said to have areas of competence-specific domains in which they apply-
the rule of exemplarity is total,23 and this means that Holderlin does not simply 
subtract himself from the dominance of empty exemplarity, rather he only exists 
because he is both its cause and consequence. He is what Agamben calls a 'sovereign 
exception'. Whereas, we might usually think of an exception as an 'inclusive 
exclusion '-as being included in the rule precisely by being excluded from its 
application24-Holderlin's exceptionality is what allows there to be any rule at all: 
'Here what is outside is included is not simply by means of an interdiction 
or an internment, but rather by means of the suspension of the ... order's 
validity-by letting the ... order, that is, withdraw from the exception and 
abandon it. The exception does not subtract itself from the rule; rather the 
rule, suspending itself, gives rise to the exception and, maintaining itself in 
relation to the exception, first constitutes itself as a rule' .25 
22 Halliburton, David. Poetic Thinking: An Approach to Heidegger, p. 88. 
23 This is evident in the Heideggerian version of things to the extent that we are doomed to 
everydayness, to its indifferent representationality. Such existentialism assumes (as Agamben himself 
does) that we exist in a homogenous order, in which 'the exception is situated in a symmetrical position 
with respect to the example', and with it 'forms a system' (Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare 
Life, p. 21). In such a system there are only examples and their exception. 
24 As Agamben puts it, 'what is excluded in the exception maintains itself in relation to the rule in the 
form of the rule's suspension. The rule applies to the exception in no longer applying, in withdrawing 
from it' (pp 17-18). 
25 Ibid, p. 18. Agamben who is in this case looking at sovereign power over bare life is concerned 
with the 'juridico-political order'. This order is total to the degree that it impinges upon all 'bare life' . 
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Thus, whereas all Dasein is submitted to rule of empty exemplarity, to the condition 
of 'Being-with-one-another', with its implications of the publicness of the 'they' and 
the emptiness of 'idle talk' ,26 Holderlin is the Dasein that stands and speaks 
sovereignly. What he says is not a hollow repetition of the already familiar; it is a 
unique and authentic disclosure. 
Moreover, we can hope to hear this disclosure because ofHolderlin's own 
exemplarity. In order to be the sovereign exception to the rule of empty exemplarity, 
Holderlin must himselfbe an example, the model of an exceptional exemplarity. This 
latter exemplarity does not boil down to a barren system of reference-the 
Agambenian exclusive inclusiveness that shows its belonging to a class at the cost of 
its significance-rather it retains its significance by directing itself to those who 
aspire to the same essentiality, to those who 'bear witness that they too belong to this 
inwardness by their creation of a world,?7 That is, the poet's exemplarity depends 
upon our receptiveness to it; we must hear his call in order for his exemplarity to ever 
appear.28 In the language of Stanley Cavell, such essential exemplarity is that of an 
'exemplar', a term, which is in its turn a translation ofthe Kantian notion of 
'archetypes'. According to Cavell, 'the acceptance of an "exemplar" ... is not 
grounded in the relation between the instance and a class of instances it stands for but 
in the relation between the instance and the individual other-for example, myself-
for whom it does the standing'. 29 Because of the particularity of this relation-the 
fact that it links to individuals rather than indifferent specimens-the exemplarity of 
an 'exemplar' cannot be generalised as can everyday examples. Though its content 
may vary, the fact of its relation remains unique. For this reason, an exemplar must 
always appear in sovereign isolation, must always be appealed to as the only possible 
example. For once competing candidates are suggested, an exemplar is reduced to 
beingjust an example, just one possible instance of a class of instances. 
Moreover, this is why we take exemplars seriously. If we recall, the reason examples 
that are just examples fail in this seriousness is that they can be replaced at any 
26 See sections 34-38 of Being and Time. 
27 Heidegger, M. 'Holderlin and the Essence of Poetry', p. 459. In that this is the second citation of 
this passage in not so many more pages, I have taken the liberty of pluralizing the phrase. 
28 As we will see in the section devoted to Heidegger and Holderlin, there is some reason to doubt 
whether Heidegger always allows Holderlin to be open to this receptivity. 
29 Cavell, Stanley. Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome, pp 50-1. 
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moment with other examples; their exemplarity is neither decisive nor truly hopeful. 
But if we do not have the option of replacement-such as is the case with exemplars 
to the extent that, as with friends, we cannot simply replace one with another-then 
an example has a chance of being truly serious. By pointing to their own pointing, 
examples always stand out as centres for our thoughts, but in the case of exemplars, 
this self-referential pointing appears as an entirely unique and singular act. It is for 
this reason that there is a tendency for thinkers to want to arrive at exemplars without 
having to first take them as examples. They strive to convince us that an artist is to be 
taken seriously by claiming that he is the only possible example in a world where 
something is at stake. 
Mythical exemplarity 
We should not fail to re-emphasize, however, that if an artist is to be taken seriously 
in such a fashion-if he is to be seen as an exemplar-it must follow, not from his 
personality or character, but from his artistic activity. When Heidegger states that for 
Nietzsche, '[a]rt must be grasped in terms of the artist' ,30 he is not suggesting that 
Nietzsche wants us to familiarise ourselves with artists' biographies. He is saying that 
for Nietzsche, an artist's creative efforts-and not works or histories-must provide 
our access to art. That is, Nietzsche hopes that we experience the mythical dimension 
of an artist's greatness, indeed that we experience it as the creation of myth itself. 
For this to be possible, it must indeed be the case-as we have already seen with 
Holderlin and as is inherent in Cavell's notion of an exemplar-that our experience of 
an artist's greatness-that is, his exemplarity-is essential to that greatness itself; in 
other words, that our experience contributes to the appearance of the artist's 
exemplarity. But how does this really work? How does our spectatorship contribute 
to the creation of an exemplar? To answer, let us consider the case of the ancient 
Greeks. 
30 Heidegger, M. Nietzsche: The Will to Power as Art, vol. 1, p. 7l. 
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Of the many curious features of Nietzsche's theory of the birth of tragedy through the 
Dionysian chorus perhaps one of the most notable is how it treats the ancient Greeks. 
In Nietzsche's theory, the ancient Greeks are not a group of individuals with differing 
self-interests and desires, but rather an inherent collectivity. Ancient Greeks-unlike 
us moderns-act as one man, and therefore, through the chorus can act as one artist, 
as a 'Dionysian man', who has 'the ability continually to see a living play, to live 
constantly surrounded by hordes of spirits', as well as 'the desire to transform 
[himself] and to speak from other bodies and souls'. 31 As 'Dionysian man', the 
ancient Greeks conjure myth itself on stage. 
But even if this is the basis for Greek exemplarity, it is not by itself sufficient to make 
the Greek 'Dionysian man' an exemplar; rather, as Nietzsche recognises, Greek 
exemplarity only exists in relation to contemporary lives as they are aesthetically 
experienced.32 In fact, this is the significance of his statement in the 'Attempt at Self-
Criticism', that what this 'audacious book' was about was 'to see science under the 
lens of the artist, but art under the lens oflife,.33 For Nietzsche, the exemplarity of 
the ancient Greeks does not exist in some rarefied sacred realm that would protect it 
from the vicissitudes of modern life. In fact, this may explain the vehemence of the 
criticism heaped upon this book when it first came out: Because, if the exemplarity of 
the Greeks is not a given, then imitation of them cannot be a goal, and it is, therefore, 
unclear what the purpose would be of the philological research undertaken by 
Nietzsche's own colleagues to establish ancient Greek culture in painstaking detail. 
Moreover, if the rebirth of Greek art and culture in modern times cannot occur draped 
in togas and lounging in neo-classical architecture, it is possible that it could occur by 
means of contemporary artistic efforts, such as that of the controversial Wagner. And 
even though Nietzsche himself comes to regret this latter claim, what bothers him 
about it later on is not that he related the ancient Greeks to contemporary aesthetic 
experience, but that he related them to contemporary German experience, and in 
31 Nietzsche, F. The Birth of Tragedy, pp 42-3. 
32 More could be said on this topic, particularly as relates to Nietzsche's relationship with 
Schopenhauer's philosophy since the experience of life Nietzsche seems to have in mind is one very 
much in accordance with life as it is described by the pessimistic thinker. Richard Schacht looks at this 
relation in his essay 'Making Life Worth Living: Nietzsche on Art in The Birth of Tragedy', and even 
goes so far as to call the early Greeks a 'case study' made by Nietzsche with regard to the 'question of 
how it has been possible for "life" to manage to "detain its creatures in existence" even when the 
erroneous beliefs that commonly shield them are no longer in operation' (p. 188). 
33 Nietzsche, F. The Birth of Tragedy, p. 5 (Nietzsche'S emphasis). 
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particular to German music, which he denounces later in 1886 as 'romantic through 
and through, and the most un-Greek of all possible art forms,.34 He still 
acknowledges implicitly, therefore, that in order for the exemplarity of the Greeks, 
and most importantly of them as Dionysian man, to have any significance, one must 
still wonder about a music 'that was not romantic in origin, as German music is-but 
Dionysian,.35 
As such, the issue of contemporary Dionysian music is not at all an academic one. As 
we said above, our spectatorship is essential to Greek exemplarity. Just the same, this 
should not be taken to suggest that modern theatres should be filled with the strains of 
ancient Greek lyres. Quite the contrary, such an approach suffers from the same 
fundamental flaw as the philological research of Nietzsche's contemporaries: namely, 
to assume that its object is already constituted. The real task-the task for which 
Dionysian music is so essential-is this very constitution, the creation of the Greeks 
as exemplary. But once again, we must ask how this is possible, how our 
contemporary experience is able to construct the exemplarity of the ancient Greeks. 
Certainly nothing seems likely to happen as long as we think of experience as being 
some sort of passive receptivity, and as such it is no surprise to find that for Nietzsche 
'experience' is active and creative; that it is a struggle between 'the need to look and 
at the same time ... the longing to go beyond mere looking'. 36 It is only the 'truly 
aesthetic spectator' --or 'truly aesthetic listener,3? -who has the keen sight that 
wishes for the blindness that would allow him to 'see' beyond Apollonian images to 
Dionysian wisdom.38 And even more importantly, it is this experience of the 'truly 
aesthetic spectator' that is taken as the analogue to that of the artist: 
'No one who has experienced the need to look at the same time as the 
longing to go beyond mere looking will find it easy to imagine how 
34 Ibid., p. 10. 
35 Ibid 
36 Nietzsche, F. The Birth of Tragedy, p. 1 13. 
37 I can detect little difference between the use or sense of these similar expressions, and as such will 
read them as more or less synonymous. 
38 Nietzsche, F. The Birth of Tragedy, p. 105. The phrase is as follows, and addresses 'the attentive 
friend', who is perhaps yet another expression for the 'truly aesthetic spectator': 'He looks more 
keenly, more deeply than ever, and yet wishes for blindness'. 
Julie Kuhlken Page 132 
Why would a philosopher take an artist seriously? 
clearly and definitely these two processes coexist in the contemplation of 
the tragic myth: while the truly aesthetic spectator will confirm that of all 
the singular effects of tragedy this coexistence is the most remarkable. If 
we can translate this phenomenon of the aesthetic spectator into an 
analogous process in the tragic artist, we shall come to an understanding 
of the genesis of the tragic myth ,.39 
This positing of an 'analogous process,40 in the spectator and the artist has two key 
implications: On the one hand, it sets up the artist as an aesthetic spectator par 
excellence, and as such the artist's exemplarity as an exemplary capacity for 
experience. This accords with our earlier description of the birth of tragedy through 
the Dionysian chorus as a conjuration, by which the Greeks are seemingly able to 
witness their own thoughts. It should be noted though, that what the modern artist 
would then have to conjure up would be the experience of the Greeks themselves. In 
other words, the experience of the modem Dionysian artist would be that of a creation 
of music by which he re-creates the experience of the ancient Greeks.41 This 
experience would indeed make the Greeks his exemplar; however, and on the other 
hand, it means that in order for the modem artist to be exemplary in his turn, he must 
also be observed and his experience recreated. This points to a role for yet another 
spectator in the drama of the exemplary artist. 
Before we get ahead of ourselves though, we should focus on the original Greek 
experience, because as we can now recognise, what is at stake here is a unique 
conjunction between seeing and creating, between spectator and artist. Nietzsche 
identifies this conjunction by likening it to the Heraclitean figure of the playing child. 
What he say about this figure is that it is a means for judging the 'Dionysian capacity 
of a people' ,42 and what such a capacity entails is the ability to create in the fashion of 
'the [Heraclitean] spirit that playfully builds and destroys the world of individuals as 
39 Ibid, pp 113-14. 
40 Unsurprisingly, Nietzsche remains rather quiet about the details of this translation of analogous 
experience, if for no other reason because a more detailed description would have to account for the 
obvious difference between a spectator and an artist: namely, that only the latter's experience leads to 
the creation of a work of art. We will return to this issue in the following chapters. 
41 This only makes sense if one keeps firmly in mind that Nietzsche makes almost no distinction 
between viewing and creating works of art. It is on this basis that he maintains the analogy between 
sfectator and artist so essential to his argument. 
4 Nietzsche, F. The Birth of Tragedy, p. 115. 
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the product ofa primal pleasure,.43 That is, as 'Dionysian man' the Greeks are 
paradoxically able to create and watch themselves create at the same time, gaping at 
their own creation and destruction with the eyes of a child. What this also means 
though, is that when the cycle of artistic activity ceases, so does their exemplary 
existence. 
That is, this unique Greek capacity for experience is a double edged sword. It is 
uniquely exemplary, but it is also if you will, mythical, vanishing the moment one 
stops creating in order to reflect upon it. This is Nietzsche's point against 
philologists. By only observing dispassionately, what they see in the achievement of 
the Greeks is a shadowy image of Greek greatness, an 'historical example,44 rather 
than Greek exemplarity in all its mythical dynamism. Just the same, their weakness, 
which Nietzsche only knows so well as a philologist himself, negatively points to our 
hope as modems. For this shadowy image testifies to what makes us modem: our 
self-awareness as historical. Because we can see this image of Greek greatness as an 
image, we are in a position to aspire to what it is an image of, to constitute the 
exemplarity it reflects. But we should not jump to conclusions, this image is not a 
simple picture of mythical exemplarity that we can hope to copy. Rather this 
'historical example' is an image of a history of mythical exemplarity, in fact, of the 
history of mythical exemplarity: the history of the exemplarity of the Greeks. And 
what is the decisive moment of this history? Not the birth of tragedy as one might 
expect, but rather the decline of tragedy, because it is this latter event that allows for 
the passing on and re-emergence of mythical exemplarity in modem times. In other ' 
words, the Greeks are indeed an 'historical example', but only to the extent that they 
are the example of history, that they exemplify our historical promise, our hope to see 
mythical exemplarity reborn: 
'But if we are right in our exemplification, to compare the disappearance 
of the Dionysian spirit [my emphasis] with a highly striking but as yet 
unexplained transformation and degeneration in Greek man [allusion to 
the disappearance of the truly aesthetic spectator], what hopes must 
awaken in us when all the most certain signs augur the opposite process, 
43 Ibid 
44 Ibid, p. 75. 
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the gradual awakening of the Dionysian spirit, in our contemporary 
world! .45 
In other words, the Greeks are an exemplar for us, because they were mythically 
exemplary, and we are the ones to appreciate this mythical exemplarity because we 
are in the process of becoming it ourselves. In this sense, the modem artist arrives at 
mythical exemplarity through a process of appropriation, whereby he appropriates the 
mythical exemplarity of the Greeks. Mythical exemplarity, in this sense, is truly an 
exemplarity o/the artist. As Gilles Deleuze puts it, it is part of Nietzsche's effort to 
reclaim 'an aesthetic of creation, the aesthetic of Pygmalion' . 46 It is an exemplarity 
that exists only in the experience of the artist of his own artistic activity. In order for 
the artist to be acknowledged in his mythical exemplarity by another, he must expose 
himself to a spectator who will appropriate this mythical exemplarity for himself 
This will make the artist an exemplar, but at the same time, an historical example, an 
example of the historical event that is the loss of mythical exemplarity. 
Moreover, it is here that we finally breach the second point we initially made about 
the significance of the 'truly aesthetic spectator': namely, that the theory demands that 
the modem artist be experienced by a spectator just as he in his artistic activity 
experiences the Greeks. Nietzsche prepares us for this idea by outlining in great 
detail the tale of mimetic rivalry between Euripides and Socrates that led to the 
Greek's decline. According to this story, Socrates is the spectator who deprives 
Euripides of his mythical exemplarity, by seducing the artist into being the 'poet of 
aesthetic Socratism'. 47 This would make it the philosopher who has the potential of 
being mythically exemplary-the mooted for possibility of a 'music-making 
Socrates,48-and yet this potential is never realised by Socrates himself, because he 
'did not understand tragedy and therefore chose to ignore it'.49 Rather, mythical 
exemplarity has to lie dormant until the modem age, when 'through Kant and 
45 Ibid, p. 94. 
46 Deleuze, Gilles. Nietzsche et fa philosophie, p. 116. 
47 Nietzsche, F. The Birth of Tragedy, p. 64. 
48 Ibid, p. 75. 
49 Ibid, p. 59. When Randall Havas takes up this issue in his essay 'Socratism and the Question of 
Aesthetic Justification', he argues that Socrates' misunderstanding is not simply related to tragedy but 
even to being Greek: 'In saying that he failed properly to understand tragedy, then, Nietzsche's 
suggestion is that Socrates failed properly to understand what it meant to be Greek' (p. 104). In other 
words, what Socrates failed to understand was being that exemplary artist called 'Dionysian man'. 
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Schopenhauer the spirit o/German philosophy ... was able to destroy scientific 
Socratism's complacent delight in existence' . 50 
After this, however, the story gets a bit hazy, because what we should expect is that 
another pairing between a philosopher and artist will arise, by which mythical 
exemplarity will come into the hands of an artist who can engineer the rebirth of 
tragedy. And in fact, Nietzsche himself points to such a sequence of events when he 
suggests that 'we seem to be experiencing the great epochs of Hellenism in reverse 
order'. 51 At the same time, we can perhaps understand why Nietzsche is unwilling to 
spin out the latter part of the story in detail. On the one hand, if a German 
philosopher must be cast as a pair to Wagner, in order to create an analogue to the 
Greek grouping of Socrates and Euripides, it is Schopenhauer, rather than Nietzsche, 
who seems most likely to get the part. Certainly, Schopenhauer is the thinker that 
most influences Wagner's development, and Nietzsche himself underscores this fact 
by his frequent allusions to the thinker of pessimism. However, and on the other 
hand, because Schopenhauer predates Wagner, he cannot act as a spectator to the 
composer's works in the way Socrates did Euripides', and therefore cannot be the 
model of the 'truly aesthetic spectator', which Nietzsche sees as so essential to the 
rebirth of tragedy. As Nietzsche puts it, 'the rebirth of tragedy also means the rebirth 
of the aesthetic listener ,.52 The need for a contemporary spectator would suggest the 
possibility that Nietzsche is the more appropriate philosopher to Wagner's artist, but it 
also means that it is no longer a situation of Wagner appropriating mythical 
exemplarity from Schopenhauer, but rather Nietzsche appropriating it from Wagner. 
This passing ofthe torch would allow Wagner to be recognised as an exemplar, but 
would also point to the composer's loss of mythical exemplarity. In other words, at 
the very moment Nietzsche can experience Wagner as mythically exemplary, the 
latter is no longer such, and the much hyped rebirth of tragedy is already in decline. 
At the same time, this is what we should have expected based on the logic of 
'Hellenism in reverse'. In that it is Greek/allure which augurs German success, 
Greek success augurs German/ailure. Nevertheless, Nietzsche's move to assert 
himself as the candidate for the role of a 'truly aesthetic spectator' can also be seen as 
50 Ibid. p. 95. 
51 Ibid 
52 Ibid, p. 107 
Julie Kuhlken Page 136 
Why would a philosopher take an artist seriously? 
a last ditch effort to salvage the rebirth of tragedy: in spite of its inevitable decline as 
an artistic phenomenon, if mythical exemplarity can be diverted from the artist by a 
philosophical spectator sympathetic to tragic myth, the rebirth of tragedy can hope to 
avoid the fate of its birth. 
It is tempting to propose that this is evidence of Nietzsche's mythical exemplarity, his 
tum as the creative bearer of the Dionysian spirit, but that would be to underplay the 
difficulties mythical exemplarity poses for a philosopher. This is an exemplarity of 
the artist in the dual sense of the genitive, and this puts a philosopher in the awkward 
position of both coveting and denying it. On the one hand, the exemplarity of an artist 
signals the artist's capacity for creation, and to the extent that a philosopher also sees 
himself as creative, he craves this artist's exemplarity. However, and on the other 
hand, such an exemplarity implies a self-denial as philosopher, because exemplarity 
in the style of an artist excludes the privileged, speculative position of a philosophical 
spectator. Nietzsche's approach to this dilemma is to renounce his claim to mythical 
exemplarity in favour of his relation with the artist: 'Whither does the mystery ofthe 
union of Gennan music and Gennan philosophy point, if not to a new mode of 
existence of which we can only gain an inkling through Greek analogies?,53 But like 
all such marriages of convenience, this one flirts with the likelihood of divorce, and 
its first casualty will be mythical exemplarity. Like love become hatred, the 
exemplarity of the artist becomes a counter-exemplarity for Nietzsche after his 
famous split from Wagner. 54 
The twist 
Nevertheless, we do not want to put too much emphasis on this well-known parting of 
the ways. For if we instead focus upon what this relationship says about the 
philosophical seriousness of an exemplary artist, what we find is actually an 
enonnous degree of continuity. That is, both before and after the split, Wagner stands 
53 Ibid, p. 95. 
54 My reading of this split, therefore, more nearly resembles that of Dietrich Fischer-Dieskau, who 
finds it reasonable to ask 'Why wasn't [Nietzsche] aware of his opposition to Wagner from the very 
outset?' (p. 133), rather than someone like Elisabeth Forster-Nietzsche who wants to identify specific 
events and mistakes as the cause. 
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as the artist Nietzsche most takes seriously and most persistently acknowledges in his 
exemplarity. When Nietzsche most vehemently denies Wagner as counter-
exemplary-such as he does in his denouncement of the composer as decadent-he is 
still taking Wagner very seriously; and even when he most ridicules Wagner as not to 
be taken seriously-as with Parsifal-he is still thinking of the composer as 
exemplary, even if negatively so. To put it another way, Nietzsche always treats 
Wagner as his exemplar. Regardless of whether he is struggling to accept or reject the 
composer, Nietzsche is always asking the question of whether he takes Wagner 
seriously. 
The situation is quite different with Heidegger. He more nearly tries to manage the 
trick we mentioned earlier of presenting Holderlin as an exemplar-as an exemplar 
for us, and not just himself, we should note-without having to first take him as an 
example. What this means for Holderlin's seriousness is that Heidegger wants to 
place it more or less beyond question. That is, Holderlin is emphatically presented as 
the sovereign exception to a serious world, to a world in which empty exemplarity is 
the rule. In this world, surrounded by individuals who take their idle talk and 
sweeping generalisations all too seriously, what makes Holderlin so exceptional is his 
being unmoved by all these claims to seriousness. Unlike all these others who 
clamour for their ten minutes of fame, Holderlin as he is portrayed by Heidegger does 
not ask that we take him seriously. Rather what is asked of us-or more exactly, what 
we are called upon to do--is to take poetry seriously. 
But as appealing as this apparent modesty is, there is a problem with the insistence 
upon works of art: namely, the fact that Heidegger's philosophy of art offers us no 
sure method for identifying these works that we are to take so seriously. Rather than 
provide us with an approach that would distinguish works of art from non-works, 
Heidegger simply assumes that there are such things as works of art and that they are 
readily recognisable. It is this assumption that we want to probe because it has some 
odd effects, most notable of which being that the question of art boils down to the 
issue of who creates the works. This is to return to the notion of an artistic Midas 
touch, which we mentioned earlier as characteristic of the exemplarity of the artist. 
As we will see, Holderlin represents an extreme version of this notion. This is 
particularly evident as concerns Heidegger's understanding of the poet's letter to 
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Bohlendorff from 4 December 1801. According to the notion of an artistic Midas 
touch, a letter can serve the needs of interpretation just as well as a poem, and as such 
it is perhaps not surprising to find that this letter has been scrutinised not only by 
Heidegger, but also by Peter Szondi, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Andrzej 
Warminski.55 
But why is this letter of such interest? For Heidegger, at least, the key moment in it 
lies in the relation it establishes between the Greeks and the Germans. For one of the 
'odd effects' of taking works of art for granted as Heidegger does, is to restrict oneself 
from venturing outside the range of the most commonly accepted instances of work of 
art. If he is to speak about Holderlin as a poet, he must be able to relate the latter's 
poetry to works of art which are, more or less, uncontested in their identification as 
such. Greek art fits this description, and it is for this reason that Heidegger takes up 
the well-worn task of relating modem German art to classical Greek productions, a 
task that was already a bit old fashioned in Nietzsche's day. Moreover, it is the 
reference to Nietzsche that we must keep in mind, because Heidegger clearly believes 
that he can overcome the shortcomings of the earlier philosopher's theory of the birth 
of tragedy. However, as we will see, even if Heidegger makes this Greek-German 
story work, he makes it quite difficult for the artist himself to do so. And without the 
artist's work, there is no room for our own work, no room for bearing witness, no 
room for hope. 
* 
So to tum to the letter: What Heidegger achieves in his reading of it is to operate a 
twist on the relation between the Greeks and the Germans such that we are saved from 
an endless cycle of birth and rebirth. If one recalls, the problem with Nietzsche's 
structure was that even if Greek failure augured German success, Greek success 
would augur Germanfailure. Heidegger's solution is elegantly simple: deny the 
Greeks the success that points to German failure. Even if the Greeks accomplish their 
55 See, respectively, 'Holderlin's Overcoming of Classicism' (Comparative Criticism 1983,5), 
'Holderlin et les Grecs' (L 'Imitation des Modernes) and 'HOlderlin in France' (Readings in 
Interpretation). 
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'highest' in the 'construction of Being' in exemplary works of art,56 this 'success' is 
their failure to achieve the 'free use of the proper' that Holderlin sets forth in his letter 
to Bohlendorff as the essential task ofthe poet. What this means is that exemplarity 
pertains to the Greeks only as regards works of art. Moreover, Heidegger avoids other 
complications-though as we will see, this approach also has its weaknesses-by not 
explicitly pairing artists and philosophers as Nietzsche does. Rather, philosophy 
seems to be implied by art itself, with the exemplarity of Greek art comprehending the 
failings of Greek philosophy-and in particular Platonic philosophy-to pose the 
question of Being, and thus grapple with what is 'proper'. 
But what is it about 'the free use of the proper' which dooms the Greeks to such a 
spectacular failure? We might first note that the notion of the 'free use of the proper' 
arises in the letter as a response to the difficulty of creating a properly German 
tragedy. When Holderlin asserts the importance of such 'free use', he is responding 
to Bohlendorff's tragic work Fernando, and although he kindly calls it 'on the whole, 
an authentic modem tragedy', he also says that he needs to study it more thoroughly 
before he can 'say something interesting about it'. 57 His polite reserve explains why, 
in the same letter, he tries to elucidate the essential dilemma of the German tragedian 
(and thus implicitly to admit Fernando's failure to overcome it): 
'However, the proper [das Eigene] must be learned just as much as the 
foreign. For this reason the Greeks are indispensable for us. We will not 
follow them directly into our proper, [our] national [Nationellen], because, 
as said, the free use of the proper is the most difficult' .58 
To attain to the 'free use of the proper', then, the modem German poet must look to 
the Greeks, not as models or examples, but as his other, as the 'foreign' he must learn. 
This makes some sense of the failure of the Greeks: namely, since they came first, 
they were denied any confrontation with their other, the Germans. However, for this 
explanation to have any philosophical weight it must be more than a coincidence of 
world-historical time that things happened in precisely this order. To this end, 
56 Heidegger, M. Holderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und 'Der Rhein', p. 293. 
57 Holderlin, F. Holderlins Werke lind Brie/e, Bd. 2, p. 941. 
58 Ibid 
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Holderlin offers an ahistorical basis for the differing destinies of the Greeks and the 
Gennans, according to which these two peoples exist in a relation of inverted mimesis 
as regards their innate and assigned or learned characteristics: 
'We do not learn anything more difficult than to freely use the national. 
And as I see it, the clearness of representation is as natural to us as the fire 
from heaven is for the Greeks ... 
'It sounds paradoxicaL .. the truly national will become the lesser trait with 
the advance of cultivation. For this reason are the Greeks less masters of 
the holy pathos [i.e. the 'fire from heaven], because it is innate to them, 
whereas they excel in their ability to represent. .. 
'F .. d' 59 or us It IS reverse '" 
The problem for the Greeks, therefore, is that their innate openness to the 'fire from 
heaven' dooms them to a naIvety that bars them from ever learning to 'freely use the 
proper'. Instead of learning, they express the heavenly fire in representational works 
of art, as would be expected from their assigned nature. Inversely, the Gennans have 
a natural propensity towards a 'clearness of representation', and thus the possibility to 
succeed in the necessary learning, if they would only cease treating the 'fire from 
heaven' as something learnable. The implications of the latter's projected success, 
however, depends upon one's interpretation of the letter. According to Heidegger's, 
this success will never be to 'exceed the highest of the Greeks,.6o Instead, the 
Gennan poet's task is to become authentically Gennan by learning to freely use his 
flair for representational clarity. But if this excludes writing a Gennan tragedy to 
rival Homer-since this would be to rival the Greeks' artistic 'highest'-what does it 
mean? To answer this we must realise that in Heidegger's hands the relation between 
the Greeks and the Gennans ceases to be reserved to questions of tragic art, and rather 
comes to embrace the destinies of the peoples themselves.61 On this basis, the 
59 Ibid., p. 940. 
60 Heidegger, M. H6/derlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und 'Der Rhein', p. 293. 
61 Christopher Fynsk notes this difference, as well. As he points out, 'Holderlin's primary concern 
[is] with his craft, and it is Heidegger's shift away from this emphasis, which allows him to ignore 
Julie Kuhlken Page 141 
Why would a philosopher take an artist seriously? 
differentiation between Greek and German character comes to resemble that between 
artists and philosophers-or as Heidegger puts it, poets and thinkers. This is not to 
say that Heidegger considers the Greeks artists, and the Germans thinkers. It is more 
nearly the case that he considers the Greeks as artists who are artists, and the 
Germans as artists who are really thinkers. In fact, he understands Holderlin in 
precisely this way when he says at the outset of the lectures on Germanien and Der 
Rhein that 'Holderlin is one of our greatest, that is, our most futural thinkers, because 
he is our greatest poet ,.62 
This double positing, where the question of the relation between the thinker and the 
poet is inseparable from the question of the destinies of historical peoples, follows 
what Susanne Ziegler notes in her book, Zum Verhaltnis von Dichten und Denken bei 
Martin Heidegger: 'Regardless of whether the relation between poetising and thinking 
is viewed by Heidegger as indicating identity, neighbourhood, or a springing-out-of-
one-another, it appears in connection with the futural beginning of history such that 
the relation between poetising and thinking is one side and the history of man the 
other,.63 That is, by working out the relation between poetising and thinking through 
the respective destinies of these two peoples, Heidegger is able to project a futural 
beginning of history in which self-realisation-the free use of the proper-is possible. 
Whereas a work of art may be the 'highest' for the Greeks; for the Germans, their 
innate ability to comprehend (Fassenkonnen), or as Holderlin puts it, their 'clearness 
of representation', will permit them to realise themselves historically. However, this 
ability, this 'proper', will lead to no more than empty speculation if it cannot be used 
freely, that is, unless it is liberated from subjective manipulation and transformed into 
an 'assigned,.64 For this to occur, there must be essential contact with the foreign, 
with the 'fire from heaven' innate to the Greeks. 
Or, at least, this is the story. Or should we really say history, as Heidegger wants us 
to? We have reason to be reluctant. Because when Heidegger transforms the 'free 
Holderlin's insistence upon the task of translation, and thus the impossibility of the sort of pure 
founding Heidegger proposes'. (Heidegger: Thought and Historicity, p. 179) 
62 Heidegger, M. H6iderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und 'Der Rhein', p. 6. 
63 Ziegler, Susanne. Zum Verhaltnis von Dichten und Denken be; Martin Heidegger, p. 37. 
64 Heidegger puts it as follows: 'Die geschichtliche Bestimmung ist immer, das Mitgegebene, das 
"Nationelle", in das Aufgegebene zu verwandeln'. (H6lderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' lind 'Der Rhein " 
p.292) 
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use of the proper' into the historical destiny of the Gennan people as poetic thinkers, 
he does it without sufficient respect for two important distinctions. One, perhaps 
unexpectedly, is that between thinkers and poets. By linking the relation between 
thinking and poetising to the destinies of peoples, Heidegger makes that relation so 
totalising as to eliminate the particularity that would ever allow poets and thinkers to 
become exemplars either for themselves or for us. In Heidegger's version of things, 
individual thinkers and poets vanish in the overwhelming glow that emanates from 
their belonging to a given people. Heidegger's comment about Holderlin being both 
the Gennan's greatest poet and their greatest thinker is symptomatic, because what 
this really acknowledges is that the latter possesses the innate and assigned 
characteristics of all Gennans-this people of poets and thinkers-but fails to 
acknowledge his particularity, or what it means to be either a poet or a thinker. 
The second neglected distinction is that between the poetic and the real or world-
historical. This is a tension we identified at the beginning of this chapter when we 
warned against thinking of the exemplary artist either as some sort of mythical 
conduit for the hand of god or as identical with his world-historical life. To attempt a 
reconciliation of these two extremes, as Heidegger does by blithely mixing the poetic 
and world-historical, is to make the poetic seem banal and the world-historical a lie. 
This is what occurs in the lectures on Andenken, when Heidegger explains with a 
straight face that nineteenth century France stands for ancient Greece in the case of 
Holderlin. 65 And not just figuratively. It is only ifHolderlin is truly 'one struck by 
Apollo,66 on his return from France in 1802 that it is at all believable that he 
'experiences Being in its entirety out of the ground of its suffering', and thus can 'see 
the essence of Greek existence in its essential opposition to the essence of the 
Gennans,.67 In other words, without this experience-ofFrance, of Greece?!-as the 
guarantor ofHolderlin's insight, the whole structure of inverted mimesis between the 
Gennans and the Greeks comes into doubt, and with it the founding work of the poet 
with regard to what is 'proper'. 
65 Heidegger, M. Hv/derlins 'Andenken', p. 184: 'Dieses sudliche Land und sein Feuer steht fUr das 
Griechenland' . 
66 Heidegger, M. Hv/derlins Hymnen 'Germanien' lind 'Der Rhein', p. 290. 
67 Ibid., p. 293. 
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The effect of these neglected distinctions-a neglect, we might note, that is 
continuous with Heidegger's inability to differentiate works of art from non-works-
is to make it nearly impossible for us to relate to Holderlin as an exemplar. That is, 
how are we ever to bear witness that we too belong by our creation of a world if our 
only model for doing so is a nineteenth century poet and thinker seemingly capable of 
time travel? Or of miracles? Or of charlatanism? Or of madness? Whatever 
Holderlin's experience in France, whatever his experience of poetising and thinking, 
his experience cannot serve as a model, because what it implies is that before we can 
bear witness by creating a world we already have to be living in it, we already need to 
have stepped out of world-historical time and into the pages of popular myth. 
* 
Heidegger would probably challenge us at this point by arguing that such a leap is 
necessary at some stage if we are to have any hope of a new beginning; saying that, of 
course a new beginning will always appear as nothing more than myth when 
presented before its time. Yet, as sound as this idea may be, we still have every 
reason to ask why (or even how) we would leap after Holderlin when what Heidegger 
does in the story of Holderlin-such as it is related in the lectures on Andenken and 
elsewhere-is to deny us any chance to do so. 
That we are to be disappointed by this story is not immediately obvious. For as a 
whole, Holderlin's story is an endearing tragic-heroic tale, in which a brave poet sets 
out to liberate his 'homeland' from being 'closed up, unilluminated and unfree,.68 
After journeying to a foreign land, where he is threatened with consumption by 'the 
heavenly fire' proper to it, the poet returns home out of this other.69 What happens 
next is admittedly a little unclear; there is some ambiguity as to whether this 
homecoming has any significance-as to whether it is really a homecoming at all, 
would be a more Heideggerian way of putting this. For, in an echo of the Odyssey, 
68 Heidegger, M. Hoiderlins 'Andenkell', p. 190: '1m Beginn ist die Heimat noch in sich selbst 
verschlossen, ungelichtet und unfrei und so noch nicht zu sich selbst gekommen'. Note the biblical 
tenor of this phrase. 
69 Ibid, p. 191. 
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Heidegger says that 'the poet has returned home unnoticed by the maj ority' .70 In 
addition, unlike in the Odyssey, where there is ultimately the triumphant victory over 
the suitors, no such heroism appears to be imminent in the case of the poet. However, 
as inauspicious as this situation is, for Heidegger, the poet's anonymity is precisely 
what demonstrates his 'success', his 'free use of the proper'. How is this possible? It 
is, because by Heidegger's logic, if the majority had noticed the poet, it would be 
because they could see that there was something different about him, that he wasn't 
like 'normal' Germans, like the rest of them -or more to the point, that he was 
properly German, and they were not. As such, then, their myopia is more nearly 
evidence that they themselves are becoming proper than any indication that the poet 
has failed to change anything; their myopia indicates that the poet has indeed freed 
them for the proper. After the poet's homecoming, their properness can express itself 
properly, and the Germans achieve the historical self-realisation that we mentioned 
earlier as their projected destiny. 
There is a question mark, though: Is this really a new beginning? In other words, 
what exactly happens at the point the Germans are freed for their proper? Isn't this 
simply the moment that the Germans become .... well, German? To answer, we might 
return to the Greek-German pairing that motivates this moment. What we have been 
saying is that German self-realisation is essentially related to the Greek 
accomplishment of their 'highest' in works of art. But what exactly is this relation? 
We have said that it is a relation of inverted mimesis, and that, as inverted, it means 
that neither Greek works of art nor the Greeks themselves can serve as models for 
German self-realisation. Just the same, it is a mimetic relation, and what is mirrored 
in the two peoples is a moment of realisation. That is, German self-realisation mirrors 
Greek realisation in works of art. Moreover, if we also recall that one of the 'odd 
effects' of Heidegger' s lack of criteria for works of art is that it is who created the 
works and not anything about them that is significant, what we also now see is that 
the Greek accomplishment cannot be limited to just some Greek works of art. 
Because every Greek work of art is Greek, every Greek work of art is a example of 
the Greeks' innate openness to the 'fire from heaven'. By the same token and the 
logic of inverted mimesis, therefore, once freed for their proper, every German 
70 Ibid, p. 192. 
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becomes an example of what it is to be properly German, without exception ... except 
for the poet, of course. And this is a situation we should recognise. It is yet again the 
domination of the rule of exemplarity-this time, the rule of exemplary Germans-
made possible by the exceptional exemplarity of the poet, and this is not a genuinely 
new beginning. As Alexander Garcia Dlittmann expresses it in his writings on 
Heidegger and Holderlin, 'the beginning must already bear a name' and that name is 
Graeco-German.71 Just as every Greek work of art is an example of the Greeks' 
innate openness to the 'fire from heaven', the post-Holderlinian necessity for the 
Germans to be properly German means they can be nothing but. 
Rather than embodying hope, therefore, this 'beginning' sows the seeds of despair. 
Not because of what it does or does not promise, but because it does not promise at 
all, it tells. Perhaps because he never allows himself to take Holderlin as an example, 
because he never really reaches out from his particularity to Holderlin's, Heidegger 
never entirely lets Holderlin stand as an exemplar. Rather than treat Holderlin as an 
exemplar from whom we still have something to learn, Heidegger says what Holderlin 
is there for-what the poet is there for. Rather than ask whether Holderlin should be 
taken seriously, Heidegger takes it for granted that he is. 
Taking for granted 
This last criticism may seem to miss its mark, since Heidegger, of course, doesn't 
intend to take Holderlin in any fashion at all-not for granted, not as serious, and 
certainly not as an example. He wants to see Holderlin as he is, and that is the 
motivation behind the elaborate historical narrative about the Greeks, the Germans 
and works of art. And yet, as I am sure some have noticed, this whole story is 
circular. Greek works of art provide a foundation for the modern German poet, but at 
71 Dlittmann, Alexander Garcia. The Memory of Thought: An Essay on Heidegger and Adorno, p. 
172. This is a reference to Dlittmann's thesis that both Adorno and Heidegger 'name the name' in 
their respective reflections on Auschwitz and the 'Graeco-Germanic mission'. For Dlittmann, 
'Heidegger names what is Greek and what is German' (p. 170), but he is only able to do this because 
this power to name-which constitutes the beginning or homecoming-is already named, already 
Graeco-German. The significance of this naming with regard to exemplarity is that it implies an 
exceptional capacity-the exceptional capacity of the poet-to name the entire German people and all 
Greek works as inexcusable examples. 
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the same time, it is only if the founding work undertaken by the latter realises the link 
between the Germans and the Greeks that Greek art becomes so essential at all. 
Heidegger allows this circle to stand because for him it is more nearly a challenge 
than a problem that such a circle violates logic. In fact, if there is something that 
Heidegger does take seriously, it is circles such a this one; Holderlin's dance with the 
Greeks is only a reflection of the circular relations underpinning both the work of art 
and Dasein itself.72 However, by starting with a circle, with a set of self-referential 
relations, Heidegger cannot pose questions that might threaten the circle itself. And 
this is how Holderlin gets taken for granted. Because his work, his founding, is part 
of what founds the circle itself, it can never be placed in doubt. As a consequence, his 
work is both serious and non-serious-both real and mythical-and at the same time, 
neither the one nor the other. It exists in a sort of philosophicallimbo--as an activity 
that is not active, as work without works-it exists, in other words, only as an idea. 
And once artistic activity, the work of the exemplary artist, becomes an idea, it risks 
becoming nothing but an abstraction, something that potentially has great 
philosophical significance, but little regard for anything or anyone else. 
* 
We see a similar risk at play in Adorno's critical assessment of Schonberg's heirs, 
Webem and Berg. In this assessment, the artistic activity of Schonberg becomes such 
an overwhelming idea that it absorbs that of his heirs. Their artistic activity, limited it 
as it is to providing examples of Schonberg'S exceptionality, denies itself as artistic 
activity, the composers themselves seeming nothing but placeholders in an artistic 
development that occurs somewhere other than in their efforts: 
'With Schonberg the creations of his followers are necessarily the stage 
on which his own are linked to the broad stretch of musical history. This 
is attested by their close adherence to his music; they owe him not a vague 
variety of style and technical means, but the strict basis of musical 
knowledge. At the same time he demands the greatest independence so 
that they may concretely fulfill what he offers as a possibility, realizes but 
72 The identification of a hermeneutical circle is one of the first moves of both Being and Time (see § 
2 and 32) and 'The Origin of the Work of Art' (p. 18). 
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once, and which can survive only when their own substance fills in the 
outlines of his pattern'. 73 
If Schonberg's music exists for his heirs, not as a set of rules or technical means, but 
as the basis for 'musical knowledge', and most notably the knowledge of what is to be 
created, then his heirs are no longer in a position to drive their own artistic activity 
forward. Their activity is directed toward substantiating Schonberg's exceptional 
exemplarity rather than establishing their own. As Adorno puts it, 'Berg and Webern 
both may be said to present commentaries on Schonberg', and even if 'by reason of 
this are assured ofa place in the totality ofhistory',74 the certainty of their 'place' is 
the most decisive denial of their artistic activity. For according to Adorno's own 
philosophy, it is an artist's ability to stand against history-to found it anew-that is 
most essential. 
Moreover, one essay in which Adorno develops this philosophy of historical renewal 
is that which records his reaction to Schonberg's death. When Adorno calls 13 July 
1951-the date of the composer's death-a 'caesura in the history ofnewmusic',75 he 
is speaking of a history that proceeds only by leaps and overcomings. And yet, even 
if this caesura is apiece with a history of renewal, it also threatens it with permanent 
cessation. For if the situation during the composer's life is that his artistic activity 
constitutes the exception to the rule of exemplarity-to the rule of the most advanced 
material, according to which every work serves as an example of its material moment~ 
and Schonberg is the only one who can advance the moment itself-after his death 
there are nothing but examples of the most advanced material as it exists on 13 July 
1951. Or to put it another way, if Schonberg's heirs depend upon him for 'musical 
knowledge', his mortality points to a historical delimitation of that very knowledge. 
What is surprising is that Adorno himself doesn't immediately see the problem. 
Rather he continues to tie the development of new music with the development of 
Schonberg, almost as if the latter's self-knowledge were the knowledge of new music 
itself: 'For each of his works it behoves the artist to heed the demand which Rilke 
73 Adorno, T.W. 'Berg and Webem-Schonberg's Heirs', pp 446-47. 
74 Ibid., p. 448. 
75 Adorno, T.W. 'Entwicklung und Fonnen der Neuen Musik', p. 118. 
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attributed to the archaic torso of Apollo: You must change your life,.76 Yet, unless 
one imagines death to be the next phase of new music-which is precisely the 
possibility that comes to haunt Adorno later on-the passing away of the composer 
marks the expiration of the possibility for new music to continue as a program of self-
development. That is to say, once Schonberg's exceptional example is no longer 
available-his work no longer at work, so to speak-new music itself is brought into 
question. It is this bringing into question in Adorno's essays from the 50's and early 
60's that turns Schonberg's artistic activity into an idea so philosophically powerful, 
so as to no longer be indebted even to the artist himself. 
In these considerations, an important shift seems to occur in 1955, for in this year 
Adorno develops a notion of new music which firmly distinguishes it from traditional 
music without necessarily privileging Schonberg. At first it doesn't seem a dramatic 
transformation of Adorno's thought. What he says is that any music 'that has not 
measured itself against the experience of the radically modem, as it is represented by 
the Viennese School of Arnold Schonberg, Alban Berg and Anton von Webern, is 
clearly something scarcely suitable'. 77 In other words, he still identifies Schonberg 
(though in a more equal partnership with his heirs) as the example of new music. Just 
the same, he also offers a description of what makes this school the example-that is, 
the experience of the radically modem-and by naming this experience, he at least 
opens the possibility that others can measure themselves upon it, as well. Certainly it 
is much more possible than when Schonberg's own development is the measure. 
But this new possibility also inaugurates a new critical task: namely, to relate new 
music to music in general.78 As long as it is Schonberg's activity that identifies new 
music, then the composer himself is the link, Adorno going so far as to attribute to the 
76 Ibid 
77 Adorno, T. W. 'Neue Musik heute'. Adorno does try in this essay to understand why contemporary 
musical production does not live up to this standard and offers the suggestion that composers of this 
generation 'are perhaps all too much exposed to the chaos of reality to look it aesthetically in the eye' 
(p. 130). This notion of an increasingly inhospitable environment for composition, such as would 
block the necessary experience, is echoed in the' Aging of New Music' from 1954, where Adorno says 
that 'the anxiety that gave shape to its [i.e. new music's] great founding works has been repressed. 
Perhaps this anxiety has become so overwhelming in reality that its undisguised image would scarcely 
be bearable' (p. 98). 
78 Other essays which form a part of this effort to distinguish music from new music include 'Music 
and New Music' from 1960, where Adorno concludes that 'music in general will be absorbed into the 
new music' (p. 268), and 'The Criteria of New Music' from 1957, where Adorno undertakes an 
abortive attempt to arrive at criteria for new music. 
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latter an almost mystical ability to grasp and renew the total state of musical 
material. 79 Once some sort of experience of the radically modem comes into play, 
however, then it is more nearly the case that something must happen to divide new 
music from music, that something must call for music's renewal. What happens, 
apparently, is that music itself calls for its own renewal, and even if it is Schonberg 
who heeds this call, his role is determined less by his actions than by the history of 
inverted mimesis-in the mould ofHeidegger-that informs it. 
According to this story, 80 music begins with Bach when he brings together two 
contradictory tendencies: 
'On the one hand, [music] is tied into a system, the system of triads, keys 
and their relationships. On the other hand, the subject is trying to express 
itself in it; instead of every norm that is merely imposed externally, it wants 
to generate the regularities from within' .81 
As one should expect, however, Bach's success in founding music in this fashion is 
not total, and as such also constitutes music's failure. That is, there remains in music 
as Bach conceives of it-and in spite of subsequent developments--an inadequacy 
felt in its 'external, compulsive moment'.82 Bach himself was aware of this 
inadequacy, and for this reason 
'drew on the polyphonic arts of the medieval Low Countries, which were 
already archaic in his era, in order to overcome [aufheben] the gravity of 
[music's] schema by dint of the complete integration of all the voices ... so 
that the music, as it were, owes nothing to anything except what it is itself, 
here and now' .83 
79 See in particular the reading in chapter two of' Arnold Schonberg (1)' . 
80 Based on Edward Said's reading of Adorno's writings on music entitled 'Adorno as Lateness 
Itself, it could be argued that there is an alternative version of this story, where it is Beethoven, rather 
than Bach, who plays the role of originary lack. However, this shift of actors, even if it changes the 
focus to music in the modem era, does not substantially change the structure of the story. 
8! Adorno, T.W. 'Toward an Understanding of SchOnberg', p. 633. 
82 Ibid 
83 Ibid 
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What we need to recognise is that this eighteenth century failure to completely 
integrate voices is precisely the disruptive inadequacy that calls for Schonberg's 
twentieth century attempt to totally organise musical material. 84 In the two hundred 
years that intervene, this integrative task lies dormant-disappearing 'immediately 
after the death of Bach '-with only 'a tendency to dissonance,85 to even mark its 
existence. 
According to Adorno, Schonberg is the composer who rediscovers this fundamental 
task, but he doesn't have to be, and none of Adorno's explanations--no matter how 
outlandishly persuasive--can ever disguise this structural implication of the story. 86 
That is, because new music is called for by music itself, it only requires from the 
modem composer a kind of artistic midwifery, and not artistic activity as it can only 
be undertaken by an actual artist. The story of inverted mimesis takes an idea of 
artistic activity-here, an idea of an integrative activity which can overcome the 
divisions of subject and object, freedom and necessity-and treats it as a 
philosophical certainty immune from the vicissitudes of empirical activity. And in 
fact, in an odd reversal, this certainty becomes the measure of artistic activity itself, 
replacing the earlier mooted for possibility of an experience of the radically modern. 
This allows philosophy to become the gatekeeper of the modern, denouncing 
deviations from the historico-philosophical script. This is what Adorno is doing when 
he declaims Schonberg's twelve tone works as a betrayal of earlier promise. 
But the question is: what promise? Or even whose? That is, what happens when 
artistic activity ceases to be artistic and becomes a philosopheme? Answer: it ceases 
to offer the promise that made it so revolutionary in the first place. Only as long as 
artistic activity remains uncertain, and its potential dubious, can it still promise. The 
history of inverted mimesis would betray this promise by assuring itself of art's 
potential, with the irony that the greater this certainty, the less there is anything to be 
certain about. And once the idea of artistic activity entirely disassociates itself from 
84 See Adorno, T.W. 'The Function of Counterpoint in New Music', p. 124 on this 'total 
organisation' . 
85 Adorno, T.w. 'Toward an Understanding of Schonberg', p. 633. 
86 These 'explanations' contain the expected dose of mythology, attributing to SchOnberg an 
otherworldly relation to music and history: he apparently 'bore within himself the entire heritage of 
romanticism', and that the romantic 'urge [Drang] to let pass [or express] only those things that he was 
able to feel entirely from within himself was in him developed 'to the extreme' (p. 634). 
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the uncertainty that comes from the real life actions of an artist, it disassociates itself 
from life itself and becomes an abstraction. It becomes something taken for granted, a 
strategic move in a philosophical argument, so autonomous that it has no need for the 
artist as example. 
Vers une musique exemp/aire 
In spite of the lost promise, however, an optimist could read the foregoing paragraphs 
as a portrayal of a philosopher's liberation from the exemplarity of an artist. And 
certainly if there were a candidate for such an undertaking Adorno would be one of 
them-along with Nietzsche, no doubt. 87 Nevertheless, even after this hard-won 
separation, a philosopher has not reached the frontiers of artistic exemplarity. This 
may indeed be the last word on an artist's exceptional or mythical exemplarity, but it 
is just the initial outline of the exemplarity of his works of art. Moreover and as we 
will see in the following chapters, the separation of the artist from his works-a move 
both essential to philosophical liberation and the basis for the exemplarity of works of 
art-never comes off without a hitch. That is, even when an artist is neglected in 
favour of his works, that neglect itself has philosophical significance, and even when 
a philosopher might respond to the question of whether he takes an artist seriously by 
emphatically saying 'no', this does not mean that the question itself can be ignored. 
Indeed, the very fact that the artist must be neglected indicates that the latter's 
seriousness is still very much at stake. As we will see, by continuing to question an 
artist's seriousness we gain insight into how things should not be and how things 
should not be done. After his exemplarity, in other words, an artist become a counter-
example, an example of what not to do. 
But before we tum to this, we should put the story of the exceptional exemplary artist 
to rest. As we have seen, his seriousness very often depends upon a history of 
inverted mimesis, whereby past failure is transformed into futural success, a history 
which is both for and because of the artist, and as such means that everything in it is 
&7 As we have already noted, this 'liberation' has very real philosophical significance in Adorno's case 
and allows him to move from The Philosophy of Modem Music with its privileging of SchOnberg to 
Aesthetic Theory, in which no particular artist or school is taken as the example. 
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exemplary of and for his exceptional role. But as we have also seen, the more airtight 
the story becomes, the less it has to do with the artist, the less his artistic activity is 
really artistic. And when the latter is taken so far as to become philosophical, it is 
taken for granted; the artist becomes excluded from the history that he himself 
initiates in favour of his works. 
In the case of Schonberg, this occurs at the moment Adorno sets aside new music in 
order to project the naissance of a new type of exemplary work of art: namely, 
musique informelle. Musique informelle does not exist in the sense that most music 
would be said to do so--it does not exist as compositions and performed collections 
of sounds. And yet, it would be a mistake to completely dismiss it as imaginary, 
because, as prescriptive music, as music that should be, it exists in relation to the very 
real experience of 'musical emancipation' which Adorno associates with the works of 
the Schonbergian revolution of new music. In fact, musique informelle could be said 
to relate to Schonberg in the same way that Schonberg is said to relate to Bach in the 
earlier essay 'Toward an Understanding of Schonberg'. What Adorno says exactly is 
the following: 
'Such informal music had been a real possibility once before, around 
1910. The date is not irrelevant, since it provides a demarcation line, 
dividing the age from the vastly overrated twenties. The beginnings can 
be seen in the period when Schonberg wrote Erwartung, Die glilckliche 
Hand and Herzgewachse, and Stravinsky the Three Poems from the 
Japanese. But this age, the age of synthetic Cubism, soon drifted into 
other directions' . 88 
In other words, and as it turns out-though really it should not come as much of a 
surprise-the Schonbergian revolution was a failure. Success, that is to say, musique 
informelle, will only come when we take up the task 'to resume the process which 
Schonberg throttled at the very moment when his brilliant innovation appeared to give 
it fresh impetus'. 89 At this moment, the composer is made an example of, denounced 
as an example of what not to do. In response, we are challenged by Adorno to 
88 Adorno, T.W. 'Vers une musique injonnelle', p. 273. 
89 Ibid, p. 275. 
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appropriate the composer's gift, 'his brilliant innovation', and treat it like an 
autonomous operation that can be put to work in other contexts and for other ends. 90 
However, even if we are successful in taking the composer's gift for granted, we are 
still dependent upon his works of art as examples, for as has been said, musique 
informelle stands directly in relation with the experience of 'musical emancipation' 
elicited by these works. It is for this reason that Adorno looks to these works all the 
while warning against 'a repeat of the style of 1910' .91 These works form a musique 
exemplaire that is exemplary in its failure-just like Euripides' plays, just like Greek 
works of art,92 just like Bach's experiments with the archaic music ofthe medieval 
Dutch. 
The implication of this, of course, is that musique exemplaire, or any other exemplary 
work of art, is always also a failure. However, this failure only appears when we 
consider a work of art in relation to the working of another artist-in other words, 
only as long as we read history as a history of inverted mimesis with an exceptionally 
exemplary artist as its tragic hero. Once this story is brought into question, we are 
able to consider other exemplarities of the work of art. 
90 Susan Buck-Morss identifies this tendency in Adorno's thought when she says: 'Indisputable at 
least is the significance for Adorno of correct cognitive procedure understood as a structure, or 
"model", which could be translated into different modes and different realms of intellectual discourse. 
Hence, for example, he could see parallels between the structure of SchOnberg's composing and 
Freudian analytical procedure. Or he could discern echoes of SchOnberg in the structure of Benjamin's 
writing' (p. 131). Moreover, as Buck-Morss goes on to develop throughout The Origin of Negative 
Dialectics, perhaps the most important model is indeed that of SchOnberg's composing. (See, for 
example, p. 129) 
91 Adorno, T.W. 'Vers une musique informelle', p. 275. 
92 One might protest here that Heidegger, who is being referred to, did not consider Greek works of art 
a failure, and in fact described them as the 'highest' of the Greeks. Nevertheless, these works do 
represent a certain failure in that they indicate the inability of the Greeks to attain the 'free use of the 
proper'. 
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chapter five 
The exemplarities of the work of art 
By introducing the problematic of the philosophical voice, we will investigate in this 
chapter how a concern for instrumentality gives rise to various exemplarities of the 
work of art. 
The question concerning the philosopher 
At the outset of the fourth stanza of his poem Andenken, Holderlin asks, 'Wo aber 
sind die Freunde?' 'Where are the friends?' It is a question whose colloquial 
character reasonably elicits much curiosity in the context of a poem whose language 
otherwise challenges our understanding. As Heidegger points out, '[t]his question is 
the only question of the poem and perhaps even the question of the poem'. 1 But 
rather than consider Heidegger's reasons for saying this, we might take a cue from the 
gesture itself, and ask what could be the question ofHeidegger's reading of Holder lin. 
That is to say, when Heidegger proposes to read Andenken so as 'to think the 
poeticised in Holderlin's word',2 what question could we pose that would disclose the 
thinking of this thinking? This is to ask with Veronique F6ti, 'why Heidegger's 
thought is constrained to articulate itself through appropriations, rather than 
straightforwardly and in a genuinely dialogical manner,.3 Or to pose with Robert 
Bernasconi, 'the question of Heidegger' s own access to the work' of art.4 It is to ask, 
in other words, 'Wo aber ist der Philosoph?' 
Where is the philosopher? What is his position with regard to the works of art that he 
does not create and yet claims for his own philosophy? Heidegger's extensive 
reading ofHolderlin's poems obviously begs this question, but so does Adorno's 
apparent insight into Schonberg's compositions. That is, what are we really to make 
of Adorno's claim that the rules of twelve-tone technique are 'configurations of the 
1 Heidegger, M. Holderlil1s 'Andenken', p. 167. 
2 Ibid, p. 5. 
3 Foti, Veronique. 'Heidegger, Holderlin, and Sophoclean Tragedy', p. 180. 
4 Bernasconi, Robert. 'The Greatness of the Work of Art', p. 104. 
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historical force present in the material'?5 Aren't we in our rights to wonder how he 
can be so sure about what's going on in these works? Nietzsche would seem to give 
answer to our scepticism when he proposes the union of philosophy and art, 6 and yet 
his suggestion glosses over the very issue at stake here-the cumbersome materiality 
of the work of art. As we have seen, it is relatively straightforward to imagine 
partnerships between artists and philosophers, and yet precisely what becomes a 
challenge in such partnerships is to account for the work of art. Think, for instance, 
of the aesthetic spectator in The Birth of Tragedy and the difficulties of imagining a 
fonn of spectatorship that would actually create works. Or Holderlin's existence as 
both poet and thinker: Are his letters really works of art? Otto Poggeler would say 
that this last question misses the point, that 'Holderlin's poems are not an object 
detennined by Heidegger's philosophy as a work of art; '-and thus that it would be 
pointless to quibble about whether something was a poem or a letter-and that rather 
'Holderlin's poetry is the partner of Heidegger' s thinking, and in this partnership 
thinking gains a new language,.7 Just the same, isn't this simply to displace the 
problem of the work of art to this 'new language'? Isn't our willingness to 
acknowledge this 'new language' predicated precisely upon our belief that it is the 
product of a genuine encounter between thought and art, between a philosopher and a 
work of art? That is, what is at stake with the work of art is precisely the possibility 
of such an encounter, and in fact, positing a 'new language' can actually obscure it. 8 
As such, our task is to scrutinize the movement by which, for instance, 'Heidegger's 
language is saturated by Holderlin's,9 as Andrzej Wanninski puts it. We want to 
examine what philosophers see in works of art, and thus do not consider benign, as 
Beda Allemann does, that Heidegger's Erlauterungen render 'the poem transparent as 
regards its unsaid' .10 We want to address what occurs before a work becomes 
transparent, before a philosopher's language becomes saturated with that of an 
5 Adorno, T.W. The Philosophy of Modern Music, pp 63-4. 
6 Nietzsche, F. The Birth of Tragedy, p. 95 (already cited earlier): 'Whither does the union of Gennan 
music and Gennan philosophy point, if not to a new mode of existence of which we can only gain an 
inkling through Greek analogies?' 
7 Poggeler, Otto. 'Heidegger on Art', p. 107. 
8 Heidegger, in fact, even thinks of this obscuration as a goal of interpretation: 'The goal of true 
interpretation consists only in making itself superfluous. The more complete an interpretation's 
construction is, the more decisively it has in the end dismantled, and thus denied itself, so that only the 
foet's word speaks'. (Holderlins Hymn 'Andenken', pp 38-9, already cited in chapter one) 
Wanninski, Andrzej. 'Heidegger Reading Holderlin', p. 46. 
to Allemann, Beda. Hoiderlin und Heidegger, p. 166. 
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artist-before, in other words, philosopher, artist and work of art are superseded by 
the 'word', to use Heidegger's own terminology, with all its theological undertones. II 
Notions such as that of the 'word' or the union of philosophy and art hide a 
philosopher's voice, his position with regard to the works of art that he takes so 
seriously. And yet, as we noted in the second chapter, the question that immediately 
imposes itself about the work of art is indeed who decides which works, and once this 
question is breached, the position of the philosopher must be taken into account. Very 
often the philosopher would have us believe that the work of art is not chosen but 
presents itself as exemplary just as supposedly does the exemplary artist, and yet 
because the latter has to be expropriated of his works in order for this to be possible, 
the claim falls very easily into suspicion. Our suspicion, however, is not that the work 
of art is not necessarily exemplary, but simply that it is exemplary in ways different 
from that the philosopher is claiming. It is only if we think about where the 
philosopher is, that is to say, only if we take his voice into account that we can 
perceive these other exemplarities. 
The question concerning the work of art 
In this examination, it would seem that Nietzsche's notion of a 'physiological' 
aesthetics, of an aesthetics that is an 'applied physiology', would provide a good 
starting point, since it would seem that a philosopher's voice remains very much in 
focus as long as his objections are 'physiological objections', and he sees no purpose 
being 'served by disguising the same under aesthetic formulae' .12 And yet, there 
exists a question mark as to how these 'physiological' reactions really relate to works 
of art. For instance, how much can Nietzsche really be registering about works if his 
11 The theological implications ofHeidegger's writings on Holderlin were not at all lost on his own 
contemporaries. Max Kommerell questioned it in 1942. Responding to Heidegger's lecture 'Wie wenn 
am Feiertage ... " Kommerell asks: 'Where is the transition, where your own philosophy flows into 
Holderlin, and where it, starting as a description of the human situation, becomes in such a decisive 
way a metaphysical declaration and absolute, ultimate certainty-where does it find this certainty in 
itself, and compares itself on this point with Holderlin-and finally where it approaches poetry in the 
srecific nature ofits declaration?' (pp 400-01). 
I Nietzsche, F. Nietzsche contra Wagner, p. 416. The full phrase runs as follows: '[m]eine 
Einwande gegen die Musik Wagners sind physiologische Einwande: wozu dieselben erst noch unter 
asthetische Formeln verkleiden? Asthetik ist ja nichts als eine angewandte Physiologie'. 
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reactions only alternate between overwhelming endorsement and merciless 
condemnation? That is, according to a physiological aesthetics there are only two 
kinds of works of art: those which make one ill, such as Wagner's-'My "issue", my 
''petit fait vrai" is that I no longer breathe properly when this music flrst works upon 
me, that almost immediately my feet become angry against it and revolt'13-and those 
which make one productive, like Bizet's Carmen-'Bizet makes me productive. All 
that is good makes me productive' .14 Moreover, even this distinction seems rather 
self-serving in that the claim that '[e]verything good makes [one] productive'-that 
one 'has no other thankfulness', and 'no other proof of what is good' ,IS --echoes the 
philistine complacency that runs: 'I know what I like, and I like what I like'. 
Nietzsche roundly criticises the decadent desire for 'emotion at any price'; 16 and yet it 
is difficult to see how his demand for stimulation is any different. And even if there is 
a distinction, doesn't it reside more nearly with the spectator-with the philosopher-
than with the work? In sum and contrary to expectations, if a physiological aesthetics 
is to have any philosophical signiflcance, it must involve very important 
presuppositions about the relation between a philosopher's voice and works of art. 
In order to probe this further, we might examine the increased productivity that 
Nietzsche sees as the physiological mark of a 'good' work of art. At one point he 
describes it as follows: 
'Has one noticed that music makes the spirit free? gives thoughts wings? 
that man becomes ever more a philosopher, the more he becomes a 
musician?-As with lightning the grey sky of abstraction flashes 
throughout; light strong enough for all the flligree of things; big problems 
near to grasp; the world overseen as if from a mountain.-I even deflned 
philosophical pathos-And suddenly answers fall in my lap, a small hail 
of ice and wisdom, of solved problems ... Where am I?-Bizet makes me 
d · ,17 pro uctlve ... 
13 Ibid 
14 Nietzsche, F. Der Fall Wagner, p. 8. 
15 Ibid 
16 Ibid, p. 4l. 
17 Ibid 
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To even suppose that this experience of mental quickening is some sort of effect 
of the work of art is already to posit certain analogies between the work and the 
nature of philosophical thought. But rather than think of it as an effect whose 
cause could be located in the work of art-since this would be yet again to 
disguise the philosopher's voice, by supposing a work of art that could already 
anticipate its own reception-we might see this experience as a doubling or 
mirroring between the work of art and the philosopher, such that the former 
makes possible the self-transcendence of the latter. In fact, Nietzsche signals 
the self-reflexive character of his experience when he poses the very question 
we are demanding of philosophers: namely, 'Where am IT Where is the 
philosopher? The answer in Nietzsche's case is that a philosopher is with 
himselfwhen he listens to music. In other words, the 'good' work of art does 
not decadently tempt the philosopher to escape from himself, but rather to do 
the opposite, to realise himself as philosopher. With himself, he can grasp at the 
'chances' for thought that music makes possible. These 'chances' are not 
messages that can be gleaned from an interpretation of the work of art, and 
certainly are not the product of artistic intention. 18 They are the openness of the 
work of art to the philosopher's experience. 
Just the same, this openness does not mean that a physiological aesthetics errs to 
the other extreme and is simply a philosopher's way of hearing his own voice in 
a work of art. That is, just as we should not see the analogy between 
philosopher and work of art in terms of a simple philosophical message relayed 
from work to philosopher, we should also avoid the temptation to see it as a 
mere self-imposition made by a philosopher upon a work; the work of art can no 
more become philosophy than a philosopher can transform his voice into art. 
As such, the analogy between philosopher and work of art depends upon a 
mutual openness-as it is, a mutual openness to self-overcoming. 
That said. though-and as we will see, very significantly-we cannot more 
elaborately describe this openness except negatively, except by reference to 
Wagner. The contrast is very neatly expressed in the distinction between the 
18 Ibid The relevant passage runs as follows: 'ich zittere vor Gefahren, die irgendein Wagnis 
begleiten, ich bin entziickt tiber Glticksfalle, an denen Bizet unschuldig ist' (my emphasis). 
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'solved problems', the 'geliiste Problemen', that fall in the lap of the self-
overcoming philosopher and the' salvation' , ErlOsnung, promised by Wagner's 
operas. This contrast is more than just a play on words, a play on the notion of 
IOsen, it is all the difference between hope and false hope. That is, in 
Nietzsche's view, Wagner may at first make us hope, but his opera, this 'opera 
of salvation', 19 rather than offer the infinite possibilities of transcendence, 
actually deals in nothing but morbid finitude. If we take, for instance, the 'case 
in the "Flying Dutchman"', what we find is not salvation, but its pale reflection. 
In this piece 'the eternal Jew himself is [supposedly] saved ... when he 
marries' /0 but as Nietzsche incisively asks, 'What happens with the "eternal 
Jew", whom a wench (Weib) worships and ties up?' Answer: 'He simply ceases 
to be eternal'. 21 In other words, the hope offered by Wagner's operas is false. 
Rather than offer salvation, it offers an image of salvation such as it appears in 
the light of particular prejudices and points of view; that is, the 'salvation' of the 
'eternal Jew' in The Flying Dutchman is an example of Jewish salvation as seen 
by an anti-Semitic, bourgeois society. Such salvation annuls its own content 
because it is just an example of salvation, an example that may seem strange to 
us, but that is really no stranger than contemporary ones.22 As an example, such 
a case of salvation excludes precisely that which it exemplifies; it is an 
exclusive inclusion that excludes its own signifying, its own ability to save. By 
contrast, what Nietzsche searches for is salvation itself, a 'saving power,23 by 
which works can open themselves to self-transcendence. 
What is intriguing is that in this search Nietzsche himself has recourse to an 
example. That is, he does not simply theorize about a work that would allow 
him to 'take leave of the damp north, of all the fogginess of Wagnerian 
19 Ibid, p. 10. 
20 Ibid, p. 11. 
21 Ibid, p. 12. 
22 The anti-abortion movement abounds in such examples. In the name of salvation it has justified all 
fonns of violation of individual integrity, including murder, and this is not to mention the basic fact 
that it promotes involuntary child-bearing as intrinsic to women's salvation. 
23 This is actually Holderlin's tenn, a phrase that Heidegger picks up and makes much use of We 
will be turning to it shortly. I am suggesting here, and provisionally, that there is a connection between 
Nietzsche's desire for self-transcendence and the notion ofa 'saving power' as it is developed by 
Heidegger, and that we see this relation through an understanding of the exemplary work of art. 
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ideals',24 he specifies one. He makes Bizet's Carmen his clear example of what 
a work of art should be. As such, he transforms the task of praising Bizet at 
Wagner's expense into the task of distinguishing between two sorts of 
examples, into explaining how Carmen is not an example of salvation a la 
Wagner. As we have developed,25 he sees Bizet's opera as a sort of vehicle for 
self-transcendence, and that the very mechanism by which it will save him from 
Wagner's influence will subsequently allow him to save himself from Bizet's. 
That is, the opera exemplifies a kind of self-transcendence, a kind of love which 
saves one for love, which brings one to oneself rather than into the possession of 
another. However, this sort of exemplarity cannot sufficiently distinguish itself 
from Wagner's, because one could argue that this version of self-transcendence 
is simply an example of transcendence as seen from a philosophical point of 
view, and thus that Nietzsche just repeats Wagner's mistake-finding examples 
to suit his own needs. As a consequence, to truly be able to save, Carmen must 
not merely exemplify self-transcendence, it must itself transcend; it must 
simultaneously exemplify transcendence and transcend itself as this example. 
That is, it must be an example of what it is an example of. It must, to appeal to 
Andrzej Warminski's existential notion of exemplarity, be an 'example and an 
example ofexample,.26 
Warminski comes to this formulation in an attempt to answer the question, 
'What is the example?' What he concludes is that: 'An example can never 
represent or exemplify itself enough as example to recover its own excess, the 
excess of example "itself', for there will always be one more (or less) as yet 
unreflected and forever unreflectable and unmediatable example left over or 
missing,.27 What this means in terms of the work of art, is that a work of art 
which is an example and an example of itself as an example is also an example 
of itself as an example as an example, and so on. One can never get to the 
bottom of things and say what such a work of art was an example of, except to 
24 Nietzsche, F. Der Fall Wagner, p. 9. 
25 See chapter three. 
26 Wanninski, Andrzej. 'Reading for Example: Sense-Certainty in Hegel's Phenomenology oj the 
Sfirit', p. 178. 
2 Ibid. It is critical to this logic that Warminski comes to it in the context of a discussion of Hegel's 
notion of 'sense-certainty', because only in an existential context, where being itself is at stake, would 
we speak of an example exemplifying its own existence. 
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suggest that it is an example of the self as excess, as unquenchable source for 
itself. In this light, the mistake committed by Wagner would be to have had his 
works become examples of things that they themselves clearly were not, 
examples of things other than the self. By relying upon external sources, they 
risk exhausting them. Nietzsche refers to this exhaustion, and the boredom it 
engenders, when he sarcastically comments on 'how richly [Wagner] varies his 
central theme' of salvation.28 According to this logic, Carmen is a 'good' work 
of art because it is an autotelic work of art; it carries its own 'emergence' with 
itself for all to hear. 
Moreover, it is precisely this that Nietzsche claims to hear. When he is brought 
to himself by the work of art, it is not that the work of art points to the 
philosopher's self and thereby indicates it as the latter's goal; rather the work of 
art, by pointing to itself as source, models the self-transcendence that the 
philosopher himself must practice. What this implies is that when Nietzsche 
takes himself as the source of his own self-overcoming, he stands in the same 
'place' as the work of art-that, at and as origin, work of art and philosopher 
perfectly mirror one another. This is what Nietzsche is speaking of when he 
says that he must 'bury [his] ears in under this music' and 'hear its cause,?9 At 
such moments, when he is with himself, he is also with the work of art, 
experiencing 'its emergence,30 as the model of his own. 
The stumbling block in our whole-hearted embrace of this experience is, of course, 
our willingness to accept that Carmen doe.s indeed transcend itself, that it is indeed an 
example of itself in the existential sense required by Warminski' s understanding. If 
we are not, and it is not such an example, then we are back to Carmen's uncanny 
similarity to Wagner's decadent works. The latter are decadent because they point 
outside of themselves, refer to other things as models of what they themselves want to 
say. When they exemplify they are using other things, and by so doing, they use them 
up in the way that The Flying Dutchmen uses up the notion of the' eternal Jew'. The 
self-transcending work would avoid such instrumentality by referring only to itself, by 
28 Nietzsche, F. Der Fall Wagner, pp 10-11. 
29 Ibid, p. 8. 
30 /bid 
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being its own model, the model of the self as origin. Nietzsche offers very little to 
convince us of this self-transcendence, and rather is more concerned with describing 
his own experience. As a consequence, we can't help but suspect that Carmen is no 
more than an example chosen and used by Nietzsche-that no matter how much 
Nietzsche imagines a parallelism between himself and the work of art, that the contact 
which makes this parallelism possible remains firmly rooted in the kind of 
instrumentality that such self-immanence would reject. As such, even though 
Nietzsche brags at the outset of The Case of Wagner that he has just seen Bizet's 
'masterpiece' for the 'twentieth time' ,31 such a frequency of attendance does not 
exclude the possibility that Nietzsche will eventually tire of it, bringing an end to its 
utility, and its claim to a unique existential exemplarity. 
As a consequence, the question of why Nietzsche takes Carmen so seriously imposes 
itself quite forcefully. If the opera is not really a model of the self as origin, but more 
nearly an example of self-transcendence a fa Wagner, then we indeed have to wonder 
why Nietzsche tries to tum it into an exemplary partner of his own development as 
philosopher. The short answer, of course, is his opposition to Wagner, because it is 
only ifhe can come up with an alternative to the latter's decadent works that 
Nietzsche can hope to overcome hisfirst partnership with the German composer, and 
thereby recover his own voice as philosopher. Moreover, there are, according to 
Nietzsche, qualities in Bizet's opera which make it the perfect contrast to Wagner's. 
Whereas, Wagner's works cater impersonally to the masses via 'effects', Nietzsche 
feels that Carmen approaches him as a person. The latter is 'charming' and 
'courteous', and 'does not sweat'32 as Wagner's music apparently does. This refined 
intimacy sets it off from the crass instrumentality of the marketplace that makes 
'money from sick music'. 33 Thus, even if Nietzsche cannot succeed in convincing us 
that Carmen is some sort of existential example, he does introduce the notion that an 
example that is nothing but an example-an example that is simply open to our 
experience of it--distances itself from everyday instrumentality. The seriousness of 
such an example is that its only utility is this openness, is its very exemplarity. 
31 Ibid, p. 7. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid, p. 17: 'Man macht heute nur Geld mit kranker Musik; unsre groJ3en Theater leben von 
Wagner'. 
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The 'question concerning technology' 
It is this possibility of opposing common instrumentality with a kind of exemplary 
utility-with the utility an example has simply as example-which will dominate the 
remainder of this chapter. For whereas Nietzsche only seems concerned with the 
vulgar aspects of instrumentality-and thus less likely to reject it outright-both 
Heidegger and Adorno take aim at instrumentality itself. For both of them its threat-
whether through the dominance of technology or instrumental reason-determines 
their orientation toward the work of art. At some level, Gadamer expresses this 
shared belief when he says that 'the path of the West' is 'also the path leading to 
science', a path that 'has forced upon us the separation and a never completely 
achievable unity of poetising and thinking'. 34 As such, it is not surprising to find 
Heidegger, for his part, turning to an exemplary work of art at the very moment he is 
trying to elucidate the essence of one product of this science: namely, equipment. 
To understand the full import of this move, however, we must begin at the outset of 
the essay in which it occurs, 'The Origin of the Work of Art'. This essay's 
problematic is clearly referred to in its title: how do we understand the origin of the 
work of art? In some ways, the answer seems too self-evident, but it is precisely this 
apparent simplicity which plunges us into a hermeneutical situation: 
'As necessarily as the artist is the origin of the work in a different way 
than the work is the origin of the artist, so it is equally certain that, in a 
still different way, art is the origin of both artist and work. But can art be 
an origin at all? .. Art-this is nothing more than a word to which nothing 
real any longer corresponds. It may pass for a collective idea under which 
we find a place for that which alone is real in art: works and artists,.35 
The question of the origin of the work of art, in other words, compels us to move 'in a 
circle'. Logic would tell us that such circles are something we want to avoid~ 
nevertheless, and in full awareness of logic's dictates on the subject, Heidegger 
34 Gadamer, Hans-Georg. 'Thinking and Poetising in Heidegger and in Holderlin's "Andenken"', p. 
145. 
3S Heidegger, M. 'The Origin of the Work of Art', p. 17. 
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believes that '[t]o enter upon this path is the strength of thought, [and] to continue on 
it is the feast of thought'. For him, such circularity is thinking as 'craft', thinking as it 
forms a partnership with poetising.36 What is interesting for us, however, is not this 
partnership per se-it risks, as we are now aware, obscuring the very philosophical 
voice we want to hear-but what must occur to initiate it. This initiation occurs when 
craftlike--or should we say, crafty-thinking enters into the hermeneutical situation 
properly. For as Heidegger argues in Being and Time, 'What is decisive is not to get 
out of the circle but to come into it in the right way'?? 'But what is the right manner 
to enter into it?' we might ask with Franyoise Dastur. The answer: 'To spring into 
it ... and the spring or leap consists precisely in the selection of a definite example of 
an art work' .38 The example of the work of art, in other words, is the proper response 
to the problem of origin. We have already seen a similar link between exemplarity 
and originality in Nietzsche--between an existential exemplarity and the autotelic 
work of art. Moreover, as with the latter, who praises the good-manners of his 
exemplary work of art, Heidegger extends comparable courtesy by proposing-in an 
implausible anthropomorphism-that we 'go to the actual work and ask the work 
what and how it is' .39 It is shortly thereafter that Heidegger makes his first reference 
to a 'painting, e.g., the one by Van Gogh that represents a pair of peasant shoes' ,40 
that is, to Shoes, the example which will concern us here. 
But how does the exemplarity of this work of art relate to the question concerning 
technology, and thereby to instrumentality? To answer we might note what happens 
when Heidegger first mentions the painting. He is immediately struck by its 'thingy 
character', the way it can be 'shipped like coal from the Ruhr and logs from the Black 
Forest' .41 However, what he discovers after a fairly lengthy meditation is that the 
most common way for us to approach this 'thinginess' is according to a matter-form 
schema, which is itself based on the' equipmental character of equipment'. In fact, 
36 Ibid, p.18. 
37 Heidegger, M. Being and Time, p. 195. 
38 Dastur, Franyoise. 'Heidegger's Freiburg Version of the Origin of the Work of Art', p. 123 (my 
emphasis). We might note that the example Dastur is thinking of is actually that of the Greek temple; 
however, we are going to focus on the painting by Van Gogh, because it more explicitly illustrates the 
relation between the work of art and instrumentality. Furthennore, the latter is the example actually 
mentioned by Heidegger shortly after his exposition of the henneneutical situation. 
39 Heidegger, M. 'The Origin of the Work of Art', p. 18. 
40 Ibid, p. 19. 
41 Ibid 
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the everyday manner of speaking which would refer to mere things is one that can 
only understand a thing in terms of what remains after 'the removal of the character of 
usefulness and being made,.42 It is because of the inescapable predominance of 
instrumentality, then, that Heidegger must relate the exemplary work of art-even to 
the extent that it is simply a thing-to the question concerning technology. In fact, 
the example of the work of art, its leap, is the only way we can approach technology 
as a question. 
The reason the work of art can undertake this unique critical task is because it itself is 
technology or equipment. This is evident in the Greek term techne, which embraces 
both works of art and equipment, but also to the extent that Shoes both are and is not 
shoes. To explain: Heidegger's infamous and strange exercise in example-taking 
actually starts out as an attempt to 'simply describe some equipment without any 
philosophical theory,.43 To this end he suggests that '[w]e choose as example a 
common sort of equipment-a pair of peasant shoes'. 44 But for such immediate 
perception to be possible, not only a type of equipment but also a specific instance of 
it is required, and it is this added requirement which leads us to the painting. As such, 
if we ask what Shoes is explicitly an example of, we must answer 'shoes', but, of 
course, a painting is not simply what it represents, it is also the showing of this 
representation. And it is this dual relation that forges the exceptionality of Shoes as 
an example of shoes. The painting not only belongs to the category of 'shoes' as an 
example of it-the whole peasant idyll, which follows the reference to the painting, 
indicates to what degree Heidegger thinks of the represented shoes as 
undistinguishable from some 'real' pair of shoes in use45-but also, as a painting, 
Shoes shows shoeness, and as such points to its belonging to the category of shoe 
equipment in a way that a simple pair of shoes cannot. Any other example of shoes 
would only point to its belonging to the relevant class of equipment; whereas, Shoes 
can point to its very existence as such an example. Shoes points to the very 
equipmentality that makes it an example of equipment; it is that exceptional 
equipment which can establish the rule of equipment, that is to say, its essence. 
42 Ibid., p. 30. 
43 Ibid, p. 32. 
44 Ibid. 
45 In La verite en peinture Derrida makes this point in a very clear, if not also amusing, manner. 
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We will shortly return to the issue of what Heidegger specifically identifies as the 
essence of equipment, but we first want to note how the painting reveals this essence. 
According to Heidegger, it does so by sweeping us away 'suddenly somewhere else 
than we usually tend to be,.46 In other words, this work's exceptional exemplarity 
allows us to leap out of the everyday dominance of technology. It is this leap which 
puts us into a position where we can grasp technology's essence, but as such, also into 
a position from which we can confront it. Thus, because of the disjunctive aspect of 
works of art, because of their exceptional exemplarity, we can ask the question 
concerning technology. 
A more reliable technology 
There are many reasons to read 'The Origin of the Work of Art' and 'The Question 
Concerning Technology' together. Robert Bernasconi even calls the latter essay 'at 
least Heidegger's fourth attempt to write a conclusion' to the earlier one.47 In our 
case, the significance of the pairing lies in their shared gesture of example-taking. 
For, whereas in 1936 we are taken aback by Heidegger's surreal gesture of using a 
Van Gogh as an example ofa pair of shoes, in 1953 we have equal reason to be 
confused by the philosopher's choice of a silver sacrificial chalice as an example of 
technology. Heidegger's thesis is that we are living in an age dominated by 
technology, and yet he chooses an example of it that most of us will have never even 
seen, much less seen in use. And despite this fact, Heidegger thinks of the chalice as 
being something that might indeed be used, making reference to the 'sacrificial rite in 
relation to which the chalice required is determined as to its form and matter' .48 At 
the same time, in this odd useless usefulness doesn't the silver sacrificial chalice 
strangely resemble Van Gogh's Shoes? In other words, doesn't the chalice also 
withdraw from the very realm of technology to which it belongs, thus potentially 
showing this belonging in an exceptional fashion? To the extent that this is the case, 
there is a parallelism in the exemplarities of Shoes and the silver sacrificial chalice: 
46 Heidegger, M. 'The Origin of the Work of Art', p. 35. 
47 Bernasconi, Robert. 'The Greatness of the Work of Art', p. 112. 
48 Heidegger, M. 'The Question Concerning Technology', p. 6. 
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the exemplarity of both of these objects depends on their withdrawal from their own 
utility-either formally or historically. 
Furthermore, what this withdrawal from utility allows is a disjunction which, in 'The 
Origin ofthe Work of Art' , identifies the essence of equipment, identifies what utility 
itself depends upon: 
'The equipmental quality of equipment consists indeed in its usefulness. 
But this usefulness itself rests in the abundance of an essential being of 
the equipment. We call it reliability' .49 
The reason it must be reliability rather than utility that is the essence of equipment is 
that usefulness is its own dissipation; that is, a useful object 'falls into disuse' in the 
very fact of being useful. Being useful, in other words, exposes an object to being 
'worn out and used up' and thereby turned into 'mere stuff. 50 In this process 
equipment ceases to be equipment and turns into the 'mere thing' mentioned earlier. 
To make it possible for equipment to survive such a fate, and to remain equipment 
even in its uselessness51-such as must be the case for Shoes and the silver sacrificial 
chalice-Heidegger imagines an essence that even the most beaten up pair of shoes 
could possess. Such shoes could indeed be useless, but that does not entirely deny 
them their reliability. In fact, their very moth-eaten appearance stands as a testimony 
to their reliability, to the fact that they have been with us through thick and thin like a 
close friend. By virtue of shoes' reliability, for instance, a peasant woman can be 
made to feel that she is not alone, but rather 'privy to the silent call of the earth,.52 
The notion of reliability, therefore, allows Heidegger to oppose a self-destructive 
usefulness with the possibility of a 'deeper origin' that would survive the vicissitudes 
of wear and tear. 
Such a 'deeper origin' would seem to point back to the Greek notion of techne and its 
dual reference to both equipment and works of art-to both the useful and apparently 
49 Heidegger, M. 'The Origin of the Work of Art', p. 34. 
50 Ibid., p. 35. 
51 This weakness in the notion of equipment might also explain Heidegger's shift between 1936 and 
1953 from it to the question of technology. Technology does not simply refer to objects, and thus 
cannot be used up as equipment can. 
52 Heidegger, M. 'The Origin of the Work of Art', p. 34. 
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useless. And yet, even if techne involves the proper reference, it in no way excludes 
utility and material wear in tear as Heidegger needs it to. For instance, as techne-
that is, as a product of human labour-the Van Gogh is as much exposed to wear and 
tear as the shoes it depicts. Moreover, this insufficiency in the notion of techne has 
important implications for Heidegger's thought. On the one hand, it encourages a de-
emphasization of the materiality of works of art, which bars Heidegger from 
addressing the 'brush-made surface of the picture as a painted work' ,53 and thus opens 
him to Meyer Schapiro's critique that he is insensitive to the work as art as a made 
object. And on the other hand, it initiates a shift-both in the latter part of 'The 
Origin of the Work of Art' and in much ofthe writing that follows it-towards works 
of art that are apt to withstand their own use, that is a shift towards poetry (Dichtung). 
The comparative immateriality oflanguage allows Heidegger to more plausibly put 
forth an analogy between what occurs in a poem and the unconcealment of truth itself 
As he puts it, '[t]ruth, as the clearing and concealing of what is, happens in being 
composed, as a poet composes a poem'. 54 
This brings us back to 'The Question Concerning Technology', because, as it turns 
out, another reason the silver sacrificial chalice may have been chosen as an example 
of equipment-other than the useless usefulness it shares with the Van Gogh--could 
be its implicit reference to the Holderlinian passage featured in the latter part ofthe 
essay. Like these other examples, Holderlin's word-'But where danger is, grows / 
The saving power also '-is an example of techne, but unlike them, it does not 
withdraw from its usefulness into a sort of useless usefulness. Rather, by 
withdrawing into its very own essence, it becomes the exact opposite: something of 
the ultimate usefulness, something that saves. That is, since "'[t]o save" is to fetch 
something home into its essence' ,55 Holderlin's word goes beyond mere references to 
salvation to its actual performance. It does not simply offer examples of saving, it 
itself saves-summoning us to do our part to 'foster the saving power in its 
increase,.56 Moreover, by saving, it fundamentally distinguishes itself from other 
works of art and examples of technology. Its naming-something not submitted to 
the wear and tear of pigment and canvas--can reclaim the claim made twenty or so 
53 Schapiro, Meyer. 'The Still Life as Personal Object-A Note on Heidegger and van Gogh', p.139. 
54 Heidegger, M. 'The Origin of the Work of Art', p. 72. 
55 Heidegger, M. 'The Question Concerning Technology', p. 28. 
56 Ibid., p. 33. 
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years earlier about reliability. In so doing, this work of art establishes reliability-
that is, the gathering 'within itself of all things according to their manner and 
extent'57-as the essence of equipment, as the grounds for all utility. 
Additionally, this naming serves as a response to Nietzsche's dilemma of even a half 
a century earlier: namely, to elucidate a manner for the work of art to free a 
philosopher for his voice. In other words, ifHolderlin's poem does indeed save, it 
constitutes the kind of existentially exemplary work of art able to model the task of 
the philosopher. As Heidegger provocatively asks in 'The Question Concerning 
Technology': 
'Could it be that revealing lays claims to the arts most primally, so that they 
for their part may expressly foster the growth of the saving power, may 
awaken and found anew our look into that which grants and our trust in 
it?,58 
His response is to disingenuously suggest that 'no one can tell' '[w]hether art will be 
granted this highest possibility' ,59 and yet there really can be no doubt: simply to pose 
the question of our wakefulness is already to confirm that we have indeed been 
awoken. Moreover, for Heidegger works of art can only renew by renewing 
philosophical questioning. That is, for Heidegger poetic revelation and the voice of 
the philosopher only speak to the extent that they speak together, each the double of 
the other. 
This sounds harmonious, and yet we cannot fail to recognize the price of this 
consonance: namely, the critical blindness it requires as regards works of art. If our 
renewal as philosophers-our salvation or self-transcendence even-necessitates that 
we be perfectly in tune with poetic revealing, we are in no position to question those 
works of art which operate this revealing, in no position to ask ourselves why we take 
them so seriously. Rather we have to take poetry at its word-have to assume its 
reliability-and turn our questioning whither it points us. That is, the naming of the 
57 Heidegger, M. 'The Origin of the Work of Art', p. 34. 
58 Heidegger, M. 'The Question Concerning Technology', p. 35. 
59 Ibid. 
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'saving power' is also the naming of the danger it addresses-it is, if you will, both 
diagnosis and cure--and as such, there is no measure by which to judge the 
seriousness of its claims. We either do or do not heed them. If we do not, there is no 
revelation, nothing lost, but nothing gained. We stay under the sway of technology. 
If we do, we open ourselves to hope but also to the obligation to consider the 
seriousness of technology's danger, the obligation to engage in 'essential reflection 
upon technology and decisive confrontation with it' .60 
Moreover, at least for the moment, we must heed if indeed we want to fully grasp 
Heidegger's logic. For only in heeding the work of art, do we confront the triumph of 
instrumentality-the situation where everything will only be 'challenged forth' as 
'standing-reserve': 'Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately 
at hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on call for a further ordering' .61 
Heidegger names this condition 'Enframing' (Gestell), and calls it a mode of 
destining revealing opposed to pOiesis, that mode of destining revealing, which as a 
'bringing-forth' would not instrumentally challenge-forth.62 However, we cannot 
simply think of this opposition as a confrontation between those forces in support of 
instrumentality and those which reject it; it is not simply the case that technology as 
Enframing is useful andpoiesis is not.63 If for no other reason, because the utility of 
Enframing itself suffers from a certain futility. That is, because of the lack of 
freedom within its mode of destining revealing-because it strives to dominate-
Enframing is unable to live up to its own usefulness. As Otto Poggeler puts it in 
'Heideggers Begegnung mit Holderlin', 'the world as Enframing wants thus to be 
total'.64 We experience Enframing's totalitarian impulse when we observe the 
impossibility for us 'to prepare a free relationship to [technology], 65_ the stated goal 
of the essay. Even though we may believe that we can achieve such a relationship by 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid., p. 17. 
62 Ibid., pp 24-5: 'Enframing is an ordaining of destining, as is every way of revealing. Bringing-
forth, poiesis, is also a destining in this sense'. 
63 An example of such a view can be found in Walter Biemel's essay, 'On the Relation between Art 
and Philosophy', where he puts forth the notion that 'art, unlike the general field of technology, is no 
longer under pressure of the attitude of utility' . However, and contrary to his intention, this same 
distinction between art and common utility also serves to indicate art's more essential utility: Because 
relieved of the 'attitude of utility', art 'is able to disclose new ways of being-open', and man 'able to 
find himself in art and through art and to gain insight into his essential possibilities' (p. 136). 
64 Otto, P6ggeler. 'Heideggers Begegnung mit H6Iderlin', p. 40. 
65 Heidegger, M. 'The Question Concerning Technology', p. 3. 
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becoming masters of technological means, in fact, exactly the opposite is the case: We 
are more nearly its servants than its master. Because 'man becomes truly free only 
insofar as he belongs to the realm of destining and so becomes one who listens and 
hears, and not one who is simply constrained to obey' ,66 we cannot be free as long as 
we do not engage in this listening belonging. As such, as long as we do not heed the 
exemplary work of art, technology, in spite of its apparent utility, will never be truly 
useful to us. 
It is in this light that we should come to understand the more essential usefulness of 
the work of art. That is, rather than project the end of technology in his idea of the 
saving power-for this would be also to reject that techne which is the work of art-
what Heidegger wants to see is the establishment of poiesis as that techne which 
guides. Whereas technology as Enframing offers no more than temporary means to 
temporary ends, the saving power of poiesis would be able to found 'anew our look 
into that which grants and our trust in it'. Whereas the instrumentality of an instance 
of technology is plagued by futility, the usefulness of the exemplary work of art 
would stand unquestioned in its superiority. And thus, as it turns out, the most 
reliable equipment would indeed be Shoes; that is, the work of art as example. 
No more examples 
However, we cannot help but wonder whether this particularly reliable equipment, 
which is the work of art, is not more useful for some than for others. That is to say, it 
is quite unlikely that it will ever be more than a minority who will have the 
wherewithal to look beyond instrumentality toward a higher utility of exemplary 
works of art. Moreover, such a likelihood of 'unequal access' becomes a form of 
structural elitism67 when Heidegger asserts that 'admission' to the saving power is 
66 Ibid, p. 25. 
67 Some might be tempted to shrug their shoulders and ask 'Well, even ifit were elitist? What 
difference does this make?' My response is to point out the degree to which works of art must be open 
to the existential possibility of universal experience. Without this potential universality, Heidegger's 
social critique falls impotent; it becomes, at best, the call for an alternative society, purified of 
technology, to spring up beside the one inhabited by the vast majority constitutively unaffected and 
unconcerned by either works of art or the danger of technology. 
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'blocked' by technology as Enframing.68 At this point it becomes obvious that only a 
privileged few, only philosophers such as Heidegger himself, will ever achieve the 
kind of 'piety of thought' 69 needed to overcome the easy ubiquity of technology. This 
criticism is strengthened, moreover, by two other aspects ofHeidegger's argument. 
On the one hand, Heidegger would have us believe that his examples are self-evident; 
however, they are nothing of the sort-in his writings, works of art are taken as 
examples of equipment and works of technology appear as art objects. As such, 
access to their true character only occurs by means of a privileged position, from 
which one can illuminate sharp distinctions where otherwise there is nothing but 
obscurity. This authoritative point of view, moreover, echoes a criticism that Adorno 
might have levelled against his near contemporary. For on the other hand, if what 
Heidegger's discernment reveals is that the exemplary work of art is the more reliable 
equipment, doesn't this mean that Heidegger is less opposed to domination per se 
than to the fact that it is not rather poiesis that is dominant? Adorno is sensitive to 
this distinction precisely because he shares with Heidegger a concern with the 
ascendancy of instrumentality. Even though Adorno rejects Heidegger's romantic 
attachment to pre-industrial ways of living, 70 he does indeed see instrumentality-as 
it manifests itself in instrumental rationality-as both dominant and menacing. 
Moreover, like Heidegger, he does not believe that works of art can simply be 
excluded from the sphere of instrumentality's dominance. As he says in The 
Philosophy of Modern Music, 'art in its entirety, and music in particular, feels the 
shattering effects of that very process of enlightenment in which it participates and 
upon which its own progress depends,.7l Nevertheless, Adorno would take exception 
68 Heidegger, M. 'The Question Concerning Technology', p. 26: 'Since destining at any given time 
starts man on a way of revealing, man, thus under way, is continually approaching the brink of the 
possibility of pursuing and pushing forward nothing but what is revealed in ordering, and of deriving 
all his standards on this basis. Through this the other possibility is blocked, that man might be admitted 
more and sooner and ever more primally to the essence of that which is unconcealed and to its 
unconcealment, in order that he might experience as his essence his needed belonging to revealing' 
~my emphasis). 
9 Ibid, p. 35. 
70 This is not to say that Adorno is not critical of technology. For example, in the aphorism 'Do not 
knock' in Minima Moralia, Adorno identifies a loss of civility that comes with the development of 
modem technology: 'Not least to blame for the withering of experience is the fact that [modem 
machines], under the law of pure functionality, assume a form that limits contact with them to mere 
operation, and tolerates no surplus, either in freedom of conduct or in autonomy of things, which would 
survive as the core of experience, because it is not consumed by the moment of action' (p. 40). Just the 
same, Adorno does not advocate some sort of return to earlier mannered practices, if for not other 
reason because he recognizes their oppressiveness as well .. 
71 Adorno, T.W. The Philosophy of Modem Music, p. 13. 
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to Heidegger's response to this situation. Whereas the latter seems to imagine, or at 
least hope for, a dominance by works of art that could displace that by works of 
technology, Adorno recognises such a possibility as being no more than a trade off of 
one dictatorship for another, similar to the kind of trade off that he resists in the realm 
of thought: 72 'Dialectical thought is an attempt to break through the coercion of logic 
by its own means. But since it must use these means, it is at every moment in danger 
of itself acquiring a coercive character,.73 As such, any attempt by exemplary works 
of art to oppose instrumental rationality by rising above it would in the end only 
expose them to greater submission; by setting themselves up as the means to 
achieving a certain end, they would glorify the very instrumental logic they 
opposed?4 
But here is the dilemma: how is any opposition possible that does not at least tacitly 
hope to eliminate or overcome what it rejects? In Adorno, this problematic energizes 
his writings without ever being decisively resolved. If we take, for example, the case 
of Schonberg in The Philosophy of Modern Music, we find one technical rationality 
pitted against another in a pharmacological fashion, according to which-to use the 
expression of Karla Schultz-new music 'acts as a vaccine' .75 As a vaccine, new 
music must both participate in as well as exceed the dialectic of enlightenment: 
'The technical procedures of composition, which objectively make music 
into a picture of repressive society, are more advanced than the procedures 
of mass production which march beyond new music in the fashion of the 
times, wilfully serving repressive society' .76 
72 Krzysztof Ziarek would almost certainly object at this point in order to defend Heidegger from such 
an imputation. According to Ziarek, and based on until recently unpublished essays from the late 
1930's, Heidegger was aware of the danger of art becoming just another form of oppression, and it 
would be for this reason that he developed the notion of das Machtlose, the 'power-free'. Such a 
Machtlose 'resists', not by means of opposition or critique, but 'by operating otherwise than power' , 
and it would be this rethinking of the potential for radical art that would be at work in his notion of 
~oiesis ('Radical Art', p. 354). 
Adorno, T.W. MinimaMoralia, p. ISO. 
74 It is because of this logic that one must be wary of interpretations, such as that offered by Max 
Paddison, that describe the relation between works of art and instrumentalised society in terms of an 
overcoming or emancipation: 'The sphere of art and of aesthetic experience is seen by Adorno as 
offering a model for emancipation from the dominant mode of instrumental rationality in Western 
society'. (Adorno, Modernism and Mass Culture, p. 49) 
75 Schultz, Karla. Mimesis on the Move: Adorno's Concept of Imitation, p. 179. 
76 Adorno, T. W. The Philosophy of Modem Music, p. 113. We might make a connection between 
what Adorno says here and Carl Dahlhaus' book The Idea of Absolute Music. According to the latter, 
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However, even if the advanced state of new music assures it of its resistive force 
against instrumental reason, it also exposes this music to the problem of its very 
success. New music's technical superiority means it risks outdoing the very mass 
produced products it opposes. It risks becoming, in its turn, itself a 'victim of 
technique' ,77 just another tool of instrumental reason's triumph. If such became the 
case, Schonberg's twelve-tone works, which Adorno here praises for their' didactic 
exemplary character', would become fetishistic,78 and the statement that 'twelve-tone 
technique is truly the fate of music' 79 would announce the catastrophe. 
As we have already seen, Adorno does indeed come to believe that reification is 
twelve-tone's fate, and in fact, it is the very phrase he uses here in praise of it that 
most incisively identifies what is wrong with it. To say that twelve tone works have 
'didactic exemplary character' is to say that such works are models, that they are 
examples to be imitated just as they imitate the forms of repressive society that they 
succumb to. As models, they claim for themselves the very iterative processes of 
mass production they should oppose. In order to avoid such commodification, works 
of art must instead resist imitability, and to do this, they must be more than strictly 
technical, more than simply the product of the most advanced material. 
The exemplarity of such latter works would still rely upon their resemblance to 
repressive society, but also upon their protest against this resemblance, their self-
conscious assertion of their aesthetic difference. It is this difference that makes them' 
inimitable, makes them of the 'same essence as the dialectic exterior to them but 
[resembling] it without imitating it'. 80 The challenge of this difference is that the 
Adorno conceives of music as a 'language above language', a language of 'absolute music'. As he puts 
it, basing himself on Adorno's essay 'Fragment tiber Musik und Sprache', 'Adorno endows fleeting 
intuition, such as music supplies at some moments, with a trust he withholds from an "instrumentalized 
language corrupted by decayed social practice'" (p. 116). 
77 Ibid., p. 115. One might object, as Tom Huhn argues in 'Kant, Adorno, and the Social Opacity of 
the Aesthetic', that Adorno makes a distinction between technology, as 'the application and increasing 
centrality of instrumental rationality to human praxis' and technique, whose appearance feels 'like the 
magic of not being subject to means-end rationality', such that makes it impossible to be a victim of 
technique as I am understanding it. However, this objection is flawed since it itself imagines technique 
as 'the dialectical over-coming of technology' , and thus as a potential new coercive force (p. 251). 
78 Ibid., pp 115 and 111, respectively. The latter reads: 'The self-determined law of the row truthfully 
becomes a fetish at the point when the conductor relies upon it as the source of meaning' . 
79 Ibid., pp 67-8. 
80 Adorno, T.W. Aesthetic TheOlY, p. 5. 
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more these works come to resemble society, the harder it becomes to determine 
whether this resemblance is a resented similarity (and thus, protest) or a flattering 
likeness (and thus, reconciliation). Adorno's consciousness of this dilemma leads him 
to insist again and again that we must have 'the faculty of the ear to perceive what is 
right or wrong,81 in works of art, and thereby the ability to aesthetically distinguish 
between serious works of art and those willing to reconcile themselves with modem 
society. Such an aesthetic distinction saves the former from simply being 
instrumentalised society's latest achievement and model for further dominance. It is, 
as Peter Osborne puts it, an "'aesthetic identity" [that] is of a qualitatively different 
order to the repressive identification inherent in conceptual thought'. 82 
We should note, however, that what this 'aesthetic identity' relies upon, is a 'second-
order', and somewhat indescribable, ability to recognise necessity-and more 
specifically the necessity of the ascendancy of ins trumentali sed society. That is,just 
as we are to recognise any given chord as 'a vehicle of the total context-indeed, for 
the total direction',83 we are to hear in new music the necessity of the dominance of 
instrumental rationality itself In fact, works of art are precisely what would allow us 
to recognise that there was any dominance at all. Very much in the way Holderlin's 
work can be said to establish the rule of empty exemplarity, serious works of art 
would reveal to us the dominance of instrumental rationality.84 And if everything-
including works of art-exemplified this dominance, it would only be serious works 
of art which, by their critical character, could offer us the hope that there could be an 
exception to its rule. 85 
In this perspective, twelve-tone works betray hope by no longer requiring the 
receptivity to necessity. Rather than hear necessity in them, all we make out are the 
instrumental demands of matter and form. Rather than strive for an exceptional 
81 Adorno, T.W. The Philosophy of Modem Music, p.36. 
82 Osborne, Peter. 'Adorno and the Metaphysics ofModemism: The Problem of a "Postmodem" Art', 
f' 31 (my emphasis). 
3 Adorno, T.W. The Philosophy of Modem Music, p. 36. 
84 It is important to note the asymmetry of this analogy in terms of naming, because it reveals a 
difference between Heidegger and Adorno's thought. Whereas, Heidegger tends to undermine the 
exemplarity ofH6lderlin's work by naming it in advance, Adorno is more likely (though, not certain) 
to keep the relation of exemplar open to our receptivity to it. 
85 It is precisely the fact that serious works of art must also conform to this necessity-rather than 
trying to evade it-that would attest to the full extent of instrumental reason's dominance. 
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exemplarity, they settle with simply being exemplary. They fall victim to the very 
longing for dominance that Adorno would reject in Heidegger. This danger of 
'exemplary didactic character' causes Adorno to tum against twelve-tone technique, 
and in 1964 to call it 'the first great phenomenon of relief in new music', denouncing 
it for helping 'to accomplish what the ear could not achieve at every momenf86-that 
is, for denying the need for our aesthetic appreciation of necessity. 87 By this shift, 
Adorno highlights his position as philosopher with regard to works of art. He 
responds directly to changes in his perception, and rather than try to disguise his 
voice, he openly questions his relation to works of art, reconsidering, for instance, the 
historical necessity that could have led to the development of twelve-tone technique: 
'Still, the attempts at relief have their sound reason-precisely that the 
difficulties of composing out of pure freedom, out of a kind of all-sided 
actuality of hearing, are now scarcely surmountable. That was possible, 
evidently, only during the short period of the explosion, during the heroic 
period of the new music, as it comprises the middle works of 
Schonberg'. 88 
What this passage presents is two directions Adorno's thought takes after twelve-tone 
technique's exposure as only didactically exemplary. As we know from the previous 
chapter, one strand stays focused on exemplary works, and tries to revive the tension 
of the 'heroic period' in the form of a projected musique in/ormel/e, which could be 
exemplary in the fashion of 1910. However, such a direction leaves unchanged the 
dynamic between exemplary works of art and instrumental reason, such that works of 
art continue to run the risk of becoming victims of their own success in the ambiguous 
manner of twelve-tone technique. For this reason, in this chapter we are rather going 
to consider another strand in Adorno's thought, one that takes into account the 
'scarcely surmountable' difficulties presented by late modernity. It addresses the 
rejection by works of art of their very exemplarity. For if serious works of art are 
indeed 'windowless monads', whose' dynamic, [and] immanent historicity ... is of the 
86 Adorno, T.W. 'Difficulties: 1. In Composing', p. 655. 
87 Basing himseJfupon Adorno's links to the Kantian project, J.M. Bernstein proposes even giving 
this need for aesthetic appreciation an ethical dimension. See 'Why Rescue Semblance? Metaphysical 
Experience and the Possibility of Ethics' . 
88 Adorno, T.W. 'Difficulties: 1. In Composing', p. 654. 
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same essence as the dialectic exterior to them' ,89 the most illuminating situation 
would not necessarily be the existence of exemplary works (whether exceptionally so, 
or not) as much as their lack. This potential absence of examples would point 
negatively to the crisis that Adorno sees facing modem society as a result of the 
ascendancy of instrumental reason. For him, what we face is a 'crisis of semblance' , 
in which the very possibility of works of art falls into doubt. 
Crisis of semblance 
The crisis of semblance characterises a situation inhospitable in the extreme to works 
of art. Furthermore, in accordance with Adorno's notion of 'increasing nominalism', 
the gravity of this situation deepens with each passing day, such that it seems only a 
matter time before works of art will no longer be possible at all. Whether this 
catastrophe will arrive today, tomorrow or at some point in the more distant future is 
obviously not a question Adorno is able to address. Nevertheless, its menace explains 
why it must be 'a principle of method' that 'light should be cast on all art from the 
vantage point of the most recent artworks' .90 This is not simply a caveat thrown in by 
Adorno to defend his ideas from their own ageing, nor simply an entreaty to others to 
continue his work by supplementing it with ever new examples. It is fundamentally a 
warning: if we do not examine the most recent works, we may miss the chance to 
catch sight of the catastrophe, with the consequence that we will continue to believe 
that there are exemplary works of art when in fact there are none. It is in this 
cautionary spirit that the section entitled 'The Crisis of Semblance' in Aesthetic 
Theory is suffused with negative examples. Failure rather than success marks 
engagement with the constraints of the crisis. But how could it be otherwise? It is 
only in failure that the crisis of semblance allows any development at all. Gregg 
Horowitz addresses this aspect of the dialectic of works of art in his essay' Art 
History and Autonomy', tracing it back to the notion of the autonomy of aesthetic 
judgement as it is first conceived of by Kant. According to Horowitz, it is 'the failure 
to win [the dialectical war] that keeps art in motion, keeps it unreconciled, thus 
battling against the realm of external determination, which itself grows more obdurate 
89 Adorno, T.W. Aesthetic Theory, p. 5. 
90 Adorno, T.W. Aesthetic Theory, p. 359. 
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with each failure. Art, far from dying of failure, would die of success' .91 What this 
means is that we can only ever really experience exemplary works of art as their loss. 
Only in the traces of works-traces, which are themselves very much like the fading 
sparkles of the fireworks that Adorno calls models for works of art92 -can we ever 
perceive a kind of exemplarity that fully acknowledges its own impossibility. 
In this sense, the crisis of semblance is an end of art scenario, whose culminating 
moment comes when a work's rejection of semblance is so complete that the rejection 
itself determines the work's appearance. At this moment, a work of art ceases to be a 
work of art and becomes either mere fantasy or a simple thing. That is, at one 
extreme of the dialectic, works of art flee into phantasmagoria; they attempt to elude 
the dialectic that would call them illusions by becoming nothing but. However, even 
though this flight into fantasy occurs as a protest 'against the bourgeois maxim that 
everything must be useful' ,93 it risks falling impotent by turning works of art into 
mere kitsch. As a reaction against this danger and at the other extreme, then, works 
attempt, not simply to outwit their illusory character, but to go so far as to relieve 
themselves of it altogether. But if they 'succeed' and 'display outwardly what cannot 
become art-canvas and mere tones-[they become their] own enemy, the direct and 
false continuation of purposeful rationality' .94 For in this elimination of their own 
illusoriness, works of art become mere things, easy pawns of instrumental rationality. 
Because works of art cannot indefinitely elude these extremes, their only hope is that 
their aesthetic appearance can bear witness to the crisis itself, that even in 
succumbing, their scars can silently testify against the dominance of instrumental 
rationality. By these scars, works of art show their detested belonging to modem 
society, protesting against it by mirroring its cruelty. This mirroring effect constitutes 
91 Horowitz, Gregg. 'Art History and Autonomy', p. 276. 
92 Adorno, T.W. Aesthetic Theory, p. 81: 'The phenomenon of fireworks is prototypical for artworks, 
though because of its fleetingness and status as empty entertainment it has scarcely been acknowledged 
by theoretical consideration'. 
93 Ibid, p. 104. 
94 Ibid., p. 103. It is interesting to note that the type of works Adorno uses to elucidate this regression 
are precisely those most contemporary with Aesthetic Theory itself: happenings and conceptual art. We 
can either read this as the failure of Adorno to live up to his own 'principle of method', or take it as 
evidence of the catastrophe projected by Adorno's thought. However, the latter would also open up the 
possibility that Adorno's notion of the catastrophe is today's idea of pluralistic post-modernity. 
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'[ t ]he difference of artworks from the empirical world, their semblance character'. 95 
Because of this special character, works of art are not simply indifferent examples of 
instrumentalised society, but rather examples that protest against their very 
exemplarity. Their fading existence reflects the hope that instrumentalised society 
itself will also wane. 
Thus, and somewhat paradoxically, works of art can only really be exemplary in the 
radical sense projected by Adorno's theory at the moment they cease to be exemplary. 
Rather than see works of art as exemplarily reliable, Adorno rejects Heidegger's hope 
of an artistic overcoming of instrumentality. Accordingly, we cannot imagine that 
works of art have the last word any more than we can solve 'the antinomy of aesthetic 
semblance by means of a concept of absolute appearance', that is, by means of a 
transcendence of art over reality.96 Instead, and much like the quiet that accumulates 
at the end of Erwartung as the voice of each instrument volatilises into a bubble of 
tones, the most exemplary work lies in the echo that follows the last sounded note. 
Such mute resonance speaks volumes in spite of its inability to speak, and for Adorno 
what it speaks of is the 'powerless hope' that alone 'allows us to draw a single 
breath,.97 
* 
It is not irrelevant that a piece of music provides the most fitting evocation for this 
peculiar exemplarity of works of art-this exemplarity that anticipates a lack of 
examples. For music occupies an extreme position in the crisis of semblance. Its 
distance from mimesis and representational illusion means that a 'measure of the 
intenSity of the crisis of semblance is that it has befallen music'. 98 Music serves, in 
other words, as a sort of limit case in the crisis of semblance, and it is for this reason 
that we should not be surprised to find Adorno beginning and ending his 
consideration of the latter by speaking of music. In fact, these introductory and 
95 Ibid The ambiguity of mimesis in Adorno's thought is considered by Martin Jay in his essay 
'Mimesis and Mimetology: Adorno and Lacoue-Labarthe'. He sums it up by saying Adorno 'practices 
a trauerliche Wissenschaft' in which mimesis plays a necessary but insufficient part' (p. 45). 
96 Ibid 
97 Adorno, T.W. MinimaMoralia, p. 121. 
98 Adorno, T.W. Aesthetic Theory, p. 100 (my emphasis). 
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concluding passages provide us a manner of summarising the exemplarities of works 
of art. 
The initial concern in 'Crisis of Semblance' is none other than the problem of 
integrally constructed music as it is posed by the works of Schonberg: 'The 
emancipation from the concept of harmony has revealed itself to be a revolt against 
semblance',99 he says. This revolt points to the fundamental problematic of the crisis 
of semblance, which is art's unwillingness to engage in the illusion that makes it 
resemble reality without simply imitating it. Harmony offered the illusion of the 
whole, which would separate a work from the reality it otherwise participates in. 
Without harmony music risks disintegrating into mere sounds just as when 'viewed 
under the closest scrutiny, the most objectivated paintings metamorphose into a 
swarming mass and texts splinter into words'. 100 Nevertheless, this slide into 
thingness is not without hope, because as Adorno points out, '[ c ]onstruction inheres 
tautologically in expression, which is its polar opposite'. 101 In this way, he raises the 
possibility that expression will still resonate even as total construction transforms 
music into mere collections of sounds. 
Such hope arises from the pathos Adorno sees as essential to aesthetic seriousness-
the pathos, if we recall from our first chapter, that results in the confrontation between 
the objectivity of musical material and the subjectivity of a composer, who is 
necessarily insufficient to those objective demands. 102 In other words, as long as the 
crisis of semblance persists, serious music will be possible, but at the point it simply 
appears-either as a collection of sounds or as fantastical kitsch-it will cease to be 
serious. What we must watch for is this moment of appearance, because it marks the 
disappearance of serious works, the exemplarity of a lack of examples. That is, for 
Adorno, serious works of music are most exemplary precisely in their moment of self-
denial. And they are such because their dying word-if such a thing can indeed be 
overheard--would be an expression of their truth content, of their will to expression 
even in a society that eliminates its possibility. Adorno tries to capture this notion of 
99 Ibid 
100 Ibid, p. 101. 
101 Ibid, p. 100. 
102 Consider for example the passage cited in chapter one from the section entitled, 'Experiment (II): 
Seriousness and Irresponsibility': The' serious in art is the pathos of an objectivity that confronts the 
individual with what is more and other than he is in his historically imperative insufficiency' (pp 38-9). 
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expression when speaks of its analogies with the technical term, espressivo, as it 
appears 'as musical indication'. What he notes is that the latter usage 'demands 
nothing specifically expressed, no particular emotional content'. 103 As such, if the 
expression of the truth content of works of art approaches espressivo, it is in the sense 
that their denial of any particular content is their refusal to negotiate their survival in 
instrumentalised society. For Adorno, it is this possibility for expression even in 
dissolution which marks the most remarkable exemplarity of works of art. 
Such exemplarity goes beyond that proposed by either Nietzsche or Heidegger-or 
even Adorno himself in some of his other writings. It represents a utopianism that 
goes beyond a challenge to instrumentality to the refusal to accept anything less than 
its disappearance. Unlike Nietzsche who is willing to accept utility as long as it is 
useful to himself-that is, makes him productive-Adorno sees even the utility of 
life-affirmation as menaced by an emotional free reign that can only find its voice in 
phantasmagoria and kitsch. And unlike Heidegger, Adorno does not accept any 
dominance by works of art, since this could not be anything other than 
instrumentality's latest achievement. 104 But where, we must ask, would this hoped for 
disappearance leave the philosopher? Isn't the promise of utopia also the promise of 
his chance to become the last philosopher of art? The question may seem unfair; it is 
a question that requires the very instrumentality-the very question of the satisfaction 
of individual ends-that the theory is supposed to eliminate. And yet, we must at 
least provisionally keep ourselves open to such a question, because if we don't, we 
miss the chance to glimpse what happens to the artist when his work becomes so 
utopianly exemplary. 
103 Ibid, p. 104. 
104 This is an interpretation more or less consonant with Alain Badiou's critique ofHeidegger-the 
latter's, as he puts it, 'anti-"nihlistic" nihilism', which consists of 'the hypothesis of a return of the 
Gods, of an event wherein the mortal danger to which the annihilating will exposes Man-technology's 
civil servant-would be surpassed' (Manifesto for Philosophy, pp 57 and 51 respectively). 
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chapter six 
The counter-exemplarity of the artist 
In this final chapter we will investigate the duality of the exemplarity of the artist, 
seeing how the exemplarity of the work of art renders the artist a counter-example, an 
example of what not to do. 
L' obliteration 
In the previous chapter we posed the question: 'Where is the philosopher?' In this 
one, we must pose its complement, and ask 'Where is the artist?' We must ask 
because the types of exemplarity which occupied us in the previous chapter 
paradoxically require that works of art be independent from those who create them-
only as autonomous do they escape being simple instances of an artist's oeuvre-and 
yet if their autonomy is taken too far, their exemplarity-if not their very existence-
is threatened. That is, Nietzsche's argument in favour of Carmen requires that the 
focus be put, not upon what inspired Bizet to compose, but upon how the finished 
opera inspires Nietzsche himself to think; if he had had to concern himself with 
Bizet's intentions, he would not have seen the opera as being exemplary in the 
exceptional fashion he does. At the same time however, Carmen's exceptional 
exemplarity depends upon its very authorship; its critical import depends essentially 
upon the fact that it is not composed by Wagner. Similarly, the 'saving power' of 
Holderlin's word depends upon its withdrawal into its own essence, and thus away 
from the poet, and yet Heidegger would never have been able to identify it as 
Holderlin's word, and thus to understand it in terms of its essential poetising, without 
reference to the poet. As such, even though the exemplarities of works of art call for 
the suppression of the reference to the artist, they also bring this very suppression into 
question. Because if denied a relation to their createdness, works of art become 
indistinguishable from manufactured products and mere things, the separation 
between works and artists can never be complete. Rather, the exemplarities of works 
of art make the contradictory demand that artists be both present in and absent from 
their works. They make us wonder, 'Where is the artist?' 
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Moreover, it is only under the scrutiny of philosophers that this demand comes fully 
into perspective, because it is only in relation to the problem of a philosopher's voice 
that such an absent presence on the part of an artist becomes exemplary. To explain: 
as we discovered in the previous chapter, a central aspect of works' exemplarity 
consists in their relation to instrumentality, their promise that our relations with the 
world can be more than just means undertaken to achieve ends. As such, the hope 
that they offer a philosopher is that when he raises his voice, that he is not simply 
making use of a tool in the service of argumentation, but directly engaging the world. 
However, if it is exemplary works of art that offer this hope, then it is the lingering 
presence of artists in them that threatens to undermine it. For, this presence brings out 
the made-ness of works of art, the fact that they themselves are the end results of 
productive activities, which could in this light be seen as means. For this reason, 
philosophers search for traces of the withdrawal of artists from their works, to the 
point of seeing the works themselves as demanding this withdrawal. In this search, 
the exemplarity of works becomes inseparable from a kind of counter-exemplarity of 
artists, whereby the latter's lingering presence constitutes an example of what not to 
do, the admission of the failure of artists to create works that truly speak for 
themselves. A philosopher who identifies this counter-exemplarity could be said to 
engage in Heidegger's notion of 'genuine criticism', an effort to 'become free for the 
supreme exertion of thinking' ,1 a thinking that does indeed speak for itself. 
According to Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, in order to arrive at such a thinking, what 
this' genuine criticism' must undertake is a strategy of' obliteration'. In it, what is at 
stake is the voice of the author, the fact that he is a '''subject'' of writing' .2 The latter 
poses a problem because thought, as it is undertaken by a 'subject', is always 
essentially incomplete and incompletable, always haunted by the saying of its saying. 
And as such, rather than offer a thought of Being that is safely 'anonymous', 3 it 
reminds us that thought must be said, and as a consequence, must be said by a certain 
1 Heidegger, M. Nietzsche: The Will to Power as Art, pp 4-5. 
2 Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe. 'Obliteration', p. 93. It should be noted that Lacoue-Labarthe develops 
the notion of 'obliteration' in the context of his reading ofHeidegger's writings on Nietzsche, and thus 
it would seem misplaced to think of it as a possible philosophical strategy with regards to artists. And 
yet, this strategy is aimed precisely at the literary aspect of philosophy-the fact that it is writing-and 
thus to the extent that a philosopher recognises a thinking by art, as these thinkers do, then an 'erasure 
of the letter' may be the best, or even only, hope of revealing it. 
3 Ibid., p. 78. 
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person, at a certain time and in a certain context. By means of the strategy of 
obliteration, then, what a philosopher does is to address the saying of saying, the 
unsaid of the said. He does so by taking up the task of thought as it is initiated by a 
'subject of writing', but rather than echo it in interpretation, he returns to its origin 
and attempts to speak its speaking. In this way, he undertakes a kind of 'erasure of 
the letter' ,4 an exclusion ofthe subject from his words with the hopes of freeing 
thought for itself. In this, the philosopher takes the subject of writing both seriously 
and not seriously, both as a model that must be accounted for and as the derided 
object of that very account. As such, what he obliterates becomes by this very 
obliteration, a counter-example. 
Exemplary duty 
We should note, though, the creative character of this strategy, because it precludes us 
thinking of obliteration as a simple appropriation of artworks on the part of a 
philosopher. The exclusion of an artist from his works is not simple theft, if for no 
other reason that the exclusion itself is the acknowledgement that the artist has 
achieved something that would be worthy of such theft. 5 Rather, obliteration appears 
as a sort of ethical demand, a kind of 'exemplary' duty. In that, as Kant puts it, 
nothing is 'more fatal to morality than that we should wish to derive it from 
examples' ,6 obliteration is a manifestation of that paradoxical duty, which is our duty 
to reject examples. Such a duty is not limited to philosophers: Adorno identifies 
Schonberg'S engagement with it in his essay on the latter's Serenade, op. 24. In a 
defence of Schonberg against the accusation of empty playfulness, he explains: 
'Schonberg the revolutionary has not sacrificed the forms in order to make himself 
less constrained: Revolt and unconstraint were duty to him, because the forms 
disintegrated,.7 In other words, as the forms disintegrate, and with them all models 
4 Ibid, p. 60. 
S Precisely the same comment would be appropriate in the original context of the notion of 
'obliteration'. We cannot think of reading another philosopher for his ideas as simple theft, because it 
is only in our adoption of these ideas that the latter have any life. 
6 Kant, Immanuel. Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, p. 26. 
7 Adorno, T.W. 'Schonberg: Serenade, op. 24 (1)', p. 327: 'Nicht hat Schonberg der Aufhihrer die 
Formen geopfert, urn sich ungebundener selbst zu geben: Aufruhr und Ungebundenheit wurden ihm zu 
Pflicht, wei! die Formen verfielen'. 
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for imitation, it is Schonberg's duty to step in and hasten the disappearance, to act in a 
revolutionary manner so as to eliminate even the possibility of their return. In 
Passions: 'An Oblique Offering " Jacques Derrida makes similar observations as 
regards our duty more generally when he points out that once duty is involved in an 
action, it is no longer possible to simply follow examples: 'Morality, decision, 
responsibility, etc., require that one act without rules, and hence without example: that 
one never imitates'. 8 However, what Derrida also notes is the impossibility for duty 
to ever exclude exemplarity altogether. The very ritualistic and normative nature of 
duty means that we only know our duty by means of examples, and as a consequence 
duty makes the contradictory demand that we act in a way that is both 'singular and 
exemplary,9-singular to the extent that our actions exclude exemplarity, exemplary 
to the extent that they must be recognisable as our duty. 
In this light, obliteration offers a particularly acute manifestation of 'exemplary' duty, 
of our duty to reject examples. This because obliteration is simultaneously an 
acknowledgement of success-of the fulfilment of duty through the rejection of the 
empty imitation of past models-and a condemnation of this very success as a 
failure-of the fact that by creating such singular works, a creator becomes, in his 
turn, a model of exemplary duty, a model of precisely that duty which is the rejection 
of models. As such, when Schonberg takes up his revolutionary duty to reject past 
forms, this very behaviour risks becoming itself an example, a model of our 
exemplary duty to reject examples. Moreover, if it does become a model for 
imitation, then it loses the singularity-the revolutionary force-that made it 
exemplary in the first place. Anyone who .followed his model, would, by this very 
imitation, deny his model, the model of our exemplary duty to act without example. 10 
What a philosopher tries to achieve by means of the strategy of obliteration, then, is to 
preserve the possibility of exemplary duty by rescuing it from imitation. That is, 
unlike an artist who always risks undermining exemplary duty by means of his 
imitation of other artists-no matter how much an artist tries to follow Kant's 
exhortation 'that genius is entirely opposed to the spirit of imitation' , he has no way 
8 Derrida, J. Passions, p. 31 (footnote 10). 
9 Ibid, p. 9. 
10 This is a restating of the problem oflegacy as we addressed it in chapter two. 
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of recognising his exemplary duty except by reference to the model of another 
artist1J-a philosopher, by contrast, hopes to recognise his exemplary duty in an artist 
without treating it as a model for imitation. Because he only acknowledges an artist's 
exemplarity negatively, only in its failure, a philosopher hopes to avoid imitating. He 
hopes, by engaging in philosophical thought rather than art, to avoid repeating the 
error of creating works that must struggle for their autonomy. 12 In this way, by 
making an example of the very exemplarity of artists-by means of the counter-
exemplarity of an artist-a philosopher strives to preserve the possibility of 
exemplary duty, and with it the possibility of duty itself. Such a strategic move 
echoes Derrida's observation as regards Kant; that when the latter attempts to salvage 
duty faced with its necessary rejection of examples: 'Is it by chance that, touching on 
this logic, Kant quotes, but against the example, the very example of passion, of a 
moment of the sacrificial passion of Christ who provides the best example of what it is 
necessary not to do [my emphasis], namely to offer oneself as an example'. 13 
Solicitous to not offer himself as an example, therefore~ a philosopher cites against the 
example. He cites the example to reject the example. By this dual movement of 
acknowledgement and refusal, a philosopher exposes an artist to the question of 
taking seriously in a way that a judgement of simple approval or opprobrium never 
could. That is, whether taken seriously or not, a counter-exemplary artist can never 
be simply dismissed as bad nor straightforwardly hailed as good. And even though 
the notion of counter-exemplarity entails an explicit reference to artists' failure, such 
failure only exists as an opening to future possibility, and never as an inadequation 
with regard to past expectations. In fact, any judgement of works that would want to 
11 Kant, Immanuel. Critique oj Judgement, p. 151. Those familiar with Kant's passages on genius 
might want to protest that for Kant, it is not the genius, whose exemplarity must be recognised, but that 
of his works. For Kant works are indeed 'models' that 'ought not spring from imitation, but must serve 
as a standard or rule of judgement for others' (pp 150-51). However, even ifworks are models in 
Kant's thinking, this does not preclude the genius being one as well. In fact, the genial artist provides a 
very important model, without which 'beautiful art' would not be possible at all. Only if nature does 
indeed 'give the rule to art' through genius, can a work of art be beautiful 'in the mere act ojjudging it' 
(pp 150 and 149, respectively). Without the genius to serve as a model ofthe unique mode of beautiful 
art's creation-its imperviousness to the pleasures of charms and emotions-we could never be sure of 
its existence. As such it is no surprise that Kant himself calls the genial 'talent' that makes this 
creation possible 'exemplary' (p. 162). For more on Kant and the exemplarity of the genius, see lM. 
Bernstein's critique in The Fate oj Art, particularly pp 89-109. 
12 Since my development depends upon Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe's notion of' obliteration', it is 
important to note that his term identifies precisely the impossibility for philosophy to attain these hopes 
and overcome the '''subject'' of writing'. 
13 Derrida, l Passions, p. 31 (footnote 10). 
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distinguish between good and bad art itself depends upon counter-exemplarity, just as 
all Christian ethics depends upon Christ's counter-exemplary death on the Cross. 14 
As such, the distinction between 'serious' modem composers such as Schonberg and 
'bad' composers ofthe culture industry depends precisely upon us taking seriously the 
taboos imposed by the former. That is, only if we take seriously the notion that 
Schonberg makes it impossible to make music in the traditional mould can we 
criticise 'bad' musicians for doing so. Furthermore, we should not confuse our terms, 
because even though these 'bad' musicians exemplify what should not be done, they 
are not counter-exemplary. Their negative exemplarity is in no way singular, and in 
no way a fulfilment of duty. 
The counter-exemplary artists of the Republic 
The irony, then, of the counter-exemplarity ofthe artist is that it allows the best of 
artist to be singled out for the most abuse. We have already touched on this as regards 
the 'case of Wagner', 15 but it is perhaps even more notable in the case of the most 
famous of counter-exemplary artists, the artists expelled from the Republic by Plato. 
In the Republic, it would only be those capable of creating lifelike resemblances who 
could be considered deserving of the philosopher's sanction. It would be silly to 
castigate as deception the work of a painter so inept that one could never be taken in 
by its illusion. Moreover, the emphasis upon successful mimesis in Plato must be 
understood as part of a larger effort to work out the relation between mimesis and 
exemplarity. Most recently, the person who has perhaps best examined this relation is 
(again) Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe. In his book Heidegger, Art and PolitiCS, he 
14 It is tempting to pause here, though, and consider this relation between counter-exemplarity and 
judgments of good and bad, and to ask what this implies about our judgment as regards the counter-
exemplary event itself. Can a Christian, for example, ever imagine the passion of Christ being judged 
bad? To some extent, the answer is no, because the event itself precedes and founds, and thus exceeds, 
any judgment that follows from it. Nevertheless, it is important to note that such an understanding 
depends upon the event itself being considered total, and absolutely exclusionary, and yet the event 
must make an exception as regards its own exemplarity (even as counter-exemplary), and as suc~ a 
remainder of singular exemplarity always persists to bring the original event into question as total, 
opening the possibility of other counter-exemplary events, which could in turn give rise to different 
judgements. 
15 David E. White refers to this irony in his essay 'Who is Parsifal's "pure fool"?: Nietzsche on 
Wagner' when he says: 'Whatever faults Wagner had were, for Nietzsche, precisely on account of his 
greatness, not because his artistic value was superseded by that of another composer presently on the 
scene' (p. 204). 
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explains-acknowledging the simplification-that 'at least since Plato, education or 
training, political Bildung, has been thought taking the mimetic process as starting 
point', and as such always 'thought on the basis of what the Romans were to 
understand as exemplarity' .16 In this consideration, 'the model (the example)' makes 
the 'ever paradoxical' demand: 'imitate me in order to be what you are' .17 It is 
through this paradoxical demand that exemplarity and mimesis play their role in the 
two thousand year old 'dream of the City as work of art' . 18 In investigating this 
dream, as it is initiated by Plato, what we want to highlight is the essential role of the 
relation between philosopher and artist. When we read Plato, what we want to 
question is less his political project than why he takes artists so seriously as to make 
them part of it in the first place. 
To do so, we must initially note that in the Republic, Plato has recourse to the 
illustrative aspect of art in several ways, and in fact one could say that his whole 
argument-ultimately turned against art-bases itself on art's exemplarity. Right at 
the beginning of the infamous dialogue in Book X where Plato outlines the dangerous 
deceptiveness of art, he starts with an example. He has no choice. The relation 
between the Forms and their manifestations in the real world is one of exemplarity: 
the Form of, let's say Table since that is one of Plato's first examples, encompasses 
the class, Table, and all of the characteristics that make up table-ness. Any particular 
table, then, is an example of this class, and it has in relation to its class the exclusive 
inclusiveness that Giorgio Agamben cites as characteristic of examples. In other 
words, a particular table, precisely by being a particular table, is excluded from the 
Form (i.e. class) Table, but at the same time, this particularity that excludes it is what 
includes in the class Table as an example. The implication of this is that Plato can 
only take for granted that there are such things as Forms, because he can name 
particular things that are examples of them: 
'Well then, shall we proceed as usual and begin by assuming the existence 
of a single essential nature or Form for every set of things which we call 
by the same name? Do you understand? 
16 Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe. Heidegger, Art and Politics, pp 80 and 81, respectively (his emphasis). 
17 Ibid, p. 81. 
18 Ibid, p. 66. 
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'I do. 
'Then let us take any set of things you choose. For instance there are any 
number of beds or of tables, but only two Forms, one of Bed and one of 
Table'. 19 
I include the italics in order to emphasize the fact that taking examples is an intrinsic 
part of the establishment of the Forms. 
After this establishment, Plato's next move is to take up the seemingly unrelated topic 
of producing beds and tables. However, this constitutes, in fact, the groundwork for 
another class of examples, namely those related to techne, or art. As has been pointed 
out by innumerable commentators, the Greeks did not make the same distinction 
between art and manufacture that we do today, and rather the two were linked 
together under the notion of making or producing, of techne. In this way, it is 
perfectly reasonable to consider the craftsman who makes a table and the painter who 
paints a picture of it, as examples of the same group. One sees this relation explicitly 
in the introduction of the artist: 'what name would you give to a craftsman who can 
produce all the things made by every sort of workman?' 20 As such, a painter is an 
example of a craftsman just as a carpenter is; and whereas the latter makes a bed out 
of wood, the former makes a bed in his way, as described in the following: 
'There is no difficulty; in fact there are several ways in which the thing 
can be done quite quickly. The quickest perhaps would be to take a 
mirror and tum it round in all directions. In a very short time you could 
produce sun and stars and earth and yourself and all the other animals and 
plants and lifeless objects which we mentioned just now. 
, Yes, in appearance, but not the actual things. 
'Quite so; you are helping out my argument. My notion is that a painter 
is a craftsman of that kind. You may say that the things he produces are 
not real; but there is a sense in which he too does produce a bed' .21 
19 Plato. The Republic of Plato, p. 325 (my emphasis). 
20 Ibid 
21 Ibid (my emphasis). 
Julie Kuhlken Page 190 
Why would a philosopher take an artist seriously? 
third by the painter'. 24 By means of exemplarity, then, Plato creates a chain between 
three levels that makes the class of craftsmen very serious indeed to the viability of 
the Republic. 
Nevertheless, if we look at the nature of the divine craftsman's work, we notice 
something interesting, because all that distinguishes it from that of the others is its 
singularity: 
'Now the god made only one ideal or essential Bed, whether by choice or 
because he was under some necessity not to make more than one; at any 
rate two or more were not created, nor could they possibly come into 
being. 
'Why not? 
'Because, ifhe made even so many as two, then once more a single ideal 
Bed would make its appearance, whose character those two would share; 
and that one, not the two, would be the essential Bed. Knowing this, the 
god, wishing to be the real maker of a real Bed, not a particular 
manufacturer of one particular bed, created one which is essentially 
umque. 
So it appears'. 25 
'So it appears'. So appears the 'single ideal Bed', much as representations of beds 
might be said to appear in the mirror of the painter-craftsman. What Plato wants us to 
focus on is the notion that there is only 'a single ideal Bed', because in his mind, this 
excludes the notion that the divine craftsman is making examples like the carpenter 
and painter. But, in fact, isn't Bed an example of a Form? Isn't any Form an example 
of a Form? And mustn't we imagine that the divine craftsman is busy creating a 
multitude of Forms, all of which would be examples? The answer is yes, and that is 
why Plato must make an example of the artist. 
To explain: Plato is faced with the danger of an infinite regress. If he allows that 
there can be something such as the Form of the Form, that a Form can be an example 
24 Ibid., p. 326 (my emphasis). 
25 Ibid., pp 326-27. 
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of a Form, then there is no end to the possible permutations of the type of a Form as 
an example of a Form as an example of a Form. For this reason, he must argue that 
things cannot be examples of themselves, that Forms are not examples of Forms. To 
do so, he sets up the three levels we have already seen-Bed-bed-'bed'-such that the 
only examples of Bed possible are those made at the level below it. Bed is never an 
example of Bed, any more than bed is ever an example of anything other than Bed. 
However, the problem with this set up is that it cannot be demonstrated at the level of 
Bed and beds. We can never experience the exemplarity of a bed with regard to 
Bed-except possibly metaphorically as in the 'Cave'-and as such, it. can only be 
posited based on an assumption. However, with the painting Plato can show the 
relation convincingly. There the relation of exemplarity is as clear as the mimetic 
similarities between a painting of a bed, i.e. a 'bed', and a 'real' bed. By analogy, 
then, this same relation of exemplarity is said to operate between Bed and bed. As 
such, what we see in Book X is as much a militationfor Forms, as it is a polemic 
against artists. In fact, the exemplarity of the painting or work of art could be 
considered the militation for Forms, and the example of their relation to things in our 
everyday world. 
Nevertheless, it is important not to forget the argument against artists, and particularly 
as it appears in the light of the 'Allegory of the Cave'. There again we see an 
-argument in favour of Forms, but there, rather than pick on art, Plato bases himself on 
it. In order to convince us of the existence of the Forms, what he argues is that life 
itself is like a shadow play, in other words, like art. However, once he has made this 
argument, he cannot very well let artists go on freely making works of art in just any 
old way. In Plato's world view, for example, it would be quite disastrous if artists 
developed non-figurative art. As a result, it is imperative for him to take control of 
what artists do and make sure they don't do anything different from what they have 
done, and what better way than to arrest them, to stop them in their activities on the 
basis of some accusation. The charge, of course, is trumped up, or at the very least a 
Catch-22: artists can only be accused of being deceptive on the basis of the singularity 
of the Forms, but this singularity depends in its tum upon the model created by artists 
themselves. The artists of the Republic, in other words, are guilty of nothing more 
than the capacity to make many examples of different objects. What is wrong with 
such an ability is that it belies the notion that exemplary works of art-and most 
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importantly those of the divine craftsman-must be exceptionally exemplary, that is, 
unique. It is for this reason that Plato must make an example of artists, claim their 
counter-exemplarity, and expel them from the Republic. 
In this light, the counter-exemplary artist is both the most serious and the least serious 
of actors in the Republic. On the one hand, he is the most serious: both because the 
works he creates are exemplary, and because his continued work threatens to 
undermine that very exemplarity. On the other hand, he is the least serious, because, 
once it is established, the Republic can do without him and his services. As indicated 
above, fundamentally artists are expulsed from the Republic because of their success 
in fulfilling their duty, and it is this achievement that philosopher-kings want to keep 
quiet. What, in other words, would be the purpose of a Republic and all its 
mechanisms of control, if its citizens can already fulfil their duty on their own? 
The causa exemplaris 
Just the same, as central as Plato's account is to understanding the relation between 
philosophers and artists, it would seem that his antagonism depends to a great extent 
upon his inflated notions of what artists are capable of Couldn't he save himself 
. from needing to take them so seriously by believing less in the illusory likenesses 
crafted by them? It is a realm for questioning that has undeniable appeal. It allows us 
to wonder, for example, what Plato would have done confronted with modern forms 
of art, whether abstract or conceptual or surreal. What would he have made of 
modern art's assault upon representation? Can we, in other words, imagine a 
Republic that would not depend upon traditional figurative art forms? To some 
extent, the rest of this chapter tries to answer these questions, because all three of the 
thinkers we are concerned with share with Plato two of the most significant elements 
of his thesis: the exemplarity of the work of art, and the counter-exemplarity of the 
artist. How they fundamentally differ from the Greek philosopher, however, is in 
their assumptions about the prowess of artists. They respond directly to lM. 
Bernstein's 'suggestion' that 'there is something deeply enigmatic in the very idea 
that a work can be exemplary ... [and] take up the burden of human significance; and 
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that we unavoidably acknowledge this enigma in acknowledging the risk of failure'. 26 
As such, none of them are willing to accept the premise that artists' seriousness 
depends squarely upon their success. Quite the contrary, they seem to find much 
more food for thought in failure, and in particular the failure of the very best of 
artists. 27 
* 
What, then, we might ask, could be Holderlin's failure in the eyes ofHeidegger? It 
would seem that for the latter Holderlin can do no wrong. In that the poet is able to 
found the very Dasein of a people, it is hard to see how there could be anything 
lacking in his conduct. And yet, there is. Because even though Holderlin' s word is 
'establishing', it can only do this establishingfuturally.28 Holderlin, in other words, is 
unable to speak to us today. And even though Heidegger most often portrays this as 
our problem, our inability to measure up to Holderlin's poetry, it is still reasonable to 
see in Holderlin the particular kind of failure we identified in chapter three as 'Gottes 
F ehl'. If one recalls, 'Gottes F ehl ' is not, as the implication of' F ehl' would make us 
believe, a 'failure to reach in the sense of not-arriving, of falling short of a goal'. 
Rather 'Gottes Fehl' implies a missing due to 'over-shooting' or 'over-revving'. 29 In 
terms ofHolderlin's word, it is a failure.on the part of the poet which keeps us from 
'hearing his word properly in the present-both his and our own. Moreover, because 
'Gottes Fehl' is not simply a single act of missing, but missing 'as attitude' ,30 it 
means that we will not understand Holderlin's word in any conceivable present. 
As it is, therefore, Holderlin's failure is not just any old slip up; it is absolutely 
catastrophic. It brings the whole existence of poets and poetry into question, makes 
26 Bernstein, lM. The Fate of Art, p. 106. 
27 As regards Adorno, Charles Rosen notes this in his essay 'Should we adore Adorno?' and sees it as 
a foretaste of deconstruction: 'In what seems like a forecast of the movement to come of deconstruction 
in criticism, it is the greatness of an artist's failure that awakens Adorno's imagination' (p. 10). 
28 Heidegger, M. Hoiderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und 'Der Rhein', p. 113. Although he does not 
use the term 'futurally' in it, this particular passage very neatly lays out the dynamic between ourselves 
and the poet that we are discussing: 'Das Sagen des Dichters ist stiftend. Unsere Dichtung stiftet und 
grundet einen Ort des Daseins, in dem wir noch nicht stehen, wo aber das dichterische Sagen uns 
hinzwingen will, wohin wir uns bringen, wenn wir das stiftend grundende Sagen, das, was jetzt gesagt 
wird, entsprechend verstehen, d.h. wollen, daB wir auf den Grund kommen der im stiftenden GrUnden 
~elegt wird' . 
9 Ibid, p. 236. 
30 Ibid 
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us wonder why we listen if we are doomed never to understand, and exposes them to 
the glaring light of the question of why we take either of them seriously at all. We 
have already addressed the question of poetry's seriousness in the previous chapter, 
seeing that for Heidegger it is never really in doubt, but this still leaves open the 
question of the poet. In that the fate of poetry is not the fate of poets, the poet's future 
is not so clear. 31 
To understand this future, we must return to the terrain we opened up in the previous 
chapter with the two essays 'The Question Concerning Technology' and 'The Origin 
of the Work of Art'. Only once we understand what happens to the artists and 
artisans in these essays, can we understand what happens to Holderlin himself In 
chapter five, we saw how an opposition between exemplary utility and common 
instrumentality formed the basis of an exemplarity of the work of art-the work of art 
as most reliable equipment. What remains to be worked out here is the implications 
of this exemplarity for the artist. To do so we will consider the respective fates of the 
silversmith responsible for the manufacture of silver sacrificial chalices, the painter 
Van Gogh who creates Shoes, and the shoemaker who presumably made the shoes in 
Shoes. 
We will start by addressing the silversmith because, unlike with the others, Heidegger 
. spends a fair amount of time trying to identify precisely what his role is in the 
manufacture of chalices. This may seem a bit silly, because it would appear very 
straight-forward what a silversmith does-he casts things in silver-and yet 
Heidegger would reject our common sense ideas as missing the essential, as settling 
for a 'correct' instrumental understanding that 'is not yet true'. 32 The truth is that an 
instrumental understanding of technology33 takes just one of the four causes at work 
in causality, the causa efficiens-usually thought of as the human activity that, as a 
means, results in a certain end-and lets it set 'the standard for all causality' .34 What 
31 This is a reference to our argument in chapter one about 'HolderIin and the Essence of Poetry' , in 
which Heidegger doubly poses the question of taking seriously in tenns of the poet and poetry. 
32 Heidegger, M. 'The Question Concerning Technology', p. 6. 
33 On p. 4, Heidegger gives his version of this understanding, saying: 'We ask the question concerning 
technology when we ask what it is. Everyone knows the two statements that answer our question. One 
says: Technology is a means to an end. The other says: Technology is a human activity. The two 
definitions of technology belong together. For to posit ends and procure and utilize the means to them 
is a human activity' . 
34 Ibid, p. 7. 
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Heidegger says we must do, by contrast, is to take all four causes into account. The 
four are causa materialis, causa formalis, causa finalis, and causa efficiens, and what 
is particularly important is Heidegger's effort to reduce the disproportionate influence 
of the last upon our thinking. To this end, he makes two seemingly contradictory 
statements about causa efficiens. In the first, he appears to echo the common sense 
notion that would equate the causa efficiens with the silversmith: it is that 'which 
brings about the effect that is the finished, actual chalice, in this instance, the 
silversmith,.35 In the second, however, he appears to say the exact opposite, rejecting 
the notion that the silversmith is a causa efficiens: 
'Finally there is a fourth participant in the responsibility for the finished 
sacrificial vessel's lying before us ready for use, i.e., the silversmith-but 
not at all because he, in working, brings about the finished sacrificial 
chalice as if it were the effect of a making; the silversmith is not a causa 
efficiens' .36 
Now it is hard to see how we are going to find any chalices 'lying before us ready for 
use' if the silversmith idles about, and yet this is the notion Heidegger wants us to 
swallow, because for him, chalices are not 'caused' by physical work, but by 
intellectual effort. As he puts it, the silversmith's role is to be responsible for 
"pondering' upon 'the "that" and the "how" of [the] coming into appearance and into 
play' of the other three causes.37 Moreover, in that the silversmith's pondering does 
not by itself determine either the 'that' or the 'how', he, as causa efficiens, in no way 
stands above or as superior to the other causes; he is as indebted to them as they are to 
him in the coming into appearance of a chalice. The apparent contradiction, in other 
words, between the two statements depends upon a false understanding of causa 
efficiens; the silversmith is not a causa efficiens in a false, instrumental sense. 
As such, what Heidegger is saying is that the silversmith is not so much a doer, as he 
is a thinker. But because this forces him into a comparison with none other than the 
thinker of Being himself, much in the way that Plato forces the artist into the same 
35 Ibid, p. 6. 
36 Ibid., p. 8. 
37 Ibid 
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class as that of the' divine craftsman', this move paves the way for the silversmith's 
dismissal. Obviously, since the silversmith only thinks about the hows and 
wherefores of silver sacrificial chalices, he fares poorly in a comparison with such a 
thinker. His distinctive character as the maker of chalices disappears when his actions 
are precluded by the thought of Being. 
The artist vanishes 
Moreover, the thought of Being can undertake this strategy, because it holds that the 
proper example for all manufacture is not to be found in manufacture at all, but in 
nature. That is, Heidegger's main argument about technology is that 'the essence of 
technology is by no means anything technological', 38 but rather something that should 
be understood according to the model of physis, a 'bringing-forth, e.g., the bursting of 
a blossom into bloom,.39 It is this example, which explains how a chalice can be said 
to arise out of a silversmith's pondering: 'what is brought forth by the artisan or the 
artist, e.g., the silver chalice, has the bursting open belonging to bringing-forth'. 
Furthermore, because in the case of art and artisanship this bursting open is 'not in 
itself-as in the case of the blossom-'but in another, in the craftsman or artist' ,40 
the example ofphysis has the further implication that an artist's or craftsman's 
creativity is much like the passive fertility of soil awaiting a seed. 
Our question, then, has to be, of course, what provides the seed. However, before we 
answer this-and in order to answer it-we must look at the shoemaker and Van 
Gogh and ask what their role is in the production of Shoes. The answer, strangely 
enough, is none at all. Neither the shoemaker nor Van Gogh can be said to be at work 
in the case of Shoes, because, as we noted in the previous chapter, Shoes both is not 
and are shoes.41 And as such, if we want to assert that Van Gogh has created it then 
we run into the objection that what we are really talking about are shoes, but if we say 
38 Ibid, p. 4. 
39 Ibid, p. 10. 
40 Ibid, pp 10-11. 
41 Ifwe recall, the painting both is not and are shoes, because it serves as an example of the latter. As 
such, it is not a pair of shoes, because it is a representation and not the things themselves. And yet, it 
can serve as an example of a pair of shoes, only because it also is this very representation-and thus 
are shoes. 
Julie Kuhlken Page 198 
Why would a philosopher take an artist seriously? 
that the shoemaker creates them, then we come into conflict with the fact that we are 
engaged with a painting, and not anything that can be worn on the feet. Moreover, 
this embarrassment with regard to who produces Shoes is reflected in the 
philosophical analysis that underpins it. As in the later essay, in 'The Origin of the 
Work of Art' Heidegger addresses the notion of causality; however, whereas the two 
essays echo each other as regards three of the causes, 'The Origin' remains strikingly 
silent when it comes to any notion of a causa efficiens. 42 This is the case-with the 
concomitant confusion about Shoes' authorship as its consequence-because at the 
time of this essay Heidegger does not yet acknowledge the model of physis, and 
instead speaks of the work of art as if it itself is endowed with a natural immediacy: 
speaking of the 'thrust' that' such a work is'. 43 Such a 'thrust' signals the exceptional 
exemplarity of the work of art. It is the displacement that occurs when we leap into 
the hermeneutical circle--4)f the artist, work of art and art-by taking an example of a 
work of art. Only if we submit to this displacement, can we hope 'to transform our 
accustomed ties to the world and to earth, and henceforth to restrain all usual doing 
and prizing, knowing and looking, in order to stay within the truth that is happening in 
the work' .44 By means of this displacement, the confusion between shoes and Shoes 
occurs, such that the artisan and artist vanish. 
Essential sacrifice 
As it turns out, however, the work of art is not the only way in which truth can occur, 
and it is this that finally brings us to Holderlin and the obliteration of the artist. By 
42 In 1953, the exposition of the four causes reads: '(1) the causa materialis, the material, the matter 
out of which, for example, a silver sacrificial chalice is made; (2) the causaformalis, the form, the 
shape into which the material enters; (3) the causafinalis, the end, for example, the sacrificial rite in 
relation to which the chalice required is determined as to its form and matter; (4) the causa efficiens, 
which brings about the effect that is the finished, actual chalice, in this instance, the silversmith' (p. 6). 
In 1935, however, Heidegger only accounts for the first three of these when he explains 'what shoes 
consist of: the causa materialis (wood, leather, or bast), the causaformalis ('joined together by thread 
and nails', for example) and the causafinalis ('such gear serves to clothe the feet') (p. 33). 
43 Heidegger, M. 'The Origin of the Work of Art', p. 66 (Heidegger's emphasis). Ifwe read the 
entire passage where this excerpt appears, we see that Heidegger himself explicitly refers to the 
necessity of this obliteration: 'The more solitarily the work, fixed in the figure, stands on its own and 
the more cleanly it seems to cut all ties to human beings, [my emphasis] the more simply does the 
thrust come into the Open that such a work is, and the more essentially is the extraordinary thrust to the 
surface and the long-familiar thrust down' . 
44 Ibid On the hermeneutical circle and its relation to the exemplary work of art, see previous 
chapter. 
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itself it is no great surprise that truth can occur in ways other than the work of art: if 
truth in works is brought forth like a flower, and as such its seed must be, again if you 
will, planted, it would be odd if artists were the only fertile soil. In 'The Origin of the 
Work of Art', Heidegger acknowledges as much and gives an account of the various 
other ways in which truth can occur: 
'One essential way in which truth establishes itself in the beings it has 
opened up is truth setting itself into work. Another way in which truth 
occurs is the act that founds a political state. Still another way in which 
truth comes to shine forth is the nearness of that which is not simply a 
being, but the being that is most of all. Still another way in which truth 
grounds itself is the essential sacrifice. Still another way in which truth 
becomes is the thinker's questioning, which as the thinking of Being, 
names Being in its question-worthiness' .45 
Now, we can easily recognise three of these happening of truth as the triumvirate of 
the poet, the thinker and the founder of states from the lectures of the year before on 
Germanien and Der Rhein. As for the notion of a 'being that is most of all', 
theological interpretations are tempting, but regardless of whether such readings 
would hold, the notion remains compatible with that of 'die Schaffenden '-i.e. the 
poet, the thinker and the founder of states-since also involving the idea of some sort 
of exceptional being. However, this still leaves the incongruous notion of 'essential 
sacrifice'. Such a notion is not incongruous as a happening of truth; it is not difficult 
to see how sacrifice could be construed as such. Nevertheless, 'essential sacrifice' 
does stick out in this context, because it is the only happening of truth that does not 
depend upon being as much as upon the privation of being. 
Thus, the question is: What is essential sacrifice? Heidegger offers no explanation in 
'The Origin of the Work of Art'. Rather, his concern here is to go on and describe in 
greater detail how truth happens in the work of art. Nevertheless, if we look at this 
discussion in its basic outlines, we notice two things that helps us understand why 
'essential sacrifice' must be included in this context. First, he says: 
45 Ibid, pp 61-2. 
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'Because it is in the nature of truth to establish itself within that which is, in 
order thus first to become truth, therefore the impulse toward the work lies 
in the nature of truth as one of truth's distinctive possibilities by which it 
can itself occur as being in the midst of beings' .46 
Right off, this passage confirms our suspicion that there is something incongruous 
about the notion of 'essential sacrifice': it cannot, like the work of art, 'occur as being 
in the midst of beings'. However, this is not to say that the happening of truth in 
works of art is without conceptual hiccups. Based on this passage, we cannot help but 
ask: if truth does not become truth except by establishing itself in being, how does 
truth occur the first time? In other words, if truth and the work exist such that the 
existence of the one depends upon the other, it is necessary that we address the issue 
of the first work, and with it the first truth. Moreover, their originality is complicated 
by Heidegger's second specification that the 'establishing of truth in the work is the 
bringing forth of a being such as never was before and will never come to be again' .47 
What this means is that the happening of truth in a work of art is unique and singular. 
This is a problem, because if completely realised, there is the risk that we will never 
recognise its truth. As if speaking a language entirely its own, the truth of such works 
of art would appear to us as contingent and idiosyncratic. Only on the basis of a first 
work, a work that could provide a model of truth as it ought to appear in works of art, 
is there any hope of us thinking their truth. As a result, a first work, in addition to 
addressing the hermeneutical problem of origin, must also provide the basis for all 
subsequent works. And to do so, it must sacrifice its own development. Rather than 
be a seed that blossoms on its own, it is a seed whose fertility spurs the flowering of 
subsequent works. As such, this first work is less a work in its own right than a 
demand for works; its self-sacrificial working constitutes essential sacrifice. In its 
essential lack, its failure to ever entirely blossom, essential sacrifice is the call for 
further happenings of truth. 
46 Ibid, p. 62. 
47 Ibid 
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Moreover, because of its sacrifice, because such work cannot be understood in the 
present, and must remain 'unheard', we need the thought of Being to recognise 
essential sacrifice, to recognise that there is something to be heard: 
'To this struggle of the discord between the currently prevailing and 
continuing tones must the firstlings be sacrificed. Those are the poets, 
who in their saying pronounce the futural being of a people in its history, 
and for this reason necessarily remain unheard. 48 
In our philosophical recognition that the poets indeed say 'the futural being of a 
people', we recognise the essential sacrifice that is the poets' obliteration-or more 
specifically, Holderlin's obliteration, for as Heidegger goes on to say, 'Holderlin is 
such a poet', the 'poet of poets'. Moreover, in that we only make this recognition to 
the extent that we see it as our duty to maintain the poet's 'continuing tones', we 
negatively model ourselves upon the poet. We say his saying; but rather than 
sacrifice ourselves in the process, we free ourselves for the future promised by it. 49 In 
this sense, the poet is a counter-example, an example of what not to do that points to 
none other than our duty to reject his example, our duty to not follow him into 
obliteration but to attempt to leap into the future. 
AB with Plato, therefore, Heidegger sees the poet as the most serious and least serious 
of beings. Most serious, because the poet's saying 'pronounces the futural being ofa 
people'; least serious because his essential sacrifice means that he cannot help us 
grasp his very pronouncement. However, unlike the Greek philosopher, Heidegger 
does not assume that our comprehension will ever be complete. Compared with the 
Republic, the futural being conceived of by Heidegger remains a negative possibility, 
most potent in its critical edge-its question concerning technology and the 
technologically dominated world. For him, if the artist is indeed a counter-example, it 
is because in leaving his works to us, the artist is not deceiving us, but undeceiving us. 
48 Heidegger, M. Holder/ins Hymnen 'Genna/lien' und 'Der Rhein', p. 146. 
49 It might be noted that the argument of essential sacrifice outlined here points to a strand of 
Hegelianism in Heidegger's thinking on art. In other words, the notion of the poet of essential sacrifice 
begs the question of how art would continue to be possible after him, and there certainly is ammunition 
for such a reading in Heidegger's work on other artists. Their work can appear as nothing more than 
signposts to Holderlin's more essential activity; whereas, the ontologically significant move passes 
from poetising to thinking, and thus via an end of art, or the capitulation of art to philosophy. 
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Leaving the artist behind 
This last notion, the emphasis upon the truth of works of art, distinguishes Heidegger 
from Nietzsche. Even ifHeidegger does not, like Plato, take art's mimetic capacity as 
the basis for creating a positive philosophical image of the world, he never questions 
the notion that works of art are happenings of truth. It never occurs to him to wonder 
whether the counter -exemplarity of the artist might reflect back poorly upon the 
artist's own works, whether his failure should not make us wonder how seriously we 
should really take his creations. Nietzsche, by contrast, takes up this very question. 
Whereas Heidegger never really imagines that we might dismiss Holderlin's poetry as 
pretentious or affected, as we have seen, Nietzsche exposes Wagnerian opera to 
ridicule, and asks: 'what? was this Parsifal meant to be taken at all seriously? ,50 For 
Nietzsche, the deception wrought by Wagner is part and parcel of the deceptiveness of 
art itself, and the composer's counter-exemplarity is able directly, and even 
negatively, to impact the exemplarity of his works. Yet, this possible counter-
exemplary contamination (of works by artists) is insufficient to make Nietzsche turn 
from works of art altogether. 51 Instead, he undertakes a reconsideration of his relation 
to them. As we saw in the previous chapter, it leads him to develop a notion of 'good' 
versus 'bad' works of art--of Bizet' s Carmen versus Wagner's Parsifal-where the 
former's exceptional exemplarity can be played off against the banal exemplarity of 
the latter. However, in that there is a certain tenuousness to Carmen's exceptional 
exemplarity, it is not surprising to find Nietzsche elsewhere continuing to question the 
seriousness of works of art, and in On the Genealogy of Morals offering a completely 
different version of the exemplarity of works of art and the counter-exemplarity of the 
artist. 
50 Nietzsche, F. On the Genealogy of Morals, p. 79. 
51 Richard Schacht notes Nietzsche's awareness of art's deceptive character, but as he points out this 
does not keep Nietzsche from considering art's importance as regards its creativity: 'What Nietzsche 
here [i.e. in the Will to Power] and elsewhere calls the "lying" in which art traffics is actually only the 
aspect borne by artistic creations when they are viewed in terms of their cognitive import. They cease 
to bear this aspect when that perspective of assessment is abandoned, and art comes to be construed in 
terms of the creativity it involves, rather than the (failing) attempt to apprehend the nature of reality 
and the way things actually (and merely) happen to be'. (,Nietzsche's Second Thoughts About Art', p. 
233) By contrast, Erich Heller, who sees the opposition of truth and lies as central to the question of 
art, cannot help but deem Nietzsche the 'last philosopher of art'. 
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As we said earlier in this chapter, counter-exemplarity very often appears as the 
failure of a great artist, and in this vein, what greater failure could confront Nietzsche 
than that of the artistic idol of his youth? The dominance of Wagner in Nietzsche's 
thinking has been documented by many, and yet it is perhaps still Nietzsche's own 
testimony-that 'one must first be a Wagnerian,52-that most concisely addresses the 
fatal necessity of Wagner for Nietzsche. However, as this testimony states, even if 
one mustfirst be a Wagnerian, one cannot remain a Wagnerian. One must move on 
from Wagner just as surely as one must first embrace him, and the reason one must 
subsequently reject him is because of his counter-exemplarity as an artist. 
To understand this counter-exemplarity we might consider a reading ofthe third essay 
of On the Genealogy a/Morals undertaken by Aaron Ridley. The third essay asks the 
question of the meaning of ascetic ideals, and in particular their meaning for artists. 
What Ridley notices, however, is that in order to answer this question, Nietzsche has 
to construct two aesthetics: one that would address the meaning of ascetic ideals for 
artists such as we usually think of them, artists such as Wagner; and a second that 
would address their meaning for artists understood as 'artists of the soul', whose 
'overfulness' allows them 'to "attain satisfaction" rather than sickness' with 
themselves. 53 Ridley dubs these two aesthetics, respectively, the 'official' and 
'unofficial'versions. According to the official version, ascetic ideals mean 'nothing 
or too many things' ,54 because artists have a bad conscience about their 'true' natures. 
This does not mean, however-as Plato would have it-that artists are at fault for 
some sort of deception. Quite the contrary, the 'true' nature of artists is precisely that 
they are 'unreal and false', and artists could have a good conscious about this if it 
wasn't for their 'typical velleity': their 'fantasy of being an actor in, rather than a 
beautifier of, the real world,.55 An artist such as Wagner, in other words, suffers from 
52 Nietzsche, F. Der Fall Wagner, p. 4. 
53 Ridley, Aaron. 'What is the meaning of ascetic ideals?', p. 144. In a more expanded passage, 
Ridley describes Nietzsche's understanding of the 'artist of the soul' in terms of the latter's notion of 
beauty: 'Beauty is a state of soul: it is the result of going to work on oneself, of interpreting oneself, of 
exercising upon oneself that artist's violence to which Nietzsche is so attached. It is a matter of 
resisting the seduction to ressentiment' (p. 140). I could spend a great deal more time on this idea of an 
artist of the soul, but because my concern is more nearly with its impact upon artists proper such as 
Wagner, I will simply refer the reader to Alexander Nehamas's essay "'How One Becomes What One 
Is'" and passages in Julian Young's book Nietzsche's Philosophy of Art, where he deals with 
Nietzsche's project of self-creation (see in particular pp 29-30). 
54 Nietzsche, F. On the Genealogy of Moral!>~ p. 77. 
55 Ridley, Aaron. 'What is the meaning of ascetic ideals?', p. 130. 
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ressentiment as regards his 'true' nature (as false), and as a consequence attempts to 
become 'relevant' by intervening in the real world. However, because of his false 
nature, he can only do so as a '[valet] to some ethics or philosophy or religion'. 56 
Such an attempt is counter-exemplary, an example of what not to do: a 'denial of the 
self, a crossing-out of the self on the part of an artist' .57 
If this, therefore, is the official version of the aesthetics at work in On the Genealogy 
of Morals, it is up to the unofficial version to explain the effect of artists' counter-
exemplarity upon the exemplarity of works of art. In this version, works of art are 
symptoms. In the case of Wagner, Parsifal is a symptom of his disease, his 
decadence. In the case of an artist of the soul, any works of art that he leaves behind 
are no more than the symptoms of his overfulness, and should not be confused with 
that overfulness itself. As an example of the latter, Ridley takes up the case of On the 
Genealogy of Morals itself, and argues that it cannot be taken as an exemplary work 
by an artist of the soul, because such a move would amount to 'a kind of reverse 
velleity', whereby an artist of the soul would try to project his self-artistry in such a 
way that it could have a direct impact outside himself. 58 The way for the artist of the 
soul to avert this velleity, and thus to overcome ressentiment, is to insist that his only 
material is himself, his own soul. In such a case 'the "typical velleity" of the artist is 
ruled out in advance': 
'for when an artist's material is himself, and his work is free of 
ressentiment, the artist/man opposition from which the velleity springs is 
abolished. There is no longer the space across which it would be 
intelligible for the artist-man to yearn "actually to be" [i.e. to overcome 
his nature as false]. This has the effect of suggesting that the problem 
with artists proper is really their insistence upon creating works of art 
which are separable from themselves,.59 
This does not mean, however, that there is no interest in considering these works of 
art which are separable from their creators. Quite the contrary, the fact that they are 
56 Nietzsche, F. On the Genealogy of Morals, p. 81. 
57 Ibid., p. 79. 
58 Ridley, Aaron. 'What is the meaning of ascetic ideals?', p. 144. 
59 Ibid, pp 135-36. 
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separable may make them all the more worthy of examination, because such works 
readily expose themselves to the very question which motivates us: whether we take 
them seriously. According to Nietzsche, 'one does well to separate the artist from his 
work, which should be taken more seriously than he is' .60 We listen intently to 
Parsifal-yes, even the much-maligned Parsifal-because in it there is the possibility 
that we hear an artist's 'secret superior laughter at himself, the triumph of his 
achievement of the ultimate, highest artistic freedom, artistic transcendence' .61 Such 
laughter would be a 'laugh not of self-rejection but of self-acceptance', 'the laugh of a 
good conscience from which the specter of ressentiment is, even if only for the 
moment, absent' .62 Nevertheless, it is only to the extent that works of art are exposed 
to the question of whether they really should be taken seriously, and open to the 
possibility of their being a joke, that the enjoyment of such shared laughter, such 
'overfulness', becomes possible. And it becomes possible precisely because of the 
counter-exemplarity of the artist, of his crossing himself out in favour of the work he 
leaves behind. In fact, the image that Nietzsche conjures up for this obliteration is 
perhaps one of the most common metaphors for self-negation and self-sacrifice: 
motherhood. 
'The poet and creator of the Parsifal is not spared a deep, fundamental, 
even frightening growth and descent into medieval contrasts of the soul, a 
hostile remoteness from all elevation, strictness, and discipline of the 
spirit, a kind of intellectual perversity (if you will pardon the expression), 
just as a woman with child is not spared the repulsive and strange aspects 
of pregnancy: which, as I said, must be forgotten before the child can be 
enjoyed' .63 
It is only if an artist submits to such self-sacrifice, such counter-exemplary self-
abnegation--as is supposedly undertaken by mothers-that we can subsequently 
laugh at the antics of the work of art, and enjoy with others the 'overfulness' that we 
are meant to strive for as artists of the soul. 
60 Nietzsche, F. On the Genealogy of Morals, p. 80. 
61 Ibid., p. 79. 
62 Ridley, Aaron. 'What is the meaning of ascetic ideals?', p. 130. 
63 Nietzsche, F. On the Genealogy of Morals, p. 80. 
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All people are created artists 
In conclusion, we might note that an important shift occurs in what Ridley dubs the 
'unofficial' aesthetic of On the Genealogy of Morals: Being an artist ceases to be the 
preserve of a restricted set of people trained to work in one of various media, and 
expands to potentially embrace anyone who devotes himself diligently to his own 
self-creation. Now, this may seem an invitation to conceptual chaos, but in fact, 
because of his rather elitist views on human nature-in terms of the weak and strong, 
decadent and healthy, with the latter very much in the minority-Nietzsche never 
imagines that just anyone can declare himself an artist of the soul. However, if one is 
disinclined to such elitism, one cannot help but wonder whether the counter-
exemplarity of conventional artists-their mistake in creating works separate from 
themselves-does not presage precisely the condition in which all people would be 
artists. 
In his own way, Adorno also approaches this idea. His notion of the alienation of the 
work from the artist constitutes itself in view of the relation between works of art and 
society. He is, as we noted in the previous chapter, suspicious of any exemplarity of 
the work of art, which would place the work somehow above or outside of society, 
and for this reason he imagines works' exceptional exemplarity as being found more 
nearly in the absence of works of art, than in any form they might take. However, by 
identifying the exemplarity of works of art with their impossibility, he begs the 
question of where this leaves artists. Common sense would say that they would 
disappear with works of art, and yet if we think about how works of art might 
disappear, we realise that their disappearance actually exposes a whole new set of 
counter-exemplary creators. That is, their disappearance puts us in the position of 
being the counter-exemplary creators of a society without works, a society whose 
only products would be those extremes traced by the crisis of semblance, fantastical 
kitsch and mere things. As such, asking whether we take such artists seriously would 
be also to ask whether we take seriously our role in the construction of 
instrurnentalised society, and as such could be the essential first step toward 
overcoming it. 
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Conclusion 
So why would a philosopher take an artist seriously? As we now can say, there are a 
variety of reasons why he would. He might, like Adorno, be concerned with the 
predominance of instrumental reason in our modern ways of living and see in an 
artist's activity some hope of resistance to these conditions. Or he might, like 
Nietzsche, dream of a future national unity that could soar to higher and higher 
achievement on the wings of a tragic heroic artist. Or he might, like Heidegger, hear 
in the word of an artist, the song of a blind poet able to name 'the gods and [name] all 
things for what they are'.1 Whatever his aspiration, a philosopher's gesture toward an 
artist implies his engagement with the world; it is the philosophical claim that our 
relation to the world is itself significant, is itself serious. 
Now this may seem self-evident, and yet it is this very self-evidence that these 
philosophers are trying to probe in their recourse to artists. Very much like Descartes 
troubled by whether his existence is a dream, these philosophers worry that the very 
self-evidence of existence masks a fundamental constructedness: namely, that we are 
thrown into a preformed existence that dooms us to never being anything more than 
spectators of our lives in the manner of an audience to a shadow play. In this 
existential dilemma, the artist, at the very least, offers the hope that we can grasp this 
constructedness, and thus, playa role in its unfolding. 
Just the same, even if an artist can offer this hope, he cannot offer sure indications as 
to what our role in the world might indeed be. Politically speaking, this is reflected in 
the disturbing ambivalence these philosophers exhibit with regard to traditional 
political distinctions. It is straightforward to denounce Heidegger's Nazism, but less 
apparent how one should react to the resonance one finds between his work and that 
of Adorno. For his part, Adorno aligns himself with the thinkers of the left, and yet 
the left itself is hesitant to embrace him. As for Nietzsche, he is perhaps the paradigm 
of political ambiguity. At various times, he has been the philosophical poster child of 
both right and left, fascists and socialists alike. And the reason this can happen is 
because in turning to an artist as his model, Nietzsche turn his back upon the 
I Heidegger, Martin. 'Holderlin and the Essence of Poetry' , p. 464. 
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establishment of party positions in favour of the creation of future possibilities. As 
Nietzsche puts it, speaking for 'good Europeans': 
'We "conserve" nothing; neither do we want to return to any past periods; 
we are not by any means "liberal"; we do not work for "progress"; we do 
not need to plug up our ears against the sirens who in the market place 
sing of the future: their song about "equal rights", a "free society", "no 
more masters and no servants" has no allure for us. We simply do not 
consider it desirable that a realm of justice and concord should be 
established on earth (because it would certainly be the realm of the 
deepest leveling and chinoiserie)'2 
Such openness to political possibility is also exposure to those who would try to 
harness political potential for their own ends; it is philosophy's inability to defend 
itself against those who see politics as a means. A philosophy of future possibility 
cannot judge the latter's ends, because to do so would be for it to assess the 
consequences of such ends, and thus in its turn, to treat politics as means. 
As such, philosophy's engagement with the world on the model of the artist must 
acknowledge the paradox of commitment as it is identified by Adorno: 
'Commitment as such, even if politically intended, remains politically 
ambiguous as long as it does not reduce itself to propaganda, the obliging 
shape of which mocks any commitment on the part of the subject'. 3 
Commitment requires that philosophy avoid becoming a simple mouthpiece for 
existing political positions, and yet only if it exposes itself to the judgement of these 
positions can it claim any commitment at all. Only if philosophy is willing to place 
its own seriousness in the balance, and to take the risk that it will not be taken 
seriously, can it claim any relevance and urgency for its engagement in the world. As 
such, the question of the seriousness of artists echoes doubly for philosophy. Not 
only does it model the seriousness of philosophy itself, it also reflects the limitedness 
2 Nietzsche, Friedrich. Gay Science, p. 338. 
3 Adorno, T.W. 'Commitment', p. 77. 
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of such seriousness, its presuppositions about the nature of the world. That is, 
philosophy's engagement with the world on the model of art is its engagement with 
the world as a work of art, as if the world itself were something that could be grasped 
in its entirety. As Adorno puts it in a passage cited earlier: 
'As a corrective to the total rule of method, philosophy contains a playful 
element which the traditional view of it as a science would like to 
exorcise ... The un-naive thinker knows how far he remains from the object 
of his thinking, and yet he must always talk as ifhe had it entirely. This 
brings him to the point of clowning. He cannot deny his clownish traits, 
least of all since they alone can give him hope for what is denied him. 
Philosophy is the most serious of things, but then again it is not all that 
serious,.4 
In this light, philosophy's limitation-a limitation whose exposure threatens to mock 
philosophy's pretence with regard to the world-would be structural. Philosophy will 
think of the world as if it were an autonomous entity, because only on this basis can it 
presume to say anything about it at all. 
As such, when Adorno reiterates his 'statement that it is barbaric to continue to write 
poetry after Auschwitz', 5 he is only saying something about commitment to the extent 
that he himself is committing himself to a vision of the world as post-Auschwitzean. 
Only to the extent that he performs commitment, that he sees himself able to grasp the 
world as a whole and to name what is at stake in it, does he have any hope that a 
philosophical gesture, that 'determinate negation', can make a difference. 
Moreover, the naming of Auschwitz negatively parallels what happens in the 
identification of Schonberg as the dialectical composer, or Heidegger's claim that 
Holderlin founds the Dasein ofthe German people, or Nietzsche's lament that one 
must first be a Wagnerian. They all simultaneously state and perform the claim that 
the world can be modelled, that there is a way it ought to be. They state it to the 
extent that they offer at least negative indications as to how the world should be-
4 Adorno, T.W. Negative Dialectics, p. 14. 
5 Ibid., p. 87. 
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how it should not be dominated by instrumental reason, how it should eschew the 
prevalence of technology, how it should not be decadent. They perform it to the 
extent that the respective investigations model themselves on the activity of the artists 
they reclaim-to the extent that they embrace the compositional, rhetorical and 
theatrical qualities of the language of philosophy itself. However, in making such 
claims, they all expose themselves to a dual critique: one that would attack the 
statement and deny its vision (even if negative) of the world-that would deny that 
the world is indeed post-Auschwitzean, for instance-and another that would question 
the performance and dismiss the artistic pretensions of these philosophers as that of 
artists manques. 
We have tried to avoid approaching these philosophers in either of these fashions. 
Even though it is implicit in the notion of a 'serious world' , as it is developed in the 
first part, that we could indeed question how plausible-and particularly how 
desirable-their future visions are, the goal of our examination was more nearly to 
suggest that this sort of critique fails to offer better alternatives for our thinking about 
the world. We have wanted to argue that the notion of a serious world is so persistent 
precisely because it is the challenge posed by taking the world seriously, by believing 
there is something at stake in our relation to it. Certainly, we can deny or remain 
indifferent to such a challenge, but this does not so much counter the demand for 
engagement as ignore it. 
As for questioning the performance of these philosophers: By taking up the issue of 
exemplarity, we have wanted to go beyond a simple rejection of the model of art as 
inappropriate, because such a rejection-very often the claim of philosophy's 
scientific nature-does not live up to the complexity of art's model. For one thing, it 
does not acknowledge the degree to which the exemplarity of the artist is also a 
counter-exemplarity-an example of what not to d()-and it fails in this 
acknowledgement because it undertakes precisely the same strategy that Philippe 
Lacoue-Labarthe accuses Plato of: namely, of performing a 'reflection trick', by 
means of which it speaks 'of the producing "subject" (of the producer) in terms of the 
product,.6 Those who would denounce the philosophy of a Nietzsche or Heidegger 
6 Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe. 'Typography', p. 90. 
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as literature rather than philosophy fail to see precisely to what degree these two 
thinkers grappled with the fact that their writings could not and should not be works 
of art. As such and additionally, those who would denounce art's model are being 
deaf to the challenge presented by exemplary works of art. What the latter reminds 
philosophers is that they too create works and as such are indeed authors of a sort. In 
fact, philosophy cannot even reclaim its scientific character without setting language 
and rhetoric in motion, and thus can never escape from its own voice. In this light, 
the work of art is less a standard that philosophers could be said to have fallen short of 
in their productions than a warning that they can only maintain their claim to 
scientific rigour at the cost of constant vigilance as regards their philosophical voice. 
Why a philosopher would take an artist seriously, then, is more nearly a question that 
is significant in its posing than in the answers it yields. When philosophy is willing to 
admit its kinship with art, that is the moment where it is willing to risk its seriousness 
in order to say something about the world. Only when philosophy itself asks us to 
take it seriously in the way that it takes art seriously, is it potentially able to address 
problems that concern us all. 
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